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The Supreme Court's Miranda decision rested upon the unverified assumptions that suspects
who received the now-famous warnings not only would possess information ensuring that
subsequent waivers were "knowing and intelligent," but also would possess the tools necessary to
resist the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation, thus ensuring that confessions were
"voluntary." The flaws in these assumptions are exposed when they are applied to mentally
retarded people The authors of this Article tested a sample of mentally retarded individuals to
determine if they could understand the Miranda warnings, then compared these results to those
obtained for a control group of nondisabled people. The results show that in contrast to the
nondisabled controls mentally retarded people simply do not understand the warnings. They do
not understand the context in which interrogation occurs, the legal consequences of confessing, the
meaning of the sentences comprising the warnings, or even the warnings' individual words. For
mentally retarded peoplk the Miranda warnings are words without meaning.
I. RIGHTS, WARNINGS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURES
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t Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory University.
tt Associate Professor of Law, Emory University.
tit Attorney, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice. The views expressed
in this article are those of the authors and not of the Department of Justice.
tttt Assistant District Attorney, New York City.
We thank Thomas K. Clancy, Thomas Y. Davies, John J. Donohue III, Donald A.
Dripps, Yale Kamisar, Marc L. Miller, Thomas D. Morgan, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Christopher
Slobogin, George C. Thomas III, and the participants in faculty seminars at the University of
Tennessee School of Law and Emory University School of Law for helpful comments. We are
grateful to the Atlanta Alliance on Developmental Disabilities, Resources and Residential
Alternatives, the Developmental Disabilities Department of the Marcus Jewish Community
Center, and Annandale Village for helping us solicit volunteers for this project. Of course, we
greatly appreciate the help of the volunteers themselves. We also thank Ellen Y. Chung and
Christopher Bly for excellent research assistance.
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
2 530 US 428, 438 (2000) ("Miranda is a constitutional decision."). See Yale Kamisar,
Symposium: Foreworc From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to ... , 99 Mich L Rev 879,887-88
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Miranda announced a constitutional rule and not merely an
evidentiary rule that Congress could overrule. This decision ensures
that Miranda will remain the centerpiece of the constitutional debate
about the rules governing interrogations and confessions-and this is
a debate that will continue. Dickerson may have resolved the issue of
Miranda's constitutional status, but it did not resolve other intractable
problems that flow from the Miranda opinion.
Among the most troubling of Miranda's failures is its inability to
ensure the constitutional validity of confessions obtained from
mentally retarded suspects. Indeed, imposing Miranda on this
population exposes the opinion's most fundamental theoretical
deficiencies.
Miranda's critics have spent the past three decades attacking its
practical effects, 5 but the opinion may be most vulnerable on a
theoretical level. The Miranda opinion rests upon a series of
interrelated assumptions and holdings. 6 Its most famous holding-that
the now well-known warnings (or some equivalent mechanism) must
be used to overcome the compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogation-is justified by the unverified assumption that the
warnings actually work. The Miranda Court assumed, without offering
& n 33 (2001) (expressing surprise at Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dickerson).
3 Among the surprises was the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist and other justices who
joined in the Dickerson majority had written earlier opinions that criticized Miranda, a fact
noted by the two dissenting justices. See Dickerson, 530 US at 445 (Scalia dissenting).
4 See, for example, Symposium: Miranda after Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law,
99 Mich L Rev 879 (2001).
5 The most obvious example is the ongoing debate about Miranda's impact on law
enforcement. The commentary on this issue is too voluminous to be cited here. but even the
direct debate between only two of the commentators on this issue is illuminating. See Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw U L Rev 387, 390 (1996)
(arguing that Miranda "has significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in this country");
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect. Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small
Social Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 500, 501 (1996) (refuting Cassell's claim that Miranda undermines
prosecutions); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders,
90 Nw U L Rev 1084 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw U L
Rev 278 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement. Some
Skeptical Observations, 20 Harv J L & Pub Pol 327 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing
Miranda Is Unjustified-and Harmful, 20 Harv J L & Pub Pol 347 (1997).
6 The first assumption-that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive-is
unremarkable and should be uncontroversial. Except for the small class of suspects who come
forward to confess voluntarily, an essential purpose of custodial interrogation is to pressure
recalcitrant suspects to confess. A second assumption, on the other hand, has provoked
controversy for more than a third of a century. It posits that even interrogation tactics that would
not have violated pre-Miranda "voluntariness" standards can generate pressure sufficient to
violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination. For commentary
placing a different emphasis upon these issues, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U Chi L Rev 435,436 (1987) (emphasizing the first assumption); Kamisar, 99 Mich L
Rev at 880 n 3 (cited in note 2) (same).
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any supporting evidence,7 that the warnings constituted "fully effective
means ... to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to ...
exercise it."8
This assumption is central to any claim that the warnings preserve
the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. If
the warnings do not work, then the opinion's entire construct is just an
elaborate sleight of hand, a device for facilitating confessions
disguised as a vehicle for guarding constitutional rights.9 This is
possible because Miranda also made it easy to relinquish those rights.
The opinion's second critical holding selected a mechanism for
allowing people to surrender their rights. The Miranda opinion
imported the constitutional waiver, test into Fifth Amendment
doctrine, concluding that anyone can give up her Miranda "rights" by
executing a waiver that is "made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently."10
In recent years, many commentators have recognized that the
waiver standard has not proven to be a significant impediment to
police interrogators. Statistical analyses conducted by Miranda's critics
and supporters indicate that waivers are secured in an overwhelming
majority of custodial interrogations1' and that these waivers are rarely
invalidated by reviewing courts. Once the warnings are given, "courts
find waiver in almost every case. Miranda waiver is extraordinarily
7 See notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
8 Miranda, 384 US at 444.
9 It is now widely recognized that when the police follow Miranda's procedural
instructions by administering the warnings and obtaining a waiver, Miranda serves as a license,
rather than an impediment, to secure usable confessions. See, for example, Dickerson, 530 US at
444, quoting Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420,433 n 20 (1984) ("Cases in which a defendant can
make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact
that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.'); Richard A.
Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 Mich L Rev 1000,
1012,1017-21 (2001) (detailing methods employed by police to use loopholes and ambiguities of
Miranda in securing confessions); William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 Mich L Rev 975, 988
(2001) (noting that courts may tolerate more coercion because the burden is on defendants who
have waived their rights to show they did not understand the warnings).
10 Miranda, 384 US at 444. This is an application of the well-known standard for waivers of
constitutional rights, specifically the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, enunciated in Johnson v
Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.").
11 Two leading studies suggest that approximately 75-80 percent of suspects execute
Miranda waivers. See Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L Rev 839, 850-51, 859-60 (1996) (noting
that a survey of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office in 1994 found that 83.7 percent
of suspects waived their Miranda rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J
Crim L & Criminol 266, 271, 275 (noting that according to data gathered in observations of
interrogations by the Laconia Police Department, 74.73 percent of suspects waived their
Miranda rights).
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easy to show-basically that the suspect answered police questions
after saying that he understood the warnings.
1 2
Commentators have rarely noted, however, how these practical
effects are the product of Miranda's theoretical manipulation of the
waiver test. As applied in the interrogation setting, the waiver test
has two dimensions. One requires that the waiver must be voluntary-
a "free and deliberate choice" - and not compelled by government
pressure. The other directs that a waiver is knowing and intelligent if
the person comprehends the nature of the right and the consequences
of abandoning it.
4
Miranda relied upon the warnings to satisfy both elements, and in
the process blurred the distinction between the "knowing and
intelligent" and "voluntariness" prongs of the waiver test. Once again,
the opinion rested upon the unverified assumption that the warnings
were effective. The Court assumed that a suspect who received the
warnings not only would possess information that would ensure that a
subsequent waiver was "knowing and intelligent," but also would
possess the tools necessary to counteract the pressures inherent in
custodial interrogation and thus ensure that a confession was
"voluntary" and not compelled." The most significant and
questionable theoretical innovation of the opinion was not requiring
the police to administer warnings; it was using the warnings as a
device for conflating the two distinct elements of the waiver test. 
6
12 George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due
Process Notice Cases, 99 Mich L Rev 1081,1082 (2001).
13 Rather than focus upon the Court's use of knowledge as a surrogate for voluntariness in
the waiver analysis, commentators have tended to be more concerned with how well the
warnings actually "work" and their impact-or lack of it-on law enforcement. This has been
true since the earliest scholarly critiques of Miranda. See, for example, Otis H. Stephens, The
Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt 170-71 (Tennessee 1973) (interpreting the well-known
"Yale study," which was conducted only months after the Miranda decision, and concluding that
"[m]ere warnings, often given reluctantly by the very officers intent on questioning suspected
criminals, hardly ensured understanding, not to mention intelligent exercise, of constitutional
rights." The critique did not address the more theoretical question of the relationship between
knowledge and voluntariness.).
In more recent commentary, George Thomas has come as close as anyone at identifying the
significance of the relationship between the two prongs of the waiver test in the world of
Miranda. But his focus is upon the differences between the warnings as a bulwark against
compulsion and the warning as a source of due-process-style notice, and not upon the merging of
the two concepts. See Thomas, 99 Mich L Rev at 1081-1120 (cited in note 12).
14 Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412,421 (1986).
15 Professor Schulhofer has argued persuasively that the post-Miranda case law has
improperly interpreted compulsion to mean involuntariness. Although this development further
weakens the waiver test, it is beyond the scope of the present Article. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 Mich L
Rev 941,943-50 (2001).
16 Nor should the practical significance of the waiver test in the Miranda construct be
underestimated. Once a waiver is secured, Miranda's direct impact on interrogations is limited to
requiring police to stop questioning once a suspect unequivocally invokes one or more of his
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The flaws in this innovation are exposed when we apply it to the
group most vulnerable to standard interrogation techniques: mentally
retarded suspects.' 7 Miranda conceptualized suspects as rational
decision makers who possessed the cognitive tools necessary to
implement the warnings.'8 The Court assumed that suspects would
understand both the meaning and the legal significance of the
warnings. Unless a suspect understands the warnings, they are but
meaningless sounds. And no group is less likely to understand the
warnings than is the large minority of suspects who are mentally
retarded.
The empirical study presented in this paper confirms what many
have suspected: mental retardation makes some people incapable of
understanding either the text of the Miranda rights'9 or the
consequences of forsaking them.2 For these people, the words of the
warnings literally have no useful meaning. The harsh reality is that for
mentally retarded suspects, the Miranda warnings cannot serve the
instrumental functions for which they are intended-ensuring that
confessions are the product of knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waivers of the right to remain silent, and not the result of the
21
pressures inherent in custodial interrogation.
rights. See, for example, Michigan v Moseley, 423 US 96, 100-01 (1977) ("'Once warnings have
been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease."'), quoting Miranda, 384 US at 473-74; Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-85 (1981)
("[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
him."). See also Kamisar, 99 Mich L Rev at 890 n 49 (cited in note 2) (citing various
commentators critical of Miranda for leaving post-waiver interrogation techniques unregulated).
17 Even Miranda's most relentless critics recognize that it creates special problems for
mentally retarded suspects. See, for example, Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme
Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 Mich L Rev 898, 939 (2001) (noting the problem of false
confessions by mentally retarded suspects).
18 One of the theoretically intriguing attributes of the opinion is that its conceptualization
of the suspect and his relationship to society can be placed within various philosophical
traditions. From one perspective, the opinion treats the suspect as a utilitarian decisionmaker
expected to balance costs and benefits. On the other hand, the opinion also appears to embrace a
Kantian notion of rationality. See, for example, Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modem Society 82
(Cambridge 1979):
First of all, rationality requires that man be treated as a rational subject, in Kant's
formulation as an end, and not only as a means. And in political terms this means that the
modem state must recognize the rights of the autonomous individual. . . .Secondly,
rationality, even in its formal Kantian definition, requires that the state be ruled by law...,
and not by arbitrary caprice; and that the law treat all alike.
But see Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 673,738-44 (1992) (arguing
that Miranda actually imposed a group rather than an individualist conception of rights).
19 The Miranda warnings "have come to be known colloquially as 'Miranda rights'...
Dickerson, 530 US at 435.
20 See Parts II and IV.
21 See Part III.
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Building upon research methods employed in earlier landmark
studies of Miranda and juveniles,2 we tested a sample of mentally
retarded individuals to determine if they could understand the
Miranda warnings and compared the results obtained to those derived
from conducting the same tests with a control group of nondisabled
people. The results obtained for the mentally retarded subjects were
both striking and discouraging.
2 See, for example, Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological
Competence (Plenum 1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal L Rev 1134 (1980); Thomas Grisso and Carolyn Pomicter,
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards and Rights Waiver, 1 L
& Hum Beh 321 (1977).
Other studies have evaluated the understanding of Miranda rights by nondisabled adults.
See, for example, Richard Medalie, et al, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Mich L Rev 1347, 1375-79 (1968) (finding a correlation
between defendants' level of understanding of rights and their invocation of the right to counsel
and the right to silence); Lawrence Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation
of Miranda, 47 Denver L J 1, 14-16 (1970) (finding that, despite warnings, many suspects do not
gain adequate understanding of their rights).
Ours is the most ambitious study to date exploring empirically the understanding of the
Miranda warnings by a large sample of mentally retarded people. Several papers discuss whether
the courts should exempt mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty. See, for example,
David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the
Death Penalty, 24 St Mary's L J 1299, 1304 (1993) (arguing that IQ should not be prima facie
proof of mental retardation when deciding whether to apply the death penalty); David A. Davis,
Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of Florida Law, 65 Fla Bar J 12, 15-16 (Feb 1991)
(arguing that obstacles to such execution should be increased); Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Penry v.
Lynaugh. The Supreme Court Deals a Fatal Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U
Pitt L Rev 699,707-25 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court confused the issues in Penry and
thus erroneously reached the conclusion that it is constitutional to sentence mentally retarded
defendants to death); Juliet L. Ream, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It
Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw U L Rev 89, 129-40 (1990) (proposing
guidelines that consider mental age and capacity to comprehend consequences). However, these
papers contain no empirical evidence on whether mentally retarded people understand either
the criminal justice system or their rights. Two other papers generally discuss the validity of
confessions by the mentally retarded, but again offer no empirical evidence concerning
understanding of the issues by these individuals. See Paul Hourihan, Earl Washington's
Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 Va L Rev 1471, 1491-94 (1995)
(noting that mentally retarded people are (1) more susceptible to coercion, (2) more likely to
confess falsely, and (3) less likely to understand their Miranda rights and the consequences of
waiving them); James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 Geo Wash L Rev 414, 445-52 (1985) (noting that mental retardation increases the likelihood
of being "abnormally susceptible" to coercion and pressure and that therefore retarded
individuals are more likely to give confessions that are not truly voluntary). A brief research
Note employs parts of the Grisso methodology to craft an interesting, but admittedly
preliminary, understanding of the Miranda warning by mentally retarded people. Solomon M.
Fulero and Caroline Everington, Assessing Competency to Waive Miranda Rights in Defendants
with Mental Retardation, 19 L & Hum Beh 533, 541 (1995). Although the Note finds that
retarded subjects lacked understanding, the study contained only a small sample of subjects with
only mild or moderate disability, African-American males severely overrepresented, no
nonretarded control subjects, and no IQ information for the individual subjects. As a result of its
limited scope, the Note could not evaluate the courts' current totality-of-the-circumstances test
for evaluating waiver by disabled suspects or examine the effectiveness of simplified warnings.
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The results indicate that mentally retarded people simply do not
understand the Miranda warnings. Virtually all of the disabled subjects
failed to understand the context in which interrogation occurs, the
legal consequences embedded in the rules or the significance of
confessing, the meaning of the sentences that comprise the warnings,
or even the individual operative words used to construct the warnings.
In contrast, comparably large percentages of the nondisabled control
group did understand the individual words, the complete warnings,
and their legal significance.f
The possibility that some mentally retarded people cannot
comprehend the Miranda warnings has been debated within the
judicial system for some time,24 but the results of this study do more
than confirm these suspicions. The results support two additional
conclusions about the constitutional validity of confessions by
mentally retarded suspects that will be surprising to many and should
be troubling to anyone examining the criminal justice system.
First, the data suggest that the number of people to whom the
Miranda warnings are meaningless is much larger than previously
acknowledged within the criminal justice system. The warnings are
incomprehensible not merely to those suffering the most severe
retardation, as many judicial opinions assume. They also are
incomprehensible to people whose mental retardation is classified as
mild, as well as some people whose "intelligence quotient" (IQ) scores
exceed 70, the number typically used to demarcate mental
retardation.n
Second, the results of this study raise disquieting questions about
the capacity of contemporary constitutional doctrine to accommodate
the special problems accompanying police interrogations of mentally
retarded suspects. When confronted with challenges to the validity of
a mentally retarded suspect's waiver of the Miranda "rights," courts
typically revert to a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to
determine whether the suspect was capable of understanding the
Miranda warnings.Y Courts utilizing a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis typically examine factors including the suspect's IQ, age,
educational level, experience with the criminal justice system, and
history of being "Mirandized" as indicators of a mentally retarded
person's competence to understand the warnings and to execute a
23 See Part IY.B.
24 See notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
25 See Part IV.B.1.
26 See Dickerson, 530 US at 435 (noting that references to the Miranda "rights" are now
common).
27 See Charles C. Marvel, Mental Subnormality of Accused as Affecting Voluntariness or
Admissibility of Confession, 8 ALR 4th 16 (1981) (collecting cases employing these methods).
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
valid waiver.7 We attempted to determine whether these factors
correlate with an understanding of the Miranda warnings by mentally
retarded people. The data derived from the participants in this study
suggest that the "totalities" analysis employed by the courts is
incapable of identifying suspects competent to understand the
Miranda warnings.
Instead, the results of this empirical analysis indicate that the
factor that matters is the presence of retardation, even mild
retardation. Multiple regression analysis demonstrates that variations
in age, education, and experience with the criminal justice system or
the Miranda warnings do not compensate for a mentally retarded
person's inability to comprehend the warnings. If mental retardation is
present, then the disabled person will not understand the warnings,
regardless of the presence of the other factors.
These data indicate that waivers of the Miranda "rights" by this
population are not "knowing" or "intelligent" in any meaningful sense
of those words. Neither the primary device used during custodial
interrogations-the Miranda warnings-nor the traditional "totalities"
analysis is an adequate device for enforcing the constitutional rights of
this population. The results of this study suggest that the words
"knowing and intelligent" have no useful meaning as our courts apply
them to waivers of the Miranda "rights" by mentally retarded suspects.
In fact, the relevant constitutional terminology is meaningless for this
population from at least three different perspectives.
First, the words comprising the Miranda warnings themselves are
"meaningless" in the sense that the object of the warnings-the
mentally retarded suspect-cannot subjectively understand them; the
words are without meaning to him.2 Second, the words used to define
the standards for a constitutionally valid waiver- "knowing,"
"intelligent," and "voluntary" -are "meaningless" in the sense that the
courts frequently apply them to mentally retarded suspects in ways
that contradict the very meaning of these words.'o The results of this
28 See notes 156-57 and accompanying text. See also People v Tackett, 246 Ill App 3d 622,
616 NE2d 691, 693 (1993) (evaluating the totality of the circumstances by looking at the
defendant's mental ability, familiarity with English, age, education, and experience); People v
Racanelli, 132 Ill App 3d 124, 476 NE2d 1179, 1184-85 (1985) (evaluating the totality of
circumstances by looking at the defendant's age, intelligence, experience with the law, and
emotional stability); Fields v State, 402 S2d 46, 48 (Fla App 1981) (allowing suppression of
defendant's statements because of "[t]he circumstances of appellant's interrogation, coupled
with the evidence of his diminished mental capacity").
29 The definitions of "meaning" include: "That which is intended to be or actually is
expressed or indicated; that which a speaker or writer intends to express; the intended sense of
(a person's) words; knowledge, understanding." 9 Oxford English Dictionary 522 (2d ed 1989).
30 Definitions of "meaningless" include "having no assigned function in a language
system." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 720 (10th ed 1997). Another dictionary defines
meaningless as "[w]ithout meaning or signification; devoid of expression; without purpose. Also,
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study suggest that when a judge examines the typical "totalities"
factors and relies upon them in reaching the conclusion that a
mentally retarded suspect's waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege
was "voluntary,' knowing, n and intelligent,"'33  the conclusion is
accurate only if we are willing to manipulate and distort the meaning
of language.
This brings us to yet a third way that words may have no useful
meaning when we are discussing confessions by mentally retarded
suspects. We are referring now to the words of the confessions
themselves. The constitutional test of waivers permits the exclusion of
even truthful and accurate confessions that were the product of
government coercion or that were not "knowing and intelligent." But
confessions by mentally retarded suspects may suffer from an even
more troubling flaw-they may be false.
It now seems beyond legitimate dispute that mentally retarded
suspects are likely to confess falsely (that is, confess to crimes they did
not commit) far more frequently than do suspects of average and
above-average intelligence. Similarly, interrogation tactics generally
believed to be acceptable with most suspects34 are more likely to
produce false confessions from mentally retarded suspects. Given the
proclivity of this population to confess falsely,3' it seems inevitable that
in some number of cases false confessions have led to the conviction
'not meaningful."' 9 Oxford English Dictionary at 523.
31 "Voluntary" has a specialized meaning in Fifth Amendment doctrine. It does not mean
"voluntary" in the sense of "having the power of free choice," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 1324 (10th ed 1997), or "[a]rising from or acting on one's own free will," The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 2002 (3d ed 1992). Instead, it means only
that the confession is not the product of government coercion. See Colorado v Connelly, 479 US
157,167 (1986) ("We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that
a confession is not'voluntary."'). See notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
32 Definitions of "knowing" include: "has knowledge of truths or facts; understanding,
intelligent, instructed, enlightened, well-informed" 8 Oxford English Dictionary 516 (2d ed
1989). Another set of definitions includes "having or reflecting knowledge, information or
intelligence" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 647 (10th ed 1997).
33 As we shall see, the subjects of this study fail to satisfy the core definitions of
"intelligent" relevant to the question of waiver. They fail the conventional notions of "[hiaving
the faculty of understanding; possessing intelligence or intellect; [h]aving a high degree or full
measure of understanding; quick to understand; knowing, sensible, sagacious; [s]howing a high
(or fair) degree of understanding," 7 Oxford English Dictionary 1070 (2d ed 1989); "having or
indicating a high or satisfactory degree of intelligence and mental capacity," Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 608. The data in this study indicate that they also fail to "reveal[ ] or
reflect[ ] good judgment or sound thought." Id. See also American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 938 (3d ed 1992) ("Showing sound judgment and rationality: an intelligent
decision.").
34 See, for example, Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev 105, 118-21 (1997) (examining the
effect of standard interrogation techniques upon both nondisabled and mentally retarded
people).
35 See Hourihan, 81 Va L Rev 1471 (cited in note 22).
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and imprisonment of innocent mentally retarded suspects. Indeed,
cases in which mentally retarded suspects have been convicted, and in
some cases sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit (with
their false confessions serving as critical evidence against them), have
been reported with increasing frequency in recent years.3 This
increased reporting results, at least in part, from concerns about the
execution of mentally retarded people.37 Although cases in which
mentally retarded people are sentenced to death may receive the most
public attention because they force us to confront the most powerful
moral issues, statistically these cases represent only the "tip of the
iceberg" of the theoretical and practical problems raised when the
criminal justice system must cope with mentally retarded suspects and
defendants.n
No one can claim to know with certainty the precise number of
mentally retarded people who are arrested, interrogated, convicted,
and incarcerated each year, 9 but the best available data suggest that at
least forty-five thousand, and perhaps more than two hundred
thousand, mentally retarded people currently are imprisoned in the
United States." Undoubtedly, these people have been arrested. Many,
36 See, for example, Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J Crim L & Criminol 429,485-86 nn 464-74,487 nn 480-81,490-91 nn 512-29
(1998) (discussing specific cases in which mentally retarded suspects confessed falsely and were
convicted).
37 See, for example, Penry v Johnson, 121 S Ct 1910, 1924 (2001) (reversing the death
penalty imposed upon a mentally retarded defendant for the second time). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in McCarver v North Carolina, 121 S Ct 1401 (2001), to address the question of
the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded suspects. North Carolina subsequently
enacted legislation prohibiting such executions, leading the Court to withdraw its grant of
certiorari. See McCarver v North Carolina, 2001 US LEXIS 5345. However, on the same day, the
Court granted certiorari in another case, Atkins v Virginia, 2001 US LEXIS 5356, amended at
2001 US LEXIS 5463, to decide whether the execution of mentally retarded people violates the
Eighth Amendment. Raymond Bonner, Argument Escalates on Executing Retarded, NY Times
A12 (July 23,2001).
38 See, for example, Grisso, Juvenile's Waiver of Rights at 214-16, table A-3 (cited in note
22) (noting that almost 14 percent of defendants officially qualify as mentally retarded, with IQs
below 70, compared to only 1 percent of the general population; more than 30 percent of
criminal defendants have IQs below 80, compared to 19 percent of the general population).
39 See, for example, Mentally Retarded Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 USC § 6000
(a)(1) (1994) (noting congressional finding that in 1993 there were "more than 3,000,000
individuals with developmental disabilities in the United States"), repealed by Pub L No 106-
402, title IV § 401a, 114 Stat 1737 (2000).
40 Mentally retarded suspects comprise somewhere between 2 and 10 percent of the
population of prisoners. See, for example, Arthur L. Bowker, Handle with Care; Dealing with
Offenders Who Are Mentally Retarded, 63 FBI L Enforcement Bull 12, 12 (1994) (giving the
figures as from 5 to 10 percent), citing C.O. McDaniel, Is Normalization the Answer for MROs?,
Corrections Today 184 (1987), and M. Sanntamour, The Offender with Mental Retardation, 66
Prison J 3 (1986); John H. Noble, Jr. and Ronald W. Conley, Toward an Epidemiology of Relevant
Attributes, in Ronald W. Conley, et al, eds, The Criminal Justice System and Mental Retardation
17, 37 (Paul Brooks 1992) (giving reasons for the variance in the estimates). Over two million
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probably most, have been "Mirandized" and interrogated while in
custody. Some have waived their rights and made statements to
investigators. The frequency of these confessions is confirmed by the
seemingly endless stream of reported decisions involving confessions
by defendants of subnormal intelligence,' including a number of the
Supreme Court's confession cases.42
In some of these cases, mentally retarded defendants were
sentenced to die. By some estimates, as many as 20 percent of the
people on death row are mentally retarded,43 and death penalty
opponents contend that at least three dozen mentally retarded people
have been executed in the quarter century since the death penalty was
reinstated." The most disturbing cases are those in which the
prosecution, conviction, and death sentence rest largely upon a
disabled suspect's confession, and that confession is later proven to be
false. The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the Constitution
permits execution of mentally retarded defendants.4 This paper
addresses a related question: whether the Constitution permits a
retarded person to be convicted based upon his confession.
It can be difficult to understand why an innocent person would
confess, particularly to a crime so heinous that it warrants the death
penalty. But if the person subjected to custodial interrogation is
mentally retarded, the possibility that he will confess to a crime he did
not commit should not be surprising.
To explain why mentally retarded suspects are unusually
vulnerable to the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation, Part II
of this Article presents a discussion of the nature of mental
retardation and then examines how this disability affects the capacity
of people to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation. In Part
people are incarcerated in prisons and jails. U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 1999,
Bulletin 1 (Aug 2000), available online at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p99.pdf>
(visited Mar 12,2002).
41 See, for example, Marvel, 8 ALR 4th at 24-60 (cited in note 27) (discussing voluminous
cases in state and federal courts).
42 Several of these cases were decided in the years leading up to Miranda, or soon after it
was decided. See, for example, Sims v Georgia, 389 US 404 (1967) (noting the limited mental
capacity of the accused, who had a third grade education level); Reck v Pate, 367 US 433 (1961)
(involving a mentally retarded youth who was interrogated incommunicado for a week during
which he grev ill and vomited blood); Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568 (1961) (holding that
the accused, who had an IQ of 64, was suggestible and subject to intimidation); Payne vArkansas,
356 US 560 (1958) (involving a "mentally dull" youth, whom the Supreme Court found
"confessed" due to the use of coercion).
43 See notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
44 See Daniel AV. Keyes and William J. Edwards, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty:
Current Status of Exemption Legislation, 1997 Mental & Physical Disability L Rep 687 (1997).
45 See, for example, Hourihan, 81 Va L Rev at 1471 (cited in note 22) (giving an example of
a death sentence based on false conviction).
46 See note 37.
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III, we examine the constitutional standards governing confessions
and the methods commonly used by courts to judge the validity of
confessions by mentally retarded suspects. The discussion focuses
upon Miranda's frequently misunderstood conceptual framework and
explains why the theoretical innovations upon which the opinion rests
ensure that it is likely to be inadequate, perhaps irrelevant, when the
person being interrogated is mentally retarded.
At a minimum, if the Miranda construct of warnings and waiver is
to amount to something more than a "form of words,4 7 the people
warned must have the cognitive capacity to comprehend the rights
described by their interrogators. The empirical study presented in this
Article addresses this issue directly by studying the capacity of a
subject population of mentally retarded individuals to understand the
Miranda warnings and then comparing their performance with the
results obtained from a control group of nondisabled people. Part IV
explains the methodology employed in this study, then presents the
findings.
Given the apparent failure of the current system to cope
effectively with the problems generated by confessions by mentally
retarded suspects, Part V explores other possible methods for dealing
with the theoretical problems this population creates for our present
constitutional doctrine, as well as the practical difficulties they pose
for the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the problem of ensuring
that confessions by mentally retarded suspects are "voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent" is not easily solved. As we discuss in the final
Part of this Article, the difficulty is so great that some may be tempted
to retain the current approach. After all, legal rules that are crafted
with words inevitably fail in some situations. The indeterminacy of
language" and the finite capacity of the human mind to comprehend
information dictate that if a legal system relying upon rules framed
with words is to function, it must accept the inevitability of errors in
some cases" and suboptimal outcomes in others.!
47 Miranda, 384 US at 444 (1966), quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States, 251 US
385,392 (1920):
This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the
constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police
practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to ensure that what was proclaimed in the
Constitution had not become but a "form of words."
48 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 125-29 (Oxford 2d ed 1994) (arguing that linguistic
indeterminacy affects the specific application of general legal rules); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv L Rev 593,607 (1958) (noting that the general words
we use have a "penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor
obviously ruled out").
49 The "harmless error" rule is a classic example. Even errors derogating fundamental
rights are acceptable if they are "harmless" in the context in which they occur. See, for example,
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These rough accommodations may be inevitable, but they must
also have their limits. Just as it is unjust to punish those who transgress
a rule they cannot understand because it is incomprehensible,5' it
seems unjust to require a person to comply with a legal standard when
mental disability prevents her from understanding the rule.52
Ultimately the Article concludes that, of the possible alternatives that
might work to protect the rights of mentally retarded suspects, only
some form of per se rule limiting the use of their confessions is a
viable means of implementing constitutional norms governing waivers
of rights. To understand why we reach this conclusion, it is necessary
to understand the nature of mental retardation and the impact this
disability has on a person's capacity to function in the justice system.
II. MENTALLY RETARDED SUSPECTS, FREE WILL, AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS
A. Mental Retardation
For centuries, Anglo-American law has recognized that some
legal standards of general application cannot be applied to mentally
retarded people. From the Middle Ages until well into the twentieth
century, the English and then the American legal systems labeled
these people as "idiots," "imbeciles," and "feebleminded,"' developed
Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279,295 (1991) (applying the harmless error rule to the admission
of involuntary confessions); Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 (1967) (stating that before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
50 Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision Making in Law and in Life 100-02 (Oxford 1991) (arguing that, since rules are afflicted
by the indeterminacy of language, in some cases strict rule application produces suboptimal
results).
51 Enforcing a rule that is so vague that it cedes excessive discretion to law enforcers, or
that it cannot be understood by a reasonable, average person, violates fundamental notions of
due process. See, for example, City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 57-60 (1999) (holding that
Chicago's gang loitering ordinance was overly vague and gave police officers too much
discretion); Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 361 (1983) (holding that a loitering statute was
unconstitutional because it contained a vague standard that could lead to arbitrary
enforcement); City of Jacksonville v Papachristou, 405 US 156,162 (1972) (holding a statute void
for vagueness because it did not give fair notice of forbidden activity and encouraged arbitrary
arrest by police).
52 See note 54 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of mentally retarded people
by medieval English law).
53 See, for example, Issac Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 227
(Harvard 1st ed 1883) (1962 reprint) ("Idiocy, imbecility, and senile dementia admit neither of
cure nor amelioration."); Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy- The Old Law and Its Incubus, 18 U Chi
L Rev 361, 361-62 (1951) (distinguishing between lunatics and idiots, and describing idiots as
having been born "mentally deficient or disturbed"); Frank C. Richmond, The Criminal
Feebleminded, 21 J Crim L & Criminol 537, 540-42 (1931) (providing classifications of the
"feeble-minded"); Henry Herbert Goddard, The Criminal Imbecile: An Analysis of Three
Remarkable Murder Cases (MacMillan 1915) (comparing the mental attributes of three
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"tests" to distinguish "idiots" from "normal" people,"' and held "idiots"
to different legal standards from those imposed on others.5
Today the mental health and legal professions label these people
as "mentally retarded" or "developmentally disabled.""' In this paper,
we generally use the term "mentally retarded" because it is "the
accepted term in modern usage"' 7 in the legal system. Although the
contemporary labels may be more benign than the earlier use of
"idiots" and "imbeciles," the reality of the incapacities that burden
these people remains the same. Their cognitive and social limitations
make mentally retarded people more vulnerable to a wide range of
dangers, including confessing to crimes they have not committed. ' The
results of this study confirm what has long been suspected: the rules
announced in Miranda simply are inadequate to counteract these
profound cognitive and social limitations.
"imbecile" murder defendants); Henry Herbert Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and
Consequences (MacMillan 1914) (providing case studies and heredity charts of "morons" and the
"feeble-minded"); Walter Elmore Fernald, The Imbecile with Criminal Instincts, 14 J Psycho-
Asthenics 16 (1909) (comparing the definitions of nineteen "imbecile" defendants), reprinted in
Marvin Rosen, et al, eds, 2 The History of Mental Retardation: Collected Papers 165-84
(University Park 1976); Anthony Highmore, A Treatise on the Law of Idiocy and Lunacy 195 (J.
Butterworth 1807) (distinguishing between idiocy and lunacy), reprinted in Classics of English
Legal Theory (Garland 1979).
54 See, for example, S. Sheldon Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 128 (Little,
Brown 1925), quoting A. Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (1534) (describing the "twenty pence" test
that could be traced back to the Middle Ages):
[An idiot is] a person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his
father or mother, nor how old he is, etc., so as it may appear he hath no understanding of
reason what shall be for his profit, or what for his loss. But if he have such understanding
that he know and understand his letters, and do read by teaching of another man, then it
seems he is not a sot or natural fool.
55 Id.
56 See, for example, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed text rev 2000) ("DSM-IV-TR").
57 Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 421 n 38 (cited in note 22). See, for example,
Penry v Johnson, 532 US 782 (2001); Olmstead v L.C., 527 US 581 (1999); Heller v Doe, 509 US
312 (1993). The other term used today, "developmentally disabled," has the additional drawback
of being less precise. It encompasses various conditions, only one of which is mental retardation.
See Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 421 n 38, citing Mentally Retarded Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 USC §§ 6000-81, repealed by Pub L No 106-402, title IV § 401a, 114
Stat 1737.
58 See notes 22,36 and accompanying text. See also Herbert J. Grossman, ed, Classification
in Mental Retardation 1,11 (American Association of Mental Deficiency 3d ed 1983) ("AAMD")
("Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting
in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
development period."). This definition was accepted by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v
Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 443 (1985). For additional definitions, see also AAMD
at 11 (definition encompasses not only the IQ test measure of cognitive functioning, but also
limits of adaptive behavior that are "significant limitations in an individual's effectiveness in
meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social
responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by
clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales").
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It now seems beyond reasonable dispute that "[t]he increased
vulnerability of a mentally disabled suspect, and his or her naivet6,
ignorance, confusion, suggestibility, delusional beliefs, extraordinary
susceptibility to pressure, and similar considerations may make it
possible for law enforcement officers to induce an involuntary
statement by using techniques that would be acceptable in cases
involving mentally typical suspects."59 This results from the nature of
mental retardation.
Mental retardation is defined as significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations
in adaptive functioning and an onset during the early developmental
period.6' General intellectual functioning is measured by IQ, with
"significantly subaverage" (the standard for mental retardation) set at
an IQ of 70 or below.
6'
"Limitations in adaptive functioning" refers to a disabled
person's reduced ability to interact and communicate with others and
to live independently and responsibly.6'  Onset during early
development means that the individual exhibits both subaverage
intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior before the
age of eighteen.6' Mental retardation is different from mental illness,
although a person may exhibit both conditions.m
People with mental retardation are not a homogenous group.
They vary enormously in aptitude, personality, achievement, and
temperament. However, they generally are classified according to the
severity or degree of their disabilities. Because of the difficulty of
testing adaptive functioning, and despite concerns about the accuracy
of IQ testing, ' mental retardation most often is identified by means of
intelligence tests.66 Based upon their IQs, people who are mentally
59 ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-5.8 (Statements by mentally
ill or mentally retarded persons) commentary (1989). See also Bowker, 63 FBI L Enforcement at
12 (cited in note 40).
60 See DSM-IV-TR at 41 (cited in note 56) ("The essential feature of Mental Retardation




64 "Mentally ill people encounter disturbances in their thought process and emotions."
Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 424 (cited in note 22). In contrast, the mentally
retarded have limited abilities to learn. Id. "Many forms of mental illness are temporary, cyclical,
or episodic." Id. In contrast, mental retardation involves a mental impairment that is permanent.
Id. Although the consequences of mental retardation can be ameliorated through education and
habilitation, it has no cure. Id. As a result, an individual with mental retardation will be no better
able to resist coercive interrogation or'to comprehend a waiver form after a few days' rest than
he or she was before. See id.
65 See generally Rumley, 24 St Mary's L J at 1329-41 (cited in note 22) (discussing the
unreliability of IQ tests).
66 Current intelligence tests are designed so that two-thirds of the population will obtain
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retarded are grouped into four categories: mild, moderate, severe, and
profound.
The "highest" classification of mental retardation is "mild," and it
applies to individuals with IQ scores ranging between 50 to 55 and
approximately 70.67 The casual observer often does not notice these
people as being mentally retarded. With appropriate support,
individuals with mild disability can usually live successfully in the
community, either independently or in supervised settings."3
"Moderate" retardation, the second classification, includes people
with IQs ranging between 35 to 40 and 50 to 55. Virtually all mildly
and moderately retarded people have the ability to conform to the
customs, habits, and standards of behavior in society and to do so
independently of direction and guidance.69
The third classification is "severe," which applies to people who
have IQ scores ranging between 20 to 25 and 35 to 40. These people
can conform to daily routines and repetitive activities. Although they
have the capability to learn simple work skills, they are usually
incapable of self-maintenance.
The "lowest" level is "profound" mental retardation, which
describes people who have an IQ below 20 or 25. These individuals
will usually benefit from physical activity, but are incapable of self-
maintenance. t
The distribution of people among these four categories is skewed.
"Approximately eighty-nine percent of the people classified as
an IQ of 85 to 115, the highest 1 percent will obtain a score of 135 or above, and the lowest 1
percent will obtain an IQ of 65 or below. See DSM-IV-TR at 39 (cited in note 56).
67 See, for example, AAMD at 27 (cited in note 58).
68 People with mild disability "typically develop social and communication skills during the
preschool years, [ ] have minimal impairment in sensor motor areas, and often are not
distinguishable from children without Mental Retardation until a later age." DSM-IV-TR at 43
(cited in note 56). "By their late teens, they can acquire academic skills up to approximately the
sixth-grade level." Id. As adults, "they usually achieve social and vocational skills adequate for
minimum self-support, but may need supervision, guidance, and assistance." Id.
69 Most people with moderate disability acquire communication skills during early
childhood years. "They profit from vocational training and, with moderate supervision, can
attend to their personal care." Id. "They can also benefit from training in social and occupational
skills but are unlikely to progress beyond the second-grade level in academic subjects." Id.
"During adolescence, their difficulties in recognizing social conventions may interfere with peer
relationships." Id. As adults, most can "perform unskilled or semiskilled work under supervision."
Id.
70 During the early childhood years, they acquire little communicative speech, although
later "they may learn to talk and can be trained in elementary self-care skills." Id. They profit
little from academic instruction, "but can master skills such as learning sight reading of some
'survival' words." Id. "In their adult years, they may be able to perform simple tasks in closely
supervised settings." Id.
71 "Most individuals with this diagnosis have an identified neurological condition that
accounts for their Mental Retardation." Id at 44.
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mentally retarded fall within the 'mildly retarded' category,"' and
approximately 95 percent of mentally retarded people have the
potential to be economically productive.2 Only about 1 percent of all
mentally retarded persons in the United States qualify as severely or
profoundly disabled.74
Even this brief overview of the nature of retardation identifies
one fundamental difficulty faced by law enforcers, judges, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers dealing with mentally retarded suspects. Because
the great majority of this population suffers from a mild or moderate
disability, it can be hard to identify these people as mentally retarded,
and easy to overestimate their intellectual capacity to understand the
meaning and significance of relatively complex concepts, such as the
Miranda warnings." These difficulties are magnified by a number of
psychological characteristics that members of this population
frequently exhibit.
B. Common Psychological Characteristics Associated with
Mental Retardation
Despite the differences among mentally retarded people, they do
tend to share common and well-known psychological characteristics
that make them especially susceptible to the pressures generated by
contemporary police interrogation methods. The following list of
seven common characteristics illustrates why mentally retarded
people are poorly equipped to cope with the pressures of
interrogation and are predisposed to confess falsely.
First, mentally retarded people are unusually susceptible to the
perceived wishes of authority figures.76 Even when no direct pressure
is exerted on them, they may be inclined to make false statements out
of a desire to please perceived authority figures." A common
72 Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 423 n 49 (cited in note 22), citing American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 40 (3d ed 1980)
("DSM-III"). See also DSM-IV-TR at 41 (cited in note 56).
73 Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 423 n 49 (cited in note 22), citing DSM-III at
40. See also DSM-IV-TR at 43 (cited in note 56).
74 See DSM-IV-TR at 44 (cited in note 56).
75 See, for example, Bowker, FBI L Enforcement Bull at 12 (cited in note 40). See also note
68 and accompanying text.
76 See, for example, Harter, Mental Age, IQ and Motivational Factors in the Discrimination
Learning Set Performance of Normal and Retarded Children, 5 J Experimental Child Psych 123,
137-38 (1967) (finding that mentally retarded individuals seek approval from authority figures
even when it requires giving an answer they know to be incorrect); Carol K. Sigelman, et al,
When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally Retarded Persons, 19 Mental
Retardation 53 (1980) (discussing studies that show mentally disabled individuals are more likely
than nondisabled individuals to answer "yes" and comply with unreasonable instructions).
77 See Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 430 (cited in note 22) ("[S]ome people
with mental retardation will eagerly assume blame in an attempt to please or curry favor with an
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phenomenon is the mental process of "cheating to lose," that is,
accepting blame so that others will not be angry.78 If an authority
figure such as a police officer makes it clear to the individual that he
wants a confession, even an innocent disabled person may confess so a
law enforcement officer will not become angry with him.9
Second, a generalized desire to please may predispose many
mentally retarded people to give biased responses.8 They tend to give
affirmative answers to questions inquiring about behaviors they
believe are desirable. Conversely, mentally retarded people are likely
to answer negatively questions involving conduct they believe is
disfavored. As a result, a disabled individual may give an incorrect
response to a question if he believes that this is the answer that an
authority figure like a police officer seeks.
Third, mentally retarded people often are unable to discern when
they are in an adversarial situation, especially with police officers. '
Often they have been taught that a police officer is someone to trust,
someone who will provide help. It may be impossible for the retarded
person to understand that a police officer assisting a person in need
plays a different role from one who is interrogating suspects. The
susceptibility of this population to threats and coercion is significant,
but their inability to cope with a complex social event such as
custodial interrogation also is influenced by their vulnerability to an
outward display of friendliness that is designed to induce confidence
and cooperation.n Mentally retarded people may have difficulty
distinguishing between the fact and the appearance of friendliness,
making them particularly vulnerable to subtle and nonphysical
intimidation and coercion.'
Fourth, people with mental retardation tend to have incomplete
or immature concepts of blameworthiness and culpability. A disabled
person may be unable to distinguish between an incident that results
from culpable behavior and an incident that results from a situation
accuser. This phenomenon of 'cheating to lose' may give rise to unfounded confessions.").
78 Id.
79 See Fred E. Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (Williams & Wilkins 3d
ed 1986).
80 See Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 428 (cited in note 22) ("For example,
many people with mental retardation are predisposed to 'biased responding."').
81 See, for example, Ellis and Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 451 (cited in note 22),
citing President's Panel on Mental Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law 33 (1963)
(noting that the retarded tend toward submissiveness in the face of police pressures); H.R.
Turnbull, ed, Consent Handbook 11 (American Association on Mental Deficiency 1977) (noting
the possibility that a mentally retarded person might be more vulnerable to police pressures for
a variety of reasons).




that is beyond the person's control. - A mentally retarded individual
may confess to a crime that he did not commit because he believes
that blame should be assigned to someone, and he is unable to
understand the concept of causation and his role in the incident.
Fifth, mentally retarded people often appear to be impulsive or to
have poor impulse control. This characteristic appears to be related
to problems involving attention span, focus, and selectivity in the
attention process. Deficits in attention or impulse control may cause
mentally retarded people to answer a question without giving any
consideration to the consequences.
Sixth, some retarded people have inaccurate views of their own
capacities. It is not uncommon for disabled people to overrate their
skills. This tendency may influence their estimates of their academic
achievement, physical skills, and intellectual level. It occurs either
because of a genuine misconception of their own abilities or because
of defensiveness about the disability. A disabled person may feel
compelled to answer a question, even if the question exceeds his
ability to answer.
Finally, all of these problems can be compounded by a tendency
not to identify themselves as disabled. This can occur in any life
setting. Mentally retarded people may attempt to hide their
disabilities, and many become skillful at masking their limitations.
The impact of this masking behavior is compounded by the reality
that those who administer the criminal justice system often are poorly
equipped to identify mental retardation.7 The limited ability of most
84 Id ("Some mentally retarded persons have incomplete concepts of blameworthiness and
culpability.").
85 See AAMD at 98-99 (cited in note 58).
86 See, for example, Thomas A. Ringness, Self-Concept of Children of Low, Average, and
High Intelligence, 65 Am J Mental Deficiency 453, 456-60 (1961) (providing data indicating a
high self-concept for mentally retarded students and identifying possible explanations). For an
example of a judicial response to this issue, see Reddix v Thigpen, 805 F2d 506, 515-16 (5th Cir
1986) (upholding the admission of defendant's confession in a state criminal prosecution despite
his claim that he was unable to waive his constitutional rights voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently; concluding that a psychiatrist's report stating that defendant's mental retardation
made him particularly vulnerable to outside influences and prevented sufficient comprehension
of his rights merely conflicted with defendant's testimony that he understood his rights and was
not coerced).
87 Numerous participants involved in our study answered yes to questions that they neither
understood nor were able to answer. That individuals with a mental retardation often answer
questions that are beyond their capability raises concerns about the accuracy of their statements.
See Hourihan, 81 Va L Rev at 1493 (cited in note 22).
88 See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-5.9 (Waiver of rights by mentally
ill or mentally retarded persons) commentary ("[M]any mildly and moderately mentally
retarded individuals have learned to devote a considerable amount of effort to hiding their
disability.").
89 See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-2.8 (Specialized training)
(providing standards for the training for personnel in "identifying and responding to incidents
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police officers, lawyers, and judges to recognize disabled people has
been well documented. For example, "[o]ne study involving 100 police
officers, 75 lawyers, and 35 judges found that'.. .while criminal justice
system personnel may have some understanding of mental
retardation, they are confused and uncertain about how to deal with
this population.' ' '
This confusion can influence how these actors interpret the
behavior and statements of mentally retarded suspects. Arresting
officers may interpret a retarded suspect's failure to make a telephone
call as an indication that he does not want to call anyone, even when
the failure to act is a product of the suspect's disability. Perhaps the
suspect cannot remember the telephone number of a friend or family
member, cannot read the telephone book, or is simply unable to
operate a telephone.9 '
Even this brief overview of common characteristics displayed by
mentally retarded suspects demonstrates why they may be susceptible
to the pressures of interrogation. The methods employed by police
interrogators inevitably, even if unintentionally, exploit these personal
vulnerabilities.
C. Contemporary Interrogation Techniques and Mentally
Retarded Suspects
The set of common psychological characteristics exhibited by
mentally retarded people makes them particularly vulnerable to the
pressures exerted by custodial interrogation. As a result, they are
more likely to execute a waiver that is not voluntary, knowing, or
intelligent in any meaningful sense of those words. Even more
troubling, when mentally retarded people are confronted with
common interrogation techniques, their personal characteristics
increase the likelihood of false confessions.
One of the difficulties faced by anyone attempting to analyze
custodial interrogations is verifying the methods actually used by
interrogators. The Miranda Court responded to this problem by
relying upon police training manuals as sources of authoritative
descriptions of interrogation theories and methods.2 Obviously this
approach is far from ideal. As critics have pointed out, the contents of
involving mentally ill or mentally retarded persons.").
90 Bowker, 63 FBI L Enforcement Bull at 12 (cited in note 40), quoting J. Schilit, The
Mentally Retarded Offender and Criminal Justice Personnel, The Council for Exceptional
Children at 16 (1979).
91 See generally Dennis E. Haggerty, et al, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally
Retarded, 6 Fain L Q 59, 59-60 (1972) (offering an example of how a retarded person can be
questioned without the interviewer realizing the person's retardation).
92 Miranda, 384 US at 448-55.
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these manuals may bear little or no relationship to how police conduct
any individual interrogation. Despite the obvious limitations of this
method, both the Miranda majority and subsequent commentators9
have found these manuals to be a useful source of information about
how police are trained to interrogate suspects. For the present study,
which emphasizes the cognitive capacity of mentally retarded suspects
to understand and utilize the warnings rather than the impact of
interrogation methods on voluntariness, these manuals provide an
adequate description of standard interrogation techniques.
Even a cursory look at the interrogation techniques described in
these manuals reveals why mentally retarded suspects are particularly
vulnerable to standard techniques and tactics. For example, the
leading text instructs that every suspect has weaknesses and
recommends interrogation techniques designed to exploit those
weaknesses.w One technique encourages interrogators to try to
establish a position of authority and then endeavor to convince the
suspect, sometimes with the aid of deceptive strategies,9 that the
police are convinced of the suspect's guilt. By positing the suspect's
guilt as a fact, the interrogators hope to undermine his will to resist.9
The interrogator cuts off a suspect's denials of guilt and dismisses and
discourages exculpatory explanations. The interrogator emphasizes
the reasons why the suspect committed the act, rather than asking the
suspect whether he did it.n Given the exaggerated tendency of
mentally retarded people to try to accommodate the perceived wishes
of authority figures, it is not difficult to appreciate that mentally
retarded suspects are particularly vulnerable to these techniques for
dominating or deceiving suspects,n even when interrogators are
unaware of a suspect's disability.9
93 See, for example, White, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 105, 118 (cited in note 34) ("As the
standard police manuals explain, the purpose of interrogation techniques is to exploit I I
weakness."). See also Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and
Testimony 2, 24 (John Wiley & Sons 1992) (examining "the various aspects of investigative
interviewing" with focus upon practice in England, including discussion of "the tactics and
techniques advocated by practical interrogation manuals").
94 Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation (cited in note 79).
95 For a critical examination of the use of deceptive interrogation techniques, see White, 32
Harv CR-CL L Rev at 118-20 (cited in note 34).
96 See Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation at 60 (cited in note 79) (discussing the effects of
assuming the guilt of the person interrogated). See also Miranda, 384 US at 455 ("To be alone
with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The
aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived
story the police seek to have him describe.").
97 See Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation at 60-61 (cited in note 79). See also Miranda, 384
US at 450 ("These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story
is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already-that he is guilty.").
93 See Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation at 60-76 (cited in note 79) (stating that the goal
of police interrogation is to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his or her
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Even a suspect who has nothing to conceal is likely to experience
anxiety as a result of the dynamics of the interrogation process. A
suspect who tries to explain his innocence will, at the very least,
experience anxiety associated with arguing with a strong authority
figure who adamantly refuses to accept, or even to listen, to his
position. This anxiety may be heightened by the fact that
interrogations often are conducted in private. The police training
manuals stress that privacy is a principal psychological factor
contributing to a successful interrogation. To be alone with the suspect
is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside
support. Privacy helps the interrogator keep the suspect off balance,
for example, by exploiting his insecurity about himself or his
surroundings. Although exhibiting "kindness" and understanding of
the suspect's situation are basic techniques, training manuals also
recommend alternating these techniques with shows of some hostility.
One well-known ploy is "good cop-bad cop,''l° a technique likely to
exploit a mentally retarded defendant's inability to understand the
adversarial nature of the interrogation. The suspect's intellectual
limitations create a complementary problem: the inability to
understand the very warnings intended to counteract the pressures of
interrogation.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES GOVERNING CONFESSIONS
The Miranda Court concluded-and the Dickerson opinion
confirmed-that the traditional method for judging the voluntariness
of confessions, the "totality of the circumstances" test, was inadequate
to ensure that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was
not trampled by the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation.""
The substitute mechanism adopted by the Miranda Court rested upon
the implicit assumption that the targets of custodial interrogation
possess the intellectual and social competence necessary to utilize this
mechanism. The results of this study reveal that the Court's
assumption is invalid for mentally retarded people who, because of
capacity for rational judgment; that every suspect has weaknesses; and recommending
interrogation techniques designed to exploit those weaknesses.).
99 See id at 60 (describing the techniques and how an average innocent person would react
to them).
100 See id at 151-52 (describing such ploys). See also Miranda, 384 US at 452 (noting that
the police manual recommends having two agents, one who is "relentless" and "who knows the
subject is guilty," and the other who is "obviously a kindhearted man," the idea being that the
subject will cooperate with the friendly officer).
101 See Dickerson, 530 US at 442 ("In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the
traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial




their intellectual, psychological, and social limitations, are the group
most in need of help to withstand those pressures. In this Part, we will
examine the fundamental and still (after more than a third of a
century) unproven assumptions upon which the Miranda opinion
rests.
A. Constitutional Rules and Miranda
The Miranda opinion synthesized two separate but
interconnected lines of constitutional rules. The first was the
constitutional prohibition of compelled confessions, the second was
the test for waivers of constitutional rights. The recurring debates
spawned by the Miranda decision have focused so often on its
dramatic treatment of the issue of coercion that the significance of this
synthesis is easily overlooked. From a theoretical perspective this is
surprising, because the synthesis rested upon an untested, unverified,
and unproven assumption about the Miranda warnings: the Court
assumed that they work. This is an assumption that, as it is applied to
mentally retarded people, is challenged directly by the empirical
results produced by our study. To understand the nature of the
synthesis and its significance for mentally retarded suspects, a brief
review of the Court's confession jurisprudence will be helpful.
For most of the century preceding the Miranda opinion, the most
important developments in the Supreme Court's confession
jurisprudence turned on the question of the voluntariness of a
suspect's statement. In a series of nineteenth-century opinions, the
Court relied upon common law rules'On and the Fifth Amendment' to
102 See, for example, Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 584-87 (1884) (holding that admitting a
confession is permissible if "voluntary and uninfluenced by hopes of reward or fear of
punishment"). See also Dickerson, 530 US at 433 (noting that the roots of the voluntariness test
developed in the common law, as the English and United States courts "recognized that coerced
confessions are inherently untrustworthy," and citing numerous English cases, including King v
Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-18, 122-23, 168 Eng Rep 160, 161, 164 (KB 1783) (Lord Mansfield)
(stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises); King v
Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 263-64, 168 Eng Rep 234, 235 (KB 1783) ("A free and voluntary
confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest
sense of guilt ... but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture
of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore
it is rejected."); King v Parratt, 4 Car & P 570,172 Eng Rep 829 (NP 1831).
103 See, for example, Brain v United States, 168 US 532,542 (1897) ("In criminal trials, in the
courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment ...
commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."); Brown v Walker, 161 US 591,597 (1896) ("[A] maxim, which in England was a mere
rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional
enactment."). See also Pierce v United States, 160 US 355, 357 (1896) ("Confessions are not
rendered inadmissible by the fact that the parties are in custody, provided that such confessions
are not extorted by inducements or threats.").
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prohibit the use of involuntary confessions. '4 In federal cases, the Fifth
Amendment provided an explicit textual basis for excluding self-
incriminatory statements that were extracted from the suspect by
coercive pressure.lO'
The Court did not reverse a state court conviction on the grounds
that it was based upon a coerced confession until its landmark 1936
decision in Brown v Mississippi.'°" The Court held that the three
defendants in Brown had been denied due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment because their convictions and death
sentences were based primarily upon confessions that were the
product of physical torture. W7
In the three decades that followed Brown, the Supreme Court
decided about three dozen confession cases, but most were governed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson summarized this case law succinctly:
Prior to Miranda, we evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's
confession under a voluntariness test .... Over time, our cases
recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a
confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
He then noted that "for the middle third of the 20th century our
cases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if
not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due process
voluntariness test in 'some 30 different cases decided during the
era.'"
,0
The due process test developed in these cases considered "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation."'' 0 Applying the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, courts examined "[a]ll the
104 See Bram, 168 US at 549 (noting that a confession is admissible if proof is "sufficient to
establish that the making of the statement was voluntary . . . [and] the accused was not
involuntarily impelled to make a statement, when but for the improper influences he would have
remained silent.").
105 At the time, constitutional theory precluded imposition of the Bill of Rights upon the
states. Barron v Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet 243,250 (1833).
106 297 US 278 (1936).
107 Id at 284-87 ("It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners.").
108 Dickerson, 530 US at 432-33 (citing Bram and Brown).
109 Id at 433-34 (referring to the period between its decisions in Brown and Escobedo v
Illinois, 378 US 478 (1964), and citing several other state cases decided during this period,
including Haynes v Washington, 373 US 503 (1963); Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US 143 (1944);
Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227 (1940)), quoting Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 223
(1973).
110 Schneckloth, 412 US at 226.
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circumstances attendant upon the confession,"'. and excluded the
confession if "all the attendant circumstances indicate that the
confession was coerced or compelled."" 2
By definition, this was a fact-sensitive, case-by-case method of
adjudication. It was "retail" constitutional decisionmaking that
produced few global rules. Nonetheless, over time the cumulative
effect of this process appeared to influence police practices. In Brown,
investigators tortured the suspects until they confessed. Twenty years
later, the claims of coercion raised in the Supreme Court's confession
cases typically alleged less egregious police misconduct. Suspects were
not whipped or hanged as they had been in Brown, but abusive
practices continued. Suspects were held incommunicado for days;
subjected to lengthy interrogations without respite; denied sleep, food,
and medical care; and forced to confess to avoid being turned over to
an apparent lynch mob.
3
These methods were less abusive than the torture reported in the
1930s.14 Nonetheless, the facts of these cases also demonstrated that in
the 1950s and 1960s, investigators continued to use coercive
techniques to pressure suspects to confess. The incremental process of
change embedded in the due process methodology was too gradual
for some justices, "- and as early as the late 1940s the Court began to
111 Reck v Pate, 367 US 433,440 (1961) ("There is no guide to the decision in cases such as
this except the totality of the circumstances"). See also Gallegos v Colorado, 370 US 49, 55
(1962).
112 Malinski v New York, 324 US 401,404 (1945).
113 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 163 n 1
(1986), lists several of these cases:
Reck v. Pate, 367 US. 433 (1961) (defendant held for four days with inadequate food and
medical attention until confession obtained); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 US. 568 (1961)
(defendant held for five days of repeated questioning during which police employed
coercive tactics); Payne v.Arkansas, 356 US. 560 (1958) (defendant held incommunicado for
three days with little food; confession obtained when officers informed defendant that
Chief of Police was preparing to admit lynch mob into jail); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944) (defendant questioned by relays of officers for 36 hours without an opportunity
for sleep).
114 Over the decades, the Court's case law also was influenced by the findings of the
Wickersham Commission, which confirmed the widespread use of the "third degree" by police
officers throughout the country to obtain confessions. See Wickersham Commission, Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 38-155 (1931). See also Miranda, 384 US 436, 445-47 (1966)
(citing the Wickersham Report for evidence of the "third degree").
115 See George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme
Court Terms, 67 Tex L Rev 231, 235-36 (1988). TWo other reasons motivated the Supreme Court
to abandon the voluntariness standard. First, the Supreme Court "had been unable to stimulate
sufficient lower-court awareness of the voluntariness doctrine's underlying concerns," especially
the Court's increasing sensitivity to the risks that police practices posed to values protected by
the federal constitution. Id at 235. Second, "the confession problem had outgrown the
voluntariness rule. As the Court encountered fewer cases of physical coercion, its concern
progressed to the more subtle risks that interrogation practices posed to constitutional values."
Id at 235-36. Voluntariness analysis, "perhaps an efficient weapon against overt coercion, was far
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grope for rule-based methods for eliminating abusive interrogation
tactics.116 The Court's efforts to find more comprehensive rules to
regulate police practices intensified in the 1960s.
Only two years before Miranda, the Court decided three cases
that moved haltingly toward a more global set of interrogation rules.
In two of these cases, the Court relied upon the Sixth Amendment.
1 7
Neither of these decisions involved the Fifth Amendment, but they
foreshadowed the Miranda decision's emphasis upon the importance
of defense counsel during custodial interrogation. The third of these
1964 decisions played a more direct role in laying the doctrinal
foundations for Miranda. In Malloy v Hogan,"" the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was incorporated in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and binding upon
less effective when applied to psychological ploys." Id at 236.
116 The first attempt at devising a broad prophylactic rule was the "prompt appearance"
rule, which was justified by evidence that most abusive interrogations occur in the period
between arrest and the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer. Eventually the
McNabb-Mallory rule was devised as a nonconstitutional rule that rested upon the Court's
supervisory powers within the federal judicial system. As a result, it did not apply within the state
systems. This principle is now embodied in Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See also McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 339-40 (1943) (holding that judicial supervision in
the federal courts implies a duty to set aside convictions based on abusive interrogations);
Mallory v United States, 354 US 449, 451-54 (1957) (applying Rule 5(a) and discussing its
justifications). Miranda, 384 US at 463, praised the prompt appearance rule's effect upon
coercive interrogations:
Because of the adoption by Congress of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and this Court's effectuation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States ... and
Mallory v. United States, we have had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the
constitutional issues in dealing with federal interrogations. These supervisory rules,
requiring production of an arrested person before a commissioner "without unnecessary
delay" and excluding evidence obtained in default of that statutory obligation, were
nonetheless responsive to the same considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that
unavoidably face us now as to the States. In McNabb ... and in Mallory ... we recognized
both the dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from
the very fact of interrogation itselt
117 The first opinion decreed that defendants have the right to have an attorney present
during any "critical period" of the proceedings, including confrontations between defendants and
undercover agents for the state, in all cases once formal adversarial proceedings had
commenced. Relying on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court suppressed statements
made to an undercover informer about crimes for which the defendant already had been
indicted. Massiah v United States 377 US 201,204, 207 (1964). In the second case, the defendant
made incriminating statements during custodial interrogation, but before the commencement of
formal adversarial proceedings. Once again the Sixth Amendment provided the constitutional
basis for the decision. In an opinion that, in retrospect, looks like a bridge between the fact-based
totality-of-the-circumstances approach and the creation of global rules in Miranda, the Court
suppressed the defendant's confession because police had taken him into custody, had made him
the focus of the investigation, and had refused to allow him to meet with his attorney. Escobedo
v Illinois, 378 US 478, 490-91 (1964).
118 378 US 1 (1964).
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the states.'19 This allowed the Miranda Court to define Fifth
Amendment rules governing both federal and state interrogations. 0
The best-known parts of the Miranda opinion addressed the
issues of voluntariness and coercion. The Miranda majority concluded
that modem methods of custodial interrogation were inherently
coercive, and that the traditional voluntariness analysis was
inadequate to preserve Fifth Amendment rights against the inevitable
pressures of this process." Its most controversial holding was that the
Constitution requires implementation of procedures to ensure that
these rights are effectively protected from this coercion, and to
reassure courts that confessions are, in fact, voluntary."' Miranda's
solution was, of course, to replace the multifactored voluntariness
analysis with bright line rules built around the now familiar warnings.
Prior to custodial interrogation,'2 the suspect must be advised that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in court,24 that he has the right to an attorney,'" and that if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him.'20
The Miranda opinion offered various reasons for abandoning the
traditional voluntariness test for confessions.'7 One is particularly
119 Id at 6-11. See also Dickerson, 530 US at 434 (listing cases relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment in requiring voluntariness in confessions).
120 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was incorporated into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed upon the states in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335,
341-42 (1963).
121 It is important to recognize, however, that Miranda can be seen as an application of the
traditional requirement of voluntariness; it is merely an attempt to ensure that every confession
produced in the specific context of custodial interrogation is voluntary. From this perspective,
Miranda did not abandon the commitment to voluntariness, rather, it redefined the
preconditions for voluntary confessions in a particular setting. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
for the Court in Dickerson, 530 US at 434: "We have never abandoned this due process
jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily. But
our decisions in Malloy v. Hogan ... and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry in
determining the admissibility of suspects' incriminating statements."
122 Miranda, 384 US at 458.
123 "[Custodial interrogation refers to] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id at 444.
124 The Court explained that only througl awareness of these consequences can there be
any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Id at 468.
125 Id at 469 (holding that "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.").
126 Id at 473.
127 The Court acknowledged that it was departing from the traditional "totalities" approach.
See, for example, id at 457:
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth
Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the
The University of Chicago Law Review
relevant to analysis of confessions by mentally retarded suspects. The
Court concluded that the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was
simply an ineffective mechanism for preserving Fifth Amendment
rights. In Dickerson, the Court explained:
In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an
involuntary custodial confession,.., a risk that the Court found
unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in
chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that
something more than the totality test was necessary.19
This conclusion leads us to the fundamental assumption upon
which the Miranda opinion's solution to the problem of coercion rests.
In Miranda, the Court assumed, without offering any supporting
evidence, that the litany of warnings actually work; that they provide
suspects subjected to the pressures of custodial interrogation with
means adequate to preserve the constitutional privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. '" Chief Justice Warren's opinion recited
the bald conclusion that the warnings constituted "fully effective






This conclusion is erroneous, at least when extended to mentally
retarded people. This error results in part from the Miranda majority's
adoption of the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" waiver test
defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police
interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent.
128 See Dickerson, 530 US at 440 n 6 ("[A] review of our opinion in Miranda clarifies that
this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require police to
administer the particular Miranda warnings, not that the Constitution does not require a
procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights."); id at 442 (explaining that even
when supplemented by additional remedies not available at the time Miranda was decided, the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach resurrected in 18 USC § 3501 (1994) is not "an adequate
substitute for the warnings required by Miranda").
129 Id at 442, citing Miranda, 384 US at 457,467,490-91. This risk was in part the product of
a second defect: totality-of-the-circumstances analysis precluded the drawing of bright lines.
Totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was too imprecise, and the Court had recognized this
problem even before Miranda: "The line between proper and permissible police conduct and
techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw." Haynes v
Washington, 373 US 503,515 (1963).
130 See Miranda, 384 US at 444 (holding that the prosecution cannot use the confession
"unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination"); id (holding that warnings must be given unless the government used other
methods that were also "fully effective"); id at 458 (holding that the government must use
"adequate protective devices ... to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings");
id at 467 ("However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.").
131 Id at 444.
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enunciated nearly thirty years earlier in the context of waivers of the
right to counsel.'- The waiver test has two dimensions. The first
requires that the waiver must be voluntary, a "free and deliberate
choice," and not compelled by government pressure. The second
commands that a waiver must be knowing and intelligent, a test that is
met if the person comprehends the nature of the right and the
consequences of abandoning it.'"
Miranda assumed that a suspect who received the warnings not
only would possess information that would ensure that a subsequent
waiver was "knowing and intelligent," but also that this knowledge
supplied the tools necessary to counteract the pressures of custodial
interrogation, thus ensuring that a confession was "voluntary."
Because these assumptions were applied to enforce the constitutional
ban on compelled confessions, Miranda functionally conflated the two
prongs of the waiver test. A confession would be uncoerced if a
warned suspect executed a waiver. Yet only by presuming that people
will understand the warnings could the Miranda decision purport to
create the necessary predicate for a "waiver ... made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently."M
The Miranda opinion repeatedly asserted the unsubstantiated
assumption that the warnings would be effective. It commanded that
the prosecution cannot use a confession "unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination."' 5 The warnings were mandatory unless the
government used other methods that were also "fully effective."'' The
government must use "adequate protective devices ... to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."" The opinion
acknowledged that the specific warnings enunciated in the opinion
were not the only possible means of providing protection beyond that
offered by the totalities analysis: "However, unless we are shown other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons
of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed." '3
One will search the Miranda opinion in vain for evidence
supporting the assumption that the warnings not only are more
effective than the totalities approach, but are adequate to ensure that
132 Id at 475. This is an application of the well-known standard for waivers of constitutional
rights enunciated in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458,464 (1938).
133 Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421 (1986).
134 Miranda, 384 US at 444.
135 Id at 444.
136 Id.
137 Id at 458.
138 Id at 467.
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waivers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In fact, the only
evidence the majority offered about the likely impact of the warnings
supported a very different proposition. The majority opinion devoted
nearly seven pages (more than 10 percent of the text of the majority
opinion) to establishing that the prior use of similar warnings both by
the FBI and in foreign jurisdictions had not impeded law
enforcement."'
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court has reiterated its
unsubstantiated assumption that cognitive understanding supplied by
the information contained in the warnings assures that all parts of the
waiver test are satisfied. After more than two decades of experience
with Miranda, the Court wrote:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee is both simpler and more
fundamental: A defendant may not be compelled to be a witness
against himself in any respect. The Miranda warnings protect this
privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not
to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel
present, or to discontinue talking at any time. The Miranda
warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is knowing and
intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this
constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever
he chooses to say may be used as evidence against him.'"
More recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson
reasserted the assumption that the warnings are "effective." 4' The
Dickerson opinion invalidated the congressional attempt to overrule
Miranda in part because the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
enacted in 18 USC § 3501 was not "equally as effective in preventing
coerced confessions."'42 Rejecting arguments that language in Miranda
revealed that the warnings were but prophylactic devices, Dickerson
concluded that this language "was intended to indicate that the
Constitution does not require police to administer the particular
Miranda warnings, not that the Constitution does not require a
procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights."'
43
The assumption that the warnings are effective is fundamental to
the entire Miranda construct. The assumption of effectiveness rested,
in turn, upon the underlying presumption that suspects would
139 Id at 483-90.
140 Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564,574 (1987).
141 Dickerson, 530 US at 440 (quoting Miranda's description of possible alternatives to the
warnings that were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it") (emphasis added).
142 Id at 441 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143 Id at 440 n 6 (emphasis added).
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understand both the meaning and the legal significance of the
warnings.'" Without this assumption of understanding, the warnings
could not logically serve as the predicate for a knowing and intelligent
waiver. Without this assumption, the Court could not justify its
decision to abandon the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances
approach to judging the voluntariness of confessions. And the
Miranda majority apparently expected that the warnings would be
effective for everyone-even mentally retarded suspects.
The Court must have contemplated that these warnings would be
applied to interrogations of suspects with subaverage intelligence,
because the Miranda opinion expressly mentions at least two such
cases. These passages indicate that the Court not only was conscious of
the increased vulnerability of mentally retarded people to the
pressures of custodial interrogation, but also was aware that their
weaknesses might lead them to confess to crimes they did not commit.
In the first passage, the Court noted:
Even without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the
specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals. This fact may be illustrated simply
by referring to ... Townsend v. Sain, [where] the defendant was a
19-year-old heroin addict, described as a 'near mental defective. 4
The Court's awareness of the vulnerability of disabled suspects to
succumb to contemporary interrogation techniques was highlighted by
the description of yet another case in which a suspect possessing only
"limited intelligence" confessed to two heinous crimes he had not
committed:
Interrogation procedures may even give rise to a false confession.
The most recent conspicuous example occurred in New York, in
1964, when a Negro of limited intelligence confessed to two
brutal murders and a rape which he had not committed. When
this was discovered, the prosecutor was reported as saying: "Call
it what you want-brain-washing, hypnosis, fright. They made
him give an untrue confession. The only thing I don't believe is
that Whitmore was beaten."' 6
144 A peripheral result of our study is that it provides limited support for one part of this
assumption as it is applied to nondisabled people. The data produced by our study suggest that
the control group of nondisabled people understood the warnings. Whether this cognitive
understanding would translate into the capacity to resist the coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation is untested by our study.
145 Miranda, 384 US at 455-56 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
146 Id at 455 n 24 (citation omitted).
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Despite this evidence that custodial interrogation might weigh
particularly heavily upon mentally retarded suspects, the Miranda
majority apparently just assumed that the warnings would be effective
means of preserving Fifth Amendment rights for all suspects,
regardless of their mental capacities. The results of the study reported
in this Article confirm what should be obvious: this assumption is
wrong for mentally retarded people. Because cognitive understanding
of the content of the warnings is required if the warnings are to fulfill
their instrumental functions, a person who is not capable of
understanding the warnings logically cannot execute a waiver that is
either knowing or intelligent. In an effort to determine whether
mentally retarded people possess the mental capacity to waive their
rights, courts frequently turn to the totality-of-the-circumstances test
rejected in Miranda.
B. Totality of the Circumstances and Mentally Retarded Suspects
Because mentally retarded people frequently appear as
defendants in criminal cases, courts repeatedly have confronted the
question of the admissibility of their confessions. In the post-Miranda
world, courts have recognized that waivers executed by mentally
retarded suspects deserve extra scrutiny to determine if they were in
fact voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In recognition of the
seriousness of the problem, many courts have employed a second level
of analysis to determine whether confessions by mentally retarded
defendants were voluntary.' 7 Unfortunately, our data suggest that the
most common method courts employ is no more effective than are the
warnings themselves at ensuring that waivers by mentally retarded
individuals are knowing and intelligent.
Miranda remains the analytical starting point for waivers by
mentally retarded suspects. Regardless of the suspect's cognitive
capacity, the warnings are required for any confession produced by
custodial interrogation. If the suspect was "Mirandized" and no
evidence of police overreaching exists, the courts are likely to hold
that the waiver was voluntary."' This analysis is unlikely to
acknowledge Miranda's assumed relationship between cognitive
understanding and voluntariness.' 9 Because of the nature of
contemporary interrogation practices -Miranda warnings are
typically administered and interrogators employ psychological, not
147 Marvel, 8 ALR 4th at 29-60 (cited in note 27) (collecting relevant cases).
148 See notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
149 See notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
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physical, pressure-in the absence of egregious misconduct, courts are
likely to find that post-waiver confessions were valid. 4
There are exceptions. In some cases, the suspects' mental
retardation was so severe that courts have concluded that Miranda
waivers were invalid."' For most mentally retarded defendants,
however, courts treat mental disability as only one factor to be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances.'5 2
When courts are confronted with challenges to the voluntariness
of confessions by people with developmental disabilities, typically they
have returned to a fact-specific, case-by-case, multifactored totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis. From a theoretical perspective, the
reemergence of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis might seem
perplexing, because Miranda (and now Dickerson)"3 rejected this
amorphous method as inadequate protection against the pressures
inherent in custodial interrogation.4 But the empirical results of our
study raise even more troubling practical concerns about this method
of judging a disabled suspect's cognitive competence to execute a
Miranda waiver. They suggest that the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis does not work.'5  This empirical evidence is significant,
because it calls into question the common practices of both federal
and state courts.
Although courts may consider any factor they consider relevant
when examining the totality of the circumstances,"6 the cases
150 See, for example, Kamisar, 99 Mich L Rev at 892 nn 54-55 (cited in note 2) (noting
difficulties of showing compulsion); Thomas, 99 Mich L Rev at 1101 (cited in note 12) ("When a
suspect waives Miranda, the only limitation on police interrogation is the Due Process Clause,
the very protection that Miranda found unacceptably parsimonious").
151 For a comprehensive review of the case law, see Marvel, 8 ALR 4th at 28-29 (cited in
note 27) (citing cases addressing the rule that subnormality so great as to vitiate understanding
renders confession inadmissible). See also Charles C. Marvel, Mental Subnormality ofAccused as
Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession, 8 ALR 4th 5-6 (Supp 1999) (citing cases
relevant to intelligence as a factor to be weighed in evaluating validity of waivers).
152 For a comprehensive review of the case law, see Marvel, 8 ALR 4th at 21-22 (cited in
note 27), 24-28 (noting the principle that subnormality is the only factor affecting voluntariness
or admissibility); id at 33-35 (reviewing federal court cases involving waiver or understanding of
Miranda rights); id at 40-52 (reviewing state court cases).
153 From a theoretical perspective, this reliance upon the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis to judge voluntariness-even as a secondary mechanism-appears to contradict the
central premise of the Miranda decision recently affirmed by the Court. See Dickerson, 530 US
at 442 ("In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession .... The Court
therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary.").
154 See note 101 and accompanying text.
155 See Part IV.
156 See, for example, Correll v Thompson, 63 F3d 1279, 1288 (4th Cir 1995) (examining
intelligence, previous experience with police, and previous warnings); Derrick v Peterson, 924 F2d
813,824 (9th Cir 1991) (examining method of waiver, prior experience with police and Miranda,
and psychologists' testimony of subject's understanding); West v United States, 399 F2d 467, 469
(5th Cir 1968) (examining defendant's age and education); Coyote v United States, 380 F2d 305,
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demonstrate that courts often focus on five factors when determining
the validity of confessions by disabled defendants: the defendant's
intelligence, usually as measured by IQ; the defendant's chronological
age; the defendant's education; the defendant's previous experience
with the criminal justice system; and his previous experience with
administrations of the warnings. 7
In this analysis, no single factor is controlling in determining
whether an individual has validly waived his or her rights. The manner
in which these factors are to be weighed and evaluated is left to the
judge's discretion.'m Because the totality-of-the-circumstances test
permits the courts to weigh several factors together, it is not always
possible to determine which factors caused a court to exclude or admit
a confession, and courts rarely indicate the relative importance of the
factors that they use. Nonetheless, some general patterns relating to
each of these factors have emerged from the case law.
(1) Intelligence. Courts employ intelligence, usually measured by
scores on IQ tests, to establish whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent. Courts generally conclude that a defendant's low
intelligence is but one factor to be considered, its importance
increasing with the degree of the person's mental deficiency.
Nonetheless, courts are not consistent in their decisions involving
similar IQ scores, and as one would expect from a "totalities" analysis,
no clear judicial guidelines have emerged from the case law. For
example, in Lavallis v Estelle, "' a federal district court found that a
waiver by a defendant with an IQ of sixty-five was valid." However, in
Smith v Kemp,' 6' a different district court found that a waiver executed
by a defendant with the same IQ score was invalid. M
Despite the absence of consistent guidelines, some patterns
appear in the case law. Courts occasionally exclude confessions of
suspects with IQs of 60 to 65 or higher when other factors indicate the
suspect did not understand the warnings.16 In general, however, when
308 (10th Cir 1967) (examining age and intelligence as possible factors to be considered); State v
White, 494 SW2d 687,691 (Mo App 1973) (examining age and previous experience with police),
revd, In re ADR, 603 SW2d 575, 584 n 7 (Mo 1980) (considering, inter alia, age, experience,
education, background, and intelligence).
157 See, for example, Correll, 63 F3d at 1288 (looking at all five factors).
158 See, for example, Derrick, 924 F2d at 823, citing Perri v Director of the Department of
Corrections of Illinois, 817 F2d at 451 (7th Cir 1987) (giving a presumption of correctness to the
state court's finding that a waiver was knowing and intelligent); Ahmad v Redman, 782 F2d 409,
412-13 (3d Cir 1986) (discussing the appropriate standard of review in waiver cases).
159 370 F Supp 238 (S D Tex 1974).
160 Id at 243-44.
161 664 F Supp 500 (M D Ga 1987).
162 Id at 501,505.
163 See, for example, Jurek v Estelle, 593 F2d 672, 675-77 (5th Cir 1979) (holding
defendant's waiver invalid where he had an IQ of 66, was treated poorly by the police prior to
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the defendant's IQ is 60 to 65 or higher, courts conclude that the
defendant understood his rights and uphold a waiver." Courts appear
to assume that a defendant with only mild mental retardation
understands his Miranda rights. In contrast, courts are more likely to
hold that waivers by suspects with IQs below 60 to 65 are invalid.'
(2) Age. Courts often consider the defendant's age when
evaluating whether a defendant understood the warnings. Once again,
some common patterns emerge from the case law. Courts frequently
uphold waivers by defendants over age nineteen, regardless of IQ. For
defendants who are sixteen to nineteen years old, courts appear to
uphold most, but not all, waivers. They reject most, but not all, waivers
for defendants of ages thirteen to fifteen, and reject waivers for
defendants who are even younger.166
(3) Education. Courts frequently consider the level of education
that the defendant has achieved when evaluating his capacity to
confessing, and had a condition that made him especially susceptible to the influence of others);
People v Stanis, 41 Mich App 565, 200 NW2d 473, 477-79 (1972) (holding defendant's waiver
invalid where he maintained an IQ between 65 to 70).
164 See, for example, Correll, 63 F3d at 1291 (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of
68); Derrick, 924 F2d at 824 (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 62); Moore v Dugger,
856 F2d 129,132 (11th Cir 1988) (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 62); Sumpter v Nix,
863 F2d 563, 564-65 (8th Cir 1988) (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 89); Fairchild v
Lockhart, 744 F Supp 1429, 1461 (E D Ark 1989) (upholding waiver by defendant, rejecting IQ
score of 60 obtained by neutral expert selected by prosecution and defense, and instead relying
upon IQ score of 75-87 resulting from other IQ tests); United States v Chrans, 696 F Supp 1210,
1211-12 (N D I11 1988) (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 86); Smith, 664 F Supp at
501,505 (waiver invalid where defendant had an IQ of 65); Lavallis v Estelle, 370 F Supp 238,243
(S D Tex 1974) (waiver valid where defendant's IQ was 65); Jackson v State, 306 Ark 70, 811
SW2d 299,301 (1991) (waiver valid where defendant's IQ was between 74 and 81); State v Fetters,
202 NW2d 84,88 (Iowa 1972) (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 67); People v Creamer,
143 11 App 3d 64,492 NE2d 923,926,928 (1986) (waiver valid where defendant had an IQ of 60);
People v Ellison, 126 M11 App 3d 985,466 NE2d 1024,1029 (1984) (waiver valid where defendant
had an IQ of 77); Johnston v State, 455 So2d 152, 156 (Ala App 1984) (waiver valid where
defendant had an IQ of 67); Mitchell v State, 338 S2d 524, 525-26 (Ala App 1976) (upholding
waiver of defendant who had an IQ of approximately 65).
165 See, for example, United States v Hull, 441 F2d 308, 309, 312 (7th Cir 1971) (holding
waiver invalid where defendant had an IQ of 54); Harvey v State, 207 S2d 108,109-10,117 (Miss
1968) (holding waiver invalid where defendant had an IQ of 60).
166 See Lopez v United States, 399 F2d 865, 867-68 (9th Cir 1968) (holding that a sixteen-
year-old's age did not per se make a waiver involuntary); West, 399 F2d at 470-71 (same); State v
Thompson, 287 NC 303,214 SE2d 742,752-55 (1975) (upholding finding that a nineteen-year-old
mildly retarded defendant validly waived his Miranda rights); In re R., 345 NYS2d 11, 12 (1973)
(holding that nine-year-old did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights); People v Baker,
9 In App 3d 654, 292 NE2d 760, 764-65 (1973) (upholding determination that a fifteen-year-old
with an IQ of 72 did not knowingly and intelligently waive despite careful explanations by
police); In re S.H., 61 NJ 108, 293 A2d 181, 184-85 (1972) (holding that Miranda warnings are
meaningless to a ten-year-old); Stanis, 200 NW2d at 477-79 (holding invalid the waiver of an
adult with a mental age of eight); State v Prater, 77 Wash 2d 526,463 P2d 640,644 (1970) (holding
valid a waiver by a seventeen-year-old familiar with the warnings). For an extensive discussion of
courts' evaluation of juveniles' confessions, see generally Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 63
an 2-4 (cited in note 22) (collecting cases).
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understand the warnings. 67 Not surprisingly, mentally retarded
individuals often have attained relatively low levels of educational
achievement. Nonetheless, courts often find that extremely modest
academic achievement indicates a capacity to understand the
warmings.' 3
(4) Previous encounters with police. Courts frequently cite
mentally retarded defendants' prior experience with the criminal
justice system as a factor supporting admission of confessions. The
courts apparently reason that understanding of the warnings follows
from increased experience with the police. For example, in United
161States v Smith, the court admitted the defendant's confession despite
the defendant's low IQ because it determined that the defendant's
numerous previous encounters with law enforcement had made him
"street-wise and fully conversant with his rights."'I'
(5) Previous warnings. Finally, courts are more likely to decide
that a disabled defendant understood the warnings if they had been
administered to him on other occasions. For example, in Correll v
Thompson,' the court upheld the admission of the confession of a
defendant with an IQ of 68.'" During the defendant's earlier
experiences with law enforcement, police had administered Miranda
warnings to him more than twelve times, leading the trial court to
characterize him as "streetwise"
167 See, for example, Commonwealth v Youngblood, 453 Pa 225,307 A2d 922,924-25 (1973)
(supporting, in dictum, the lower court's finding that waiver by a defendant with schizophrenia
and a third-grade education was not voluntary); West, 399 F2d at 469 (noting the tenth-grade
education of the defendant in holding his waiver valid). See also Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of
Rights at 65 n 8 (cited in note 22) (citing cases where "grade levels were used as an index of
general intellectual capacity").
168 See Grisso,Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 65 n 8 (cited in note 22) (collecting cases).
169 574 F2d 707 (2d Cir 1978).
170 Id at 709. See also Felder v Estelle, 588 F Supp 664, 669 (S D Tex 1984) (holding
defendant's waiver valid where he had a history of prior involvement with law enforcement
officials and was "likely aware of the consequences of confessing"), revd as Felder v McCotter,
765 F2d 1245 (5th Cir 1985) (reversing because defendant with low intelligence was questioned
outside his attorney's presence); Mealey v State, 347 A2d 651, 652 (Del 1975) (holding that
defendant who was a "borderline defective" nonetheless validly waived his Miranda rights
because he had been arrested and questioned on prior occasions when police advised him of his
rights); Correll, 63 F3d at 1291 (admitting confession of defendant with IQ of 68 because of
defendant's earlier contacts with police); Prater, 463 P2d at 641 (finding that defendant's fifteen
prior arrests reduced importance of understanding of warnings; "a warning as to his rights was
needless."); In re Morgan, 33 Il App 3d 10, 341 NE2d 19,21-22 (1975) ("[I]t is significant that he
had previous experience with the police."); White, 494 SW2d at 691 (examining age, previous
experience with the police, and noting that physical condition and intelligence are factors,
although not on the record in this case).
171 63 F3d 1279 (4th Cir 1995).
172 Id at 1288.
173 Id at 1288,1291.
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Judges employing the totalities test often conclude that a
mentally retarded person can knowingly and intelligently waive his
Fifth Amendment rights if that person's low IQ is offset by age,
education, or previous experience with the police or the warnings."
For example, courts frequently find that a mentally retarded
defendant understood the warnings if the defendant is an adult, or had
a number of years of education, or had prior experience with the
police or the warnings. Some evidence exists that these factors may
correlate with cognitive understanding by nondisabled people,'75 but
the results of our study lead to a different conclusion for mentally
retarded people.
Our empirical results, which we present in Part IV, indicate that
even people with only the mildest retardation do not understand the
Miranda warnings or their legal significance. In addition, these results
reveal that the presence of the factors commonly used in this totalities
analysis-age, education, experience with the criminal justice system,
experience with the warnings, and the degree of the disability-do not
compensate for a subject's lack of understanding resulting from his
disability.
The factor that matters is mental retardation. Our study reveals
that despite a suspect's prior experience with the police and the
warnings, or his age and education, a mentally retarded person will not
understand all of the Miranda warnings and their legal significance.
The empirical bases for this conclusion are presented in Part IV.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
Our study sought to translate the legal standard for
understanding Miranda rights into measures permitting us to evaluate
whether test subjects achieved the required level of understanding.
Our study's design drew upon extensive and well-accepted existing
research by legal experts and social psychologists that measured
understanding of Miranda rights by juveniles. Adapting this work for
174 See Smith, 574 F2d at 709 (holding defendant's waiver valid where he had numerous
previous encounters with law enforcement that made him streetwise and fully conversant with
his rights, despite the fact that defendant's IQ was admittedly low); Mealey, 347 A2d at 653.
175 See, for example, Leiken, 47 Denver L J at 18-20 (cited in note 22) (showing that such
factors influence nondisabled defendants' understanding of the Miranda rights).
176 Our research design drew heavily upon Grisso's study on the understanding of Miranda
rights by juveniles. See Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 41-58, 109-30 (cited in note 22).
Other studies that we used in the research design included Grisso, 68 Cal L Rev at 1143 n 52
(cited in note 22); Grisso and Pomicter, 1 L & Human Beh at 321 (cited in note 22); A. Bruce
Ferguson and Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 San Diego L Rev 39,40-44,
50-53 (1970) (explaining the methodology behind a study of San Diego juveniles and their
comprehension of Miranda warnings). We used Grisso's study as a model because of its careful
design and because concerns relevant to mentally retarded defendants mirror those relevant to
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mentally retarded subjects, our approach permitted us to determine
both whether this population could understand the Miranda warnings
and whether the factors contained in the typical judicial "totality of
the circumstances" analysis influenced the subjects' understanding.
A. The Methodology
1. The test components.
Our study contained three components, each of which
investigated an important aspect of understanding of Miranda rights.
a) The Vocabulary Test. Our study's first section was based on the
proposition that an individual can make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda rights only if he understands the words used in
the warnings. This section of the study objectively assessed the
disabled individual's knowledge of seven key words in the Miranda
warnings. The seven words were "consult," "attorney," "interrogation,"
"appoint," "entitled," "right," and "statement."'"
The testing followed a detailed, scripted protocol." The examiner
began each interview by explaining the directions for the test. The
examiner then said each vocabulary word and used it in a sentence in
a way unrelated to the criminal justice system. The interviewee was
then asked to explain what the word meant. Using a detailed and
objective grading protocol, two, one, or zero points of credit were
assigned to adequate, questionable, and inadequate responses,
respectively.'79
In addition to testing understanding of the Miranda warnings'
actual vocabulary, we tested understanding of a simplified vocabulary.
Our goal was to determine whether subjects who might not
understand the actual vocabulary of the warnings might understand
simplified synonyms. If so, requiring law enforcement officers to
administer a simplified warning might be an appropriate policy
change. We adapted the synonyms from studies testing simplified
warnings on juveniles.' The simplified synonyms were "seek advice,"
juveniles.
177 The words were identical to the words that were tested in the leading study on
understanding of the warnings by juveniles, except that we also tested understanding of
"statement." Grisso,Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 237-38 (cited in note 22).
178 The testing and grading protocols are reproduced in the Protocol Appendix following
this Article.
179 The testing and grading protocols, which are reproduced in the Protocol Appendix, were
based upon earlier well-accepted studies of understanding by juveniles. See Grisso, Juveniles'
Waiver of Rights at 237-42 (cited in note 22).
180 See Larry E. Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting:A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J Crim L
& Criminol 534, 553-56 (1987) (proposing a simplified "Youth Rights Form"); Ferguson and
Douglas, 7 San Diego L Rev at 39-40, 43-44 (cited in note 176) (testing the effectiveness of
simplified warnings on juveniles' understanding of their Miranda rights).
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"lawyer," "questioning," "choose," "deserve," "choice," and "your
story."
b) The Warnings Test. As noted earlier, the Miranda opinion
requires that a waiver of a suspect's fights be "voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent." Courts have proclaimed that this standard requires that
the suspect understands "both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the [waiver]."' 8' In the second
section of the study, we attempted to determine whether mentally
retarded subjects could comprehend the principles embodied in the
warnings. Even if a subject understands the meanings of the individual
words that make up the Miranda warnings, it is possible that the
subject will not understand the principles that the words express
together. The Warnings Test evaluated the subject's understanding of
each of the four sentences of the warnings as phrased by the Supreme
Court. The test measured understanding in two ways. First, the test
investigated the subject's ability to determine whether a given
statement had the same meaning as a specified sentence in the
warnings. Second, the test asked a series of yes/no questions about
each of the sentences comprising the Miranda warnings.
The interviewer began the "same/different" portion of the test by
placing a card with a sentence from the Miranda warnings in front of
the interviewee and reading the sentence aloud. The interviewer then
placed a card with a second sentence in front of the interviewee and
read it aloud. The interviewee was asked to determine whether the
sentences had the same or different meanings. For example, after
reading the subject the Miranda warnings' first sentence, "You do not
have to make a statement and have the right to remain silent," the
interviewer asked the subject whether the following sentence was the
same or different: "You do not have to say anything about what you
did." Using a detailed grading protocol, the interviewer gave the
subject a score of one for a correct answer and zero for a wrong
answer. In total, the interviewer presented the subject with three
same/different sentence comparisons for each of the four sentences of
the warnings.n
181 Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421 (1986). See also Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464
(1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.") (emphasis added).
182 The sentences were identical to those in the seminal study of juveniles' understanding.
Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 235-36 (cited in note 22). Before administering this part of
the test, the interviewer assessed whether the interviewee was capable in general of determining
whether two sentences mean the same thing or different things. The interviewer went through an
example with a sentence unrelated to the warnings. If the interviewee was able to discern
whether the meanings of those sentences were the same or different, then the interviewer
administered the entire warnings Test. If the interviewee was unable to determine whether the
meanings of the sentences were the same or different, then the interviewer only gave the yes/no
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Next, the examiner asked the subject three yes/no questions
about each of the four sentences comprising the Miranda warnings. A
score of one was given for correct answers and zero was given for
incorrect answers. The sentences tested the subject's bottom-line
understanding of each of the Miranda rights. For example, after
reading the subject the first Miranda sentence, the interviewer asked,
"Do you have to tell the police what happened?" and "Do you have to
answer the police if they ask you any questions?"
c) The Concepts Test. The premise of our study's third section
was that even if a person can understand both the Miranda vocabulary
and sentences, nonetheless she will be unable to waive her rights
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently if she lacks understanding of
the legal context within which the rights operate. For example, the
Miranda warnings are of little practical use to a person who fails to
understand either that an investigating police officer may be the her
adversary or that the her attorney is her advocate rather than
adversary. The Concepts Test investigated whether the subject had the
basic understanding of the criminal justice system that is necessary to
use the rights.
The Concepts Test had questions that addressed three topics.
First, the "Nature of Interrogation" questions examined whether the
subject understood the purpose of the interrogation and the roles and
incentives of the participants in it. For example, the questions tested
whether the subject understood both that the police believed that a
crime was committed and that they were seeking information from
the suspect. Next, the "Right to Counsel" questions investigated
whether the subject understood the role of defense attorneys. For
example, they tested whether the subject understood that the attorney
was his advocate. Finally, the "Right to Silence" questions examined
the subject's understanding of the meaning of the right to silence. For
example, the questions explored whether the subject understood that
neither the judge nor the police could require a suspect to speak or
penalize silence.""
portion of the test and scored the same/different section as all zeros.
183 The interviewer began the Concepts Test by reading directions to the interviewee. The
interviewer then placed a drawing of a scene in front of the interviewee and told a scripted story
about the picture. The interviewer then asked the interviewee questions about the scene. The
first scene depicted a person being interrogated by the police. The questions related to the
understanding of the nature of interrogation. The second scene depicted a person meeting with
his lawyer in a consulting room in the police station. The questions regarding this scene all
related to the subject's understanding of the function and significance of the right to counsel. The
third scene depicted a person entering an interrogation room with two police officers. The
questions for this scene related to the function and significance of the right to silence. The last
scene depicted a courtroom hearing, with a judge, police officers, parents or guardian, the
individual's lawyer, and the individual. The questions for this scene focused on the function of
both the right to counsel and the right to silence. The scoring of the responses to the questions
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2. Procedure for finding mentally retarded subjects.
We sought to find mentally retarded interviewees who had both a
range of severity of disabilities and variety in age, education,
experience with police, race, and gender. We contacted a number of
organizations that serve different mentally retarded populations."M
These organizations sent a letter, which we had drafted, to all of their
members or clients. The letter described the study and asked for
volunteer participation. We identified some volunteer interviewees
directly through the organizations. We arranged others through the
mentally retarded individuals' parents or guardians. In total, we
conducted forty-nine interviews with people with mental retardation.
Each interview took one to three hours, depending on the subject's
communication ability.n
In order to determine what factors are important to an
individual's understanding of his Miranda rights, the interviewer
collected demographic information from each mentally retarded
volunteer. The information from each volunteer included: (1) IQ, (2)
age, (3) education level, (4) experience with police, (5) previous
experience with the Miranda warnings, (6) race, and (7) gender."u
As Figure I shows, the levels of retardation among our subjects
varied widely. Although the average IQ was 55.5, which parallels the
categories of mild to moderate retardation, our sample included a
range of IQs. Of the sample, 18 percent were either profoundly or
severely disabled, 25 percent were moderately disabled, and 35
was two for an adequate response, one for a questionable response, and zero for an inadequate
response. See Protocol Appendix Parts III and IV.
184 Participating organizations included the Atlanta Jewish Developmental Disabilities
Department, Resources and Residential Alternatives, the DeKalb Mental Retardation Council,
the Atlanta Alliance on Developmental Disabilities, Annandale Village, and the Marcus
Institute.
185 We designed the study carefully to protect the disabled volunteers. First, a consent form
was signed by the volunteer and his or her case worker or guardian. The consent form confirmed
that the volunteer had discussed participating in the study with someone he trusted and that the
participation was voluntary. Second, the volunteer was assigned a nonidentifying number to
ensure anonymity. An identification number was composed of the first letter of the first name of
the interviewer and a sequential order. For example, the first interviewee by an examiner named
Sara would be S1. Sara's next interviewee would be S2. All data was kept using this identification
number. Third, after the interview, the volunteer received both a sheet of information explaining
the basics of the Miranda rights and an opportunity to ask the interviewer any questions.
186 Grisso collected similar information from his interviewees. The information he collected
was: race, sex, socioeconomic status, age, IQ, and prior arrests. Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights
at 212-20 (cited in note 22). Ve decided that collecting information regarding an individual's
financial status might have little meaning because most people with developmental disabilities
qualify for some sort of government assistance, such as Social Security or Medicaid, and many do
not have full-time, full-pay jobs. Ideally, we would have obtained information on disability
measures such as grade-equivalent reading level and age-equivalent social level. However, since
most caseworkers and many guardians and parents lacked this information, our only measure of
intelligence was IQ.
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percent experienced mild disability. The remaining 22 percent had IQs
from 71 to 88, which exceeds the IQ of 70 typically used as the upper
end for mental retardation. Whenever we refer to the retarded or
disabled people in our sample, we include this group of individuals. We
decided to include this latter group within the sample to test the
performance of people who fell just outside the standard measures of
retardation. One of the surprising results of our study was the poor
performance of the sample population whose IQ scores were
subaverage, yet exceeded the typical cutoff for mental retardation.
Nonetheless, by including nonretarded individuals with subaverage IQ
scores within the subject population, our study likely overestimates
the capacities of disabled people to understand the Miranda warnings.
FGURE 1





lQ=40 or less, severe or
profound disability
The sample ranged in age from fifteen to sixty-nine with a mean
of thirty-seven years. Of the sample, 59 percent were male, and 41
percent female. African-Americans represented 18 percent of the
sample. Many of the disabled subjects had completed several years of
education, often in special education classes. Approximately one in
four of the subjects had had prior contact with the police. Of these,
approximately one-third had been read the Miranda rihs'





In addition, we interviewed twenty-two control subjects. This
permitted us to compare the understanding of the Miranda rights
exhibited by mentally retarded individuals with the performance of
individuals who would be classified as average or above average. In
choosing controls, we attempted to get a variety in age, race, gender,
education level, contact with police, and socioeconomic level. ' We
contacted the controls in several ways, including through the staff of
Emory University and through acquaintances of the interviewers.
Apart from IQ, the demographic characteristics of our control
subjects were roughly similar to the demographics of our disabled
subjects."" The methodology for administering the three tests-the
Vocabulary Test, the Warnings Test, and the Concepts Test-to the
controls was the same as for the subjects with developmental
disabilities."'
4. Grading.
We sought to ensure standardized grading for the interviews of
all mentally retarded subjects and controls, regardless of which
interviewer conducted the session. We achieved this in four ways. First,
we established stringent grading protocols. 91 Second, the only
interviewers were two of the authors. Third, each interview was tape
recorded so the interviewers could carefully check the grading after
each interview. Fourth, the two interviewers graded some interviews
together and consulted each other when an interviewer could not
make a grading decision alone.
188 Our approach to obtaining controls mirrored the approach of the leading study on
juveniles' understanding of the warnings. See Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 97-98 (cited
in note 22).
189 The controls were, on average, five years younger and had four more years of education.
In addition, the control sample had a slightly higher proportion of men and somewhat more
African-Americans. A higher proportion of the controls had had earlier police contact-59
percent compared to 27 percent for the disabled. A larger proportion of the controls had also
received Miranda warnings before-23 percent compared to 8 percent of the disabled. See
Statistical Appendix, Table 2. IQ was not collected from any controls; most people do not know
their own IQ and the interviewers were not qualified to administer an IQ test. It is probable that
our controls had some diversity in IQ but an average IQ of approximately 100. See Ellis and
Luckasson, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 427 n 69 (cited in note 22) (stating that the mean IQ score is
100).
190 Each control signed a consent form. The control was assigned a nonidentifying number
in order to assure anonymity. The interviewer collected information from the control, including
his or her age, sex, education level, contact with police, and previous experience with the
warnings.
191 See Protocol Appendix.
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B. The Results
The data offer three main results. First, the mentally retarded
subjects simply did not understand the Miranda warnings. On each of
the three tests, the disabled subjects' scores indicate that, regardless of
the level of disability, they did not understand all of the important
principles contained in the Miranda warnings. The data show that
these mentally retarded subjects possessed insufficient understanding
to execute valid waivers of their Miranda rights.
Second, the results raised serious questions about the viability of
the totality-of-the-circumstances test commonly used by courts to
determine the constitutionality of confessions made by retarded
suspects. The data reveal that most of the factors that courts rely upon
as indications of the mentally retarded suspect's capacity to
understand-age, education, prior experience with the criminal justice
system, and prior administration of the Miranda warnings-do not
correlate with understanding. Regardless of the presence or absence
of these factors, whether taken singly or in combination, if the person
was retarded, he did not understand the Miranda warnings.
Third, the results suggest that the Miranda warnings are
surprisingly ineffective for many people who are not mentally
retarded. Our results indicate that people of average intelligence
understand most of their Miranda rights, if somewhat imperfectly.
However, many people with below-average IQs, but not low enough
to qualify as retarded, do not understand the warnings.
1. They just don't understand.
The mentally retarded subjects understood neither the Miranda
warnings nor the rights they describe. As Figure 2's summary of the
results shows, those survey subjects who were in our mentally retarded
group received low scores on each of the three parts of the test. This
was true even though 22 percent of this group had IQs from 71 to 88,
which exceed the standard IQ score of 70 used as the upper range of
mental retardation. '9 In contrast, the control group of nondisabled
people did understand the warnings and the rights they describe. The
controls achieved high scores on all sections of the test, both in
absolute terms and in comparison to the group of retarded subjects.
192 See text accompanying note 67.
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FIGURE 2
GENERAL RESULTS
Vocabulary test Warnings Test
M Disabled 0 Nondisabled I
Specifically, our disabled group scored an average of only 20
percent correct on the Vocabulary Test, compared to 83 percent
correct for the control group; 27 percent on the Warnings Test,
compared to 90 percent for the controls; and 38 percent for the
Concepts Test, compared to 87 percent for the controls. Considering
all of the tests together, the disabled on average got only 30 percent
right, compared to 87 percent for the nondisabled controls.
It is possible to argue that this lack of understanding might not
invalidate waivers. The Supreme Court has written that the
"Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and
understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege."' The Court made this statement in response
to the defendant's claim that a waiver was not knowing and intelligent
because law enforcers had not advised him of the full scope of the
interrogation. The defendant did not claim that he was incapable of
understanding either the words of the warnings or the concepts they
embodied.
193 Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564, 574 (1987). For additional discussion of this issue, see
notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
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The results of our study suggest that just the opposite is true of
mentally retarded individuals. They understand neither the "basic
privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment" nor "the consequences
of speaking freely" to police officers. Even the loosest interpretation
of the words "knowing" and "intelligent" cannot encompass this level
of comprehension.
2. Results of the Vocabulary Test.
The group of retarded subjects exhibited poor understanding of
the vocabulary used in the warnings. For retarded people, the Miranda
warnings are meaningless because this population does not
understand the words used to construct the warnings. As Figure 3
indicates, of the fourteen possible correct points on the vocabulary
test, on average, the sample of mentally retarded people and
nonretarded people with below-average IQs got correct answers for
only approximately one-fifth of the words.'9 In contrast, the average
control subject got more than four-fifths of the total points correct.'"
194 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 3.
195 Few disabled subjects earned high scores. Most earned low scores. Almost 40 percent of
the disabled subjects scored zero total points. That is, they scored no points on all seven of the
vocabulary words. High fractions of the disabled subjects received other very low scores. For
example, more than 60 percent received two or fewer points out of fourteen; the median score
was two. None received a perfect score of fourteen. Only seven of forty-nine disabled subjects
earned more than half of the possible points. See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.
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If the constitutional standard of waiver actually means that an
individual can only complete a "knowing and intelligent" waiver if he
understands the meaning of the Miranda warnings' words, these data
suggest that mentally retarded suspects are incapable of meeting this
standard. Looking again at Figure 3, only two of the forty-nine
retarded subjects, or 4 percent, received even partial credit for each of
the seven words. In other words, 96 percent of the mentally retarded
subjects received scores of zero understanding on at least one of the
seven vocabulary words from the Miranda warnings. In contrast, 64
percent of the nondisabled controls had perfect scores or partial credit
on all of the vocabulary words, a percentage sixteen times higher than
the retarded subjects acivd
196 More than three-fourths of the control subjects scored eleven points or higher. No
control received fewer than six points. Despite the controls' much better performance relative to
the disabled subjects, it is noteworthy that 36 percent of the controls lacked adequate
understanding of at least one of the Miranda words. This suggests that the vocabulary of the
warning is not perfect even for many nondisabled people. See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.
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Although the disabled subjects' understanding of all of the words
was poor, understanding was worse for some words than for others.
The most poorly understood word was "interrogation": Figure 3 shows
that 88 percent of the disabled completely lacked understanding of
this word. The disabled subjects' understanding of the other words
also was poor.'" In general, for a given word, about three-fourths of
the mentally retarded subjects received scores of zero. The scores for
the nondisabled controls were markedly superior. For example, in
Figure 3 we can see that 91 percent of the controls understood
"interrogation" at least partially. In general, on each word, 10 percent
or fewer of the controls received scores of zero. '"
3. Results of the Warnings Test.
The results for the first part of the Warnings Test confirm the
disabled subjects' fundamental lack of understanding of their Miranda
rights. Figure 4 shows that the retarded subjects on average got only
27 percent of the twenty-four items correct, compared to 90 percent
for the controls.9 As noted earlier, the Warnings Test actually
consisted of two sets of items: twelve "comparisons" (in which the
subjects were asked to compare two sentences and decide whether
they had the same or different meanings), and twelve "yes/no"
questions about the meaning of the sentences.
On average, the mentally retarded subjects got correct scores on
only 11 percent of the sentence comparisons, compared to the
controls, who got 87 percent. The retarded subjects obtained a much
higher average score of 43 percent on the yes/no questions, although
this still fell far below the average score of 92 percent for the controls.
The latter results could indicate a better performance on the "yes/no"
portion of the test by the retarded suspects. However, it is likely that
these seemingly higher scores result instead from differences in the
grading protocols used for the comparison and the yes/no questions.
197 See id.
198 Id.
199 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 4. As with the vocabulary test, most of the disabled
subjects received low scores of five or six correct out of twenty-four possible points, and almost
no subject received a high score. In contrast, the distribution for the controls was the opposite:
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Indeed, the disabled subjects' score of 43 percent on the yes/no
questions suggests that the disabled are actively confused about their
Miranda rights, rather than simply lacking understanding. Random
guessing on the Warnings Test's twelve yes-no questions would have
yielded a correct percentage of approximately 50 percent-as
opposed to the twelve comparisons, where the testing protocol
prevented guessing.2° The disabled subjects' 43 percent correct was far
worse, and statistically significantly so, than guessing would have
achieved.2' That the disabled obtained 43 percent correct on the
yes/no questions does not indicate that they understood 43 percent of
the concepts. Instead, the 43 percent correct indicates abysmal
performance in which the disabled performed worse than if, on each
question, they had flipped a coin. The disabled systematically choose
wrong answers, rather than simply guessing wrong randomly. The
disabled's condition leads them to believe mistakenly that they
understand the world's workings and their rights within it. The
20 Subjects with inadequate performance on two preliminary sample comparisons were not
permitted even to attempt the test's twelve comparisons, receiving all zeros.
201 The disabled's 43 percent correct was statistically significantly less than guessing's 50
percent at a 99 percent confidence level.
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disabled are not clueless. They have strong beliefs that are wrong. The
disabled appear to choose the wrong answer with confidence.
The disabled's condition of groundless confidence is especially
dangerous in contacts with law enforcement. For example, a person's
mere lack of understanding, would create at least uncertainty about
whether the person should speak to police. In contrast, a disabled
person's certain belief that he must speak creates severe danger that
he will quickly and perhaps falsely confess.
The general results achieved by the retarded subjects on the
Warnings Test for each of the four sentences of the Miranda warnings
indicate that they do not understand any of these sentences. Their
misunderstanding was most obvious for the sentences announcing the
right to remain silent, the right to a free appointed attorney, and the
fact that their statements might be used against them. Their
understanding of their right to counsel was still poor, but slightly
better, at least in comparison with the other rights. In contrast, the
control subjects performed well on each sentence. This is clear from a
more careful analysis of the data.
a) Right to silence. The inability of the mentally retarded to
understand the Miranda warnings is demonstrated starkly by their
inability to understand one of the Miranda fundamental teachings:
that the suspect is not required to speak with the police. As Figure 5
shows, the disabled understood their right to silence especially
poorly.2 For all portions of the test, they scored an average of only 22
percent correct, compared to 87 percent for the controls. Their
confusion is emphasized by their performance on the portion of the
test requiring them to compare two sentences.
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As with the other three Miranda sentences, the disabled achieved
very low scores on the right-to-silence comparisons. On average, they
got only 10 percent of the comparisons correct. Their median number
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on 86 percent of the comparisons. Similarly, the mentally retarded
subjects' overall average number correct of 35 percent on the yes-no
questions indicates that the disabled actively misunderstood their
right to silence. Again, random guesses should have produced correct
answers for about 50 percent of the responses. In contrast, the
nondisabled control group achieved the correct answer 86 percent of
the time.
The performance by the mentally retarded subjects on the
individual testing items for the right-to-silence sentence reveals the
nature and depth of their confusion. For example, after reading each
research subject a sentence explaining the right to silence ("You do
not have to make a statement and have the right to remain silent"),
we asked the subject whether the following sentence had the same or
a different meaning: "You do not have to say anything about what you
did."
Figure 5 shows that when asked to compare these two sentences,
the control group gave the correct answer 91 percent of the time. In
stark contrast, the retarded subjects were correct only 10 percent of
the time. Similarly, only 20 percent of the disabled subjects answered
correctly the question, "Do you have to tell the police what
happened?" compared to 96 percent of the controls. Random guessing
would have yielded 50 percent correct. Only 31 percent of the
disabled gave correct answers when asked, "Do you have to answer
the police if they ask you any questions?" far lower than the 50
percent from random guessing and the 82 percent correct score
obtained by the control group.2
One plausible interpretation of these data is that the mentally
retarded subjects simply did not understand the sentences with which
they were confronted. The psychological characteristics often
exhibited by mentally retarded people discussed above suggest
another possibility. Of particular relevance is the tendency of many
retarded people to try to comply with requests from authority figures.
It is possible that their poor results on this section of the test result in
part from the belief that if police officers asked them a question, they
had a duty to respond. If this is correct, it means that the brief
Miranda warnings are insufficient to overcome a lifetime of training
to comply with requests from authority figures that is amplified by the
psychological propensities to comply exhibited by many mentally
retarded people. Additional research beyond the scope of the present
203 The disabled subjects' 35 percent is statistically significantly different from 50 percent at
a 99 percent confidence level.
204 Again, the disabled's scores were statistically significantly lower than 50 percent at a 99
percent confidence level.
205 See Part III.B.
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study would be necessary to try to identify the cause of this poor
performance. Whatever the cause or causes, the performance by the
retarded subjects stands in sharp contrast to the control group, who
understood that they could refuse to speak with the police.
b) Statements used against suspect. Similar results were obtained
for the other three sentences of the Miranda warnings. For example,
when answering questions based upon the statement that "[a]nything
you say can and will be used against you in a court of law," the
mentally retarded suspects got only 31 percent correct, compared to
95 percent for the controls.2 Figure 6 reveals that once again, they did
abysmally when presented with comparisons, getting only 10 percent
correct on average, with a median score of zero, compared to 92
percent correct for the control group.
206 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 6.
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FIGURE 6
WARNINGS TEST, RESULTS FOR SECOND MIRANDA SENTENCE:
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When answering the yes/no questions for this sentence, the
mentally retarded subjects got a much higher score-51 percent
correct-which is what random guessing should have generated. In
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Yet again, examination of the individual questions highlights the
confusion experienced by the mentally retarded subjects. For example,
one yes/no question, "If you talk to the police, can they use your story
to get you in trouble?" probed understanding of the central lesson of
this Miranda sentence. Only 37 percent of the disabled subjects got
the correct answer, statistically significantly lower than 50 percent. In
contrast, the fraction of the controls with the correct answer was 96
percent. Again it appears that either the psychological characteristics
or background and training, or some combination of the two, leads
mentally retarded people to score worse than random guessing would
produce on this question.2
c) Right to consult an attorney. While still large, the gap between
the scores earned by the mentally retarded and nondisabled subjects
was smaller for questions about the third sentence, "You are entitled
to consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have an
attorney present at the time of the interrogation." The results are
presented in Figure 7.2 The mentally retarded group achieved an
average total score of 31 percent, while the control group's average
score was 86 percent. While closer than the scores for the previous
questions, the retarded subjects answered less than one-third of the
questions correctly, and their nondisabled counterparts were nearly
three times more likely to get the correct answer.
207 This analysis is supported by another result: only 12 percent of the retarded subjects
responded correctly to the comparison question, "What you say might be used to prove you
guilty," compared to 96 percent of the control group.
20 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 7.
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
FIGURE 7
WARNINGS TEST, RESULTS FOR THIRD MIRANDA SENTENCE:
"You ARE ENTITLED To CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE
INTERROGATION AND TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT THE
TIME OF THE INTERROGATION"
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As with the earlier items seeking comparisons between sentences,
the average score for the retarded subjects was extremely low and
comparable to the results for the first two sentences. Only 11 percent
of the comparisons for the sentence were accurate, and the median
correct result was zero. Once again, these data suggest a lack of










averaged 86 percent correct. Again, the results for individual
comparisons are enlightening. Only 10 percent of the disabled subjects
answered correctly that "You can have a lawyer now if you ask for
one" meant the same as the analogous sentence in the Miranda
warnings. Nearly all of the nondisabled control group (96 percent) got
the right answer for this comparison. Likewise, the retarded subjects'
average score of 50 percent on the yes/no questions was no better
than random guessing. The controls did much better at 86 percent.
This section produced one noteworthy deviation from the typical
pattern of scores achieved by the mentally retarded group. When
asked the "yes/no" question, "Can you get a lawyer before you talk to
the police if you want one?" 71 percent of the disabled answered
correctly. This is much closer than usual to the control group's score of
96 percent. The result is anomalous, because the subjects' very low
scores on the comparison questions indicate that they did not
comprehend the sentence as contained in the Miranda warnings. Yet
their performance on this related yes/no question suggests that the
group generally comprehends that they have the right to obtain an
attorney. One possibility is that they learned this in some other setting
and at an earlier time. One must wonder, however, why the subjects
would have previously learned they had the right to an attorney, but
not that they had the right to remain silent.
d) Right to appointed attorney. The result on the previous yes/no
question is even more anomalous when compared to the results
obtained for the fourth sentence from the Miranda warnings, "If you
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you." As Figure 8
shows, the disabled subjects answered only 25 percent of the items
correctly, barely more than a quarter of the control group's 90 percent
correct result.2 In particular, the retarded subjects again scored
particularly poorly on the sentence comparisons, answering only 15
percent of the items correctly, and achieving a median of zero.
209 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 8.
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
FIGURE 8
WARNINGS TEST, RESULTS FOR FOURTH MIRANDA SENTENCE:
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Their performance on the yes/no questions suggests that the
disabled actively misunderstand their right to an attorney. The average
disabled subject got only 34 percent correct, far worse than the
expected outcome from random guessing. In contrast, the controls got








for the two groups is emphasized by examining the responses to
specific yes/no questions. For example, when asked "If you are poor,
can you get an attorney?" and "Do you have to have money to get an
attorney?" the nondisabled controls scored 100 percent correct on
both questions. Only 39 percent and 27 percent of the disabled
subjects correctly answered the two questions, respectively. The results
suggest that the disabled actively believe that attorneys are available
only to people with money. The Miranda sentence's contrary
pronouncement was not sufficient to change this belief.
4. Results for the Concepts Test.
The results for the Concepts Test indicate that the disabled
subjects' understanding of the legal context within which Miranda
rights might be exercised is both inconsistent and poor. Figure 9
provides the overall results as well as the results for the three
subsections of the test. In the Concepts Test as a whole, the disabled
got only 38 percent of the possible points, compared to 87 percent for
the controls. These results suggest that even if retarded suspects could
understand the Miranda rights, they would lack sufficient
understanding of the legal context in which they had become
enmeshed to be able to waive their rights knowingly and intelligently.
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FIGURE 9
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The results for the three subsections reinforce this conclusion.
The disabled's understanding of the nature of interrogation is low,
although higher than their understanding in other areas of the test.
The disabled subjects' understanding of the questions concerning the
right to counsel was much lower, and their understanding of the right
to silence in the context of the criminal justice system was minimal.
Although the members of the disabled group displayed some
understanding of the workings of an interrogation, they were unable
to understand more complex concepts such as the roles of client and
lawyer and the nature and ramifications of the decision to invoke the
right to silence.
a) Nature of interrogation. We begin with the first subject: the
nature of interrogation. As Figure 9 reveals, the mentally retarded
group scored 62 percent correct on this section. While higher than the
results achieved by this group on almost all other parts of the test, it
still fell far short of the average correct score of 92 percent for the
controls. Nonetheless, it appears that either the disabled subjects'
education and life experience, or the administration of the warnings,
or some combination of the two, gave them at least some
understanding of an interrogation's purpose and protocol.
It is worth noting that even with the disabled subjects' higher
average score for this entire section of the test, the scores on some
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significant subparts of the section on the nature of interrogation were
lower. As illustrated in Figure 10, for example, it appears that the
disabled subjects' understanding of the implications of a decision to
waive Miranda rights was less than their overall understanding of the
nature of interrogation.20 A relatively small number fully understood
the officers' objectives in the interrogation and the information that
they sought. On both of the questions that explored these issues, fewer
than 50 percent fully understood that, in an interrogation, the officers
sought either to obtain the suspect's confession or to learn about the
suspect's involvement in, or knowledge of, the crime. In contrast, more
than two-thirds of the disabled group understood that in an
interrogation the police believe that the suspect may have committed
a crime.
210 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 9.
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FIGURE 10
CONCEPTS TEST, NATURE OF INTERROGATION,
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b) Right to counseL The disabled subjects' performance on the
section of the test designed to examine the interviewee's
understanding of the lawyer's and client's roles was worse. The results
they achieved on the Right to Counsel measure revealed that the
mentally retarded do not understand these roles. Returning to Figure




93 percent for the controls, and compared to the disabled subjects' 62
percent for the section on the Nature of Interrogation.
The responses on the section's subparts, reported in Figure 11,
confirm both the disabled's lack of understanding and the profound
nature of their confusion.21' Most of the disabled do not understand
that the lawyer is the suspect's advocate. Instead, the disabled confuse
the role of the lawyer with the roles of police, prosecutor, and judge.
For example, only 23 percent of the disabled subjects understood fully
that the lawyer's role was to work in the interests of the suspect.
Instead, 53 percent believed that the lawyer was the suspect's
adversary. For example, a common belief among the disabled was that
the lawyer's job was either to convince the suspect to confess or to
decide whether the suspect was guilty.12
211 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 10.
212 For a listing of common responses, see the study's grading protocol, reproduced in the
Protocol Appendix.
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FIGURE 11
CONCEPTS TEST, UNDERSTANDING VS. MISUNDERSTANDING OF
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Likewise, only 27 percent of the mentally retarded subjects
understood that the client's role with his lawyer was to be helpful and
truthful. Instead, many of the disabled felt that, because they believed
that the lawyer was an adversary, the suspect's appropriate behavior
with the lawyer was to keep quiet and not confess to anything.
Similarly, only 25 percent understood that the lawyer would provide
helpful information about the interrogation and future court-related
processes. Instead, 53 percent believed that the main words from the
attorney would be harsh and accusatory: for example, that the suspect
was guilty and would have to pay for it, or that the suspect was a
failure.
Only 16 percent understood that the lawyer asked the suspect
about the facts of the case in order to help defend the suspect. Instead,
71 percent felt that the lawyer asked only in order to determine
whether the suspect should be punished. For example, the mentally
retarded subjects commonly stated that the lawyer sought information
only to tell the judge about it, to decide whether the suspect should go
to jail, or to determine whether the suspect should be found guilty.
Finally, only 29 percent recognized fully that having a lawyer could
[69:495
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benefit them in court. Instead, 61 percent believed that having a
lawyer would have a negative effect.
The disabled subjects' pervasive confusion about the lawyer
contrasted with the control subjects' firm understanding, with high
total scores and high scores on each of the section's subparts, as shown
in Figure 12.213 The controls readily understood the lawyer's role. The
disabled did not.
FIGURE 12
CONCEPTS TEST, UNDERSTANDING VS. MISUNDERSTANDING OF
ASPECTS OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: NONDISABLED SUBJECTS
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The disabled subjects' confusion about the lawyer's role
eviscerates their right to counsel. A suspect who believes that the
lawyer will be the suspect's adversary will choose not to request a
lawyer.
c) Right to silence. The mentally retarded subjects' understanding
of the context of the right to silence was even worse. Although the
warnings tell the suspect that he has the right to remain silent, the
disabled are deeply confused about what the right to silence means in
practice. As Figure 9 shows, on the Right to Silence section, the
disabled got only 18 percent right.
213 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 10.
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The retarded subjects' responses on the subparts reveal the
nature of the confusion. As Figure 13 shows, only 12 percent
recognized that the right to silence prohibited the police from forcing
the suspect to talk.2 Only 18 percent understood that the judge could
neither override a suspect's invocation of the right to silence nor
compel the suspect to testify.
FIGURE 13
CONCEPTS TEST, UNDERSTANDING VS. MISUNDERSTANDING OF
ASPECTS OF RIGHT TO SILENCE: DISABLED SUBJECTS
nfession can Police cannot Police cannot No penalty for Judge cannot
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Finally, only 2 percent recognized that the suspect could not be
penalized for asserting his right to silence. Instead, 98 percent of the
disabled subjects believed that the decision to remain silent would be
punished. Common beliefs were that silence would lead the judge to
make punishment worse, to think that the suspect was guilty, or to say
211that if the suspect were not guilty, he should have nothing to hide.
As with the confusion about the right to counsel, the disabled
subjects' misunderstandings of the right to silence effectively
214 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 11.
215 See the grading protocol, reproduced in the Protocol Appendix.
[69:495
Words Without Meaning
eliminate the right. The misunderstandings could easily cause a
disabled person to waive the right and confess. A suspect would have
little incentive to remain silent if the suspect believed, as the disabled
do, that the police or judge could nonetheless compel the suspect to
speak. Likewise, mentally retarded suspects might fear remaining
silent because they believe that the judge will punish the silence.
Although the controls understood the right to silence far better
than did the disabled subjects, the controls' understanding of this right
was substantially worse than their understanding of other Miranda
rights. As shown in Figure 9, the controls scored only 75 percent
correct, substantially lower than their scores both on other parts of the
Concepts Test and on the other tests. Moreover, the controls' scores
on the right-to-silence subparts suggest substantial confusion as to
various aspects of the right to silence. As Figure 14 shows, 59 percent
of the controls thought that the judge could compel a defendant to
216speak. Likewise, 27 percent believed that the judge could penalize
invocation of the right to silence. Smaller but still substantial numbers
of the controls believed that the law permitted the police both to put
pressure on a suspect who chose to remain silent and to force the
suspect to speak.
216 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 11.
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FIGURE 14
CONCEPTS TEST, UNDERSTANDING VS. MISUNDERSTANDING OF
ASPECTS OF RIGHT TO SILENCE: NONDISABLED SUBJECTS
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5. The understanding of the controls.
The three tests demonstrate that the control subjects'
understanding of the Miranda warnings generally was quite good, but
with one major gap and a few minor ones. On the Vocabulary Test, the
controls did well overall, obtaining 83 percent of possible points.
However, understanding was not perfect. For three of the words-
"consult," "right," and "statement" -almost half of the controls did
not obtain perfect scores.218 For "appoint," 18 percent of the controls• 219
received zero points.
The controls' performance on the Warnings Test was also quite
good, with average scores of approximately 90 percent for both the
comparisons and yes/no questions.228 The controls also had a firm
understanding of each individual right within the Miranda warnings,
217 See Figure 3 and Statistical Appendix, Table 3.
218 Statistical Appendix, Table 3.
219 Id.
2Mo See Figure 4 and Statistical Appendix, Table 4.
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as indicated by their sound performance on the Warnings Test's four
subsections, including the right to silence.2'
Likewise, the controls did well on the first two parts of the
Concepts Test. They understood well both the nature of interrogation
and the context surrounding the right to counsel.-
If the Miranda warnings were to be improved in one area, it
should be in expressing the right to silence more clearly and
completely. The Concept Test's third section on the right to silence
shows that the disabled misunderstand the right completely. The
controls misperceive it partially, earning only 75 percent of the total
points.m Specifically, the results suggest that the warning should
express more clearly both that a suspect cannot be punished for
asserting the right and that neither the police nor the judge can
override the right."
6. Inadequacy of the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
Multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that the courts'
totality-of-the-circumstances test for evaluating confessions by
mentally retarded suspects is inappropriate and misguided. Our
results undermine both of the essential hypotheses that justify the test.
First, most of the factors that courts assume can increase
understanding do not have that effect. Second, if a subject is disabled,
then the subject cannot understand the Miranda warnings, regardless
of the presence of any other factors.
a) Three of the courts' five factors do not influence understanding.
Regression analysis permits us to reject the courts' first working
hypothesis that the following factors all influence a disabled suspect's
level of understanding of her Miranda rights: intelligence, measured
by IQ; age; level of education; previous contact with police; and
previous administration of the Miranda warnings. The stars in Figure
15 indicate which of the courts' variables (plus race and sex) had an
impact,m the other factors held constant, on each of four measures of
understanding of the Miranda warnings. The four measures of
understanding in the regressions were the combined percent correct
on all of the tests (in column 1 of Figure 15) and the three individual
test scores (in columns 2- 4).'
221 See Figures 5-8 and Statistical Appendix, Tables 5-8.
222 See Figures 9,10, and 12 and Statistical Appendix, Tables 9-10.
223 See Figure 9 and Statistical Appendix, Table 11.
224 See Figure 14 and Statistical Appendix, Table 11.
225 "Impact" here means statistically significant at at least a 10 percent confidence level. See
Statistical Appendix, Tables 12-17.
226 Figure 15 summarizes the regression results from the Statistical Appendix, Tables 12,13,
14, and 16. To identify the influences on each measure of understanding, we ran two regressions
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FIGURE 15
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL SCORE AND THREE TESTS
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all tests Test Test Test
Disabled (IQ below_




. Earlier contact with





For all four measures of understanding, the only significant
influences were disability/IQ and earlier contact with the police.W
Indeed, for the score on the Vocabulary Test in column 2, only
disability/IQ was a significant influence. . Contrary to the courts'
common hypothesis, the other factors that courts often consider-age,
years of education, previous Miranda warnings-influenced none of
for each measure. First, we ran the regression with all of the test subjects, both disabled and
controls. Because we lacked information on the controls' IQs, we used a dummy variable to
indicate whether the subject was in our disabled group. The details of these results appear in the
Statistical Appendix, Tables 12-16. Our second regression examined which of the factors
influenced the total percent correct among the disabled. That is, the second regression examined
whether, among the disabled subjects, there was a significant impact on percent correct from IQ,
age, education, contact with police, earlier warnings, race, or sex. Limiting the second regression
to the disabled, for whom we had IQ data, permitted us to examine the influence on
understanding of the level of each subject's disability, rather than merely whether the subject was
disabled, as in the first regression. Because the coefficients that were significant were the same
for both sets of regressions, Figure 15 combines the regression results into a single column for
each measure.
227 At either the 5 percent or 10 percent significance level.
228 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 13.
[69:495
Words Without Meaning
the four measures of understanding. We also tested the possible
influence on understanding of the subject's race and sex, although
courts do not formally consider these characteristics as part of the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. We found that race and sex had no
significant influence on understanding.'
Not only did being disabled have an impact on understanding, the
impact was large. Figure 16 depicts the sizes of the impacts on the four
measures of understanding from each of the factors. 0 All other things
equal, the impact of being in the disabled group with an IQ below 88
was to decrease a disabled subject's score by 52 percentage points.
That is, a disabled subject who, if not disabled, would have received an
overall score of 90 percent correct, would on average instead earn
only 38 percent. Similarly, on the Vocabulary Test, all else equal, the
disabled subjects received 57 percentage points less than the
nondisabled subjects. On the Miranda Warnings Test, they received 58
fewer percentage points. On the Concepts Test, being disabled
reduced a subject's score by 40 percentage points.
229 See id.
23 Figure 16 summarizes the sizes of the coefficients in the Statistical Appendix, Tables 12,
13,14, and 16.
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FIGURE 16
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disabled tion with police warning
mOverall score EOVocab. Test MWamings Test EConcepts Test]
Although earlier police contact had an impact on understanding,
its impact was small. All other things equal, subjects with earlier police
contact earned 10 percentage points higher overall scores3' Police
contact had no significant impact on scoring on the Vocabulary Test. It
increased scoring by only 11 percentage points on the Warnings Test
and only 17 percentage points on the Concepts Test.2 As we saw
already in Figure 15 and as we see again in Figure 16, all of the other
factors had no significant impact.n3
b) A disabled subject fails to understand the warning, regardless of
other factors. Regression analysis also rejects the courts' second
working hypothesis: that a defendant with high levels of the other
factors will understand his Miranda rights, even if his low IQ indicates
231 See Statistical Appendix. This is the result for the regressions that included all subjects.
In the regression that included only disabled subjects, the impact of prior police contact was a
slightly higher 12 percent. Id.
232 Statistical Appendix, Tables 14 and 16. The regressions with only disabled subjects
yielded similar results: impacts of 10 percent for the Warnings Test and 20 percent for the
Concepts Test. Id.
233 See also Statistical Appendix, Tables 12,13,14, and 16.
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mental retardation.24 The courts' approach assumes that even a
disabled person can knowingly and intelligently waive her Miranda
fights if her low IQ is counterbalanced by age, education, and
experience with the police.2" Our results challenge this assumption.
They suggest that even those disabled defendants with police
experience, the one other factor that influenced scores, do not
understand their Miranda rights. A person who is disabled does not
understand the warnings, regardless of the other factors. Indeed, no
disabled person in our sample understood the warnings adequately2
Moreover, among the disabled group, those who were only mildly
disabled did not understand the warnings substantially better than
those who were severely disabled. If a subject was disabled, even just
mildly, then the subject did not understand the warnings. Whether or
not the subject was disabled determined understanding. The degree of
disability had little impact.
Figure 17 presents regression results that demonstrate these two
findings. It presents the score that a disabled person would be
expected to obtain on each of the four measures of understanding if
all other factors that influence understanding were favorable; given
that a person is disabled, the figure sets forth the predicted scores for
the person if the person possessed all of the other characteristics that
increase understanding. We have seen that the two factors that can
increase understanding are IQ and prior police contact.m Thus, Figure
17 presents the predicted scores on the four measures of
understanding for subjects who barely qualify as disabled, with IQs
just below the cutoff of 70, and who have had earlier contact with the
police.M
234 See text accompanying notes 163-65.
235 See Part III.B.
236 See note 238 and accompanying text.
237 See Part IV.B.1; note 227 and accompanying text.
238 The predictions are based on the coefficients in the Statistical Appendix, Tables 12, 13,
14, and 16.
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FIGURE 17
PREDICTED SCORES FOR SUBJECTS WITH MILDEST DISABILITY








Overall score Vocab. Test Warnings Test Concepts Test
Even this best-case disabled person will not understand his
Miranda rights. The person's predicted overall score is only 41 percent,
with expected scores on the three individual tests of 31 percent, 38
percent, and 53 percent. As we saw above,2" being disabled reduced a
subject's predicted overall score by 52 percentage points. Having a
mild disability rather than a severe disability, or having prior police
contact, increased the subject's expected score by far too little to make
up for this and create real understanding.2"O Contrary to the courts'
typical assumption, the disabled do not understand their Miranda
rights, regardless of how mild their disability is and regardless of other
factors.2'
c) Results on bottom-line questions also contradict the courts'
assumptions. Regression results for two bottom-line questions
confirm that both of the courts' common assumptions are flawed. As
part of the Warnings Test, we asked two questions that tested whether
the subject understood one of the fundamental messages from the
Miranda warnings: "Do you have to tell the police what happened?"
239 See Part IV.B.1.
240 An increase in IQ of twenty-five points, representing a change from being severely
disabled to only mildly disabled, would increase total percent correct by only 20 percentage
points. See Statistical Appendix, Table 12. Prior police contact would increase total percent
correct by 10 to 12 percentage points. Id.
241 In our sample, the highest total score for any subject with an IQ below 70 was 60
percent. Other subjects with IQs approaching 70 had much lower total scores. For example, one
subject with an IQ of 69 had a total score of 23 percent.
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and "Do you have to answer the police if they ask you any questions?"
The stars in Figure 18 indicate which of the possible factors influenced
whether the subjects answered the questions correctly.22
FIGURE 18
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS
Stars indicate significant influences on:
Correct answer on Correct answer on "Do
"Do you have to tell you have to answer the
the police what police if they ask you
happened?" any questions?"
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
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Subject disabled .............
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In the regressions for both questions in which we used the entire
sample, both disabled and nondisabled together, the only coefficient
that was statistically significant was whether the subject was mentally
retarded.43 Having a disability had a huge impact on understanding.
As depicted in Figure 19, a disabled subject had only 1/100 the
probability of answering the first question correctly as did a
242 Figure 18 summarizes the full regression results, which are found in the Statistical
Appendix,Table 15.
243 we used a logistic specification because the dependent variable was a yes-no variable.
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nondisabled subject, and only 1/20 the probability of getting the
second question right.2" That is, on the fundamental lesson of the
Miranda warnings that a defendant need not speak with the police, the
nondisabled had from twenty times to one hundred times greater
probability of understanding than the disabled, an order of magnitude
difference.
FIGURE 19
RELATIVE PROBABILITIES THAT DISABLED AND NONDISABLED
ANSWER CENTRAL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY:
"Do you have to tell the police what happened?"
Odds







The results reject both of the courts' hypotheses. First, all of the
variables other than disability, including all of the factors that courts
typically use in their totality-of-the-circumstances test, failed to yield
statistically significant coefficients. These results also necessarily reject
the courts' second hypothesis. Because no factors other than disability
significantly influence understanding, the other factors cannot
counterbalance the lack of understanding from the disability.
244 The impact of IQ and disability as revealed in the regression is larger than in the means
of our data. See Figure 2. This is because the regression analysis permits us to isolate the impact
of IQ and disability, holding all else constant.
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In regressions with only the disabled subjects, rather than
everyone, the results in columns 2 and 4 in Figure 18 show that, on the
bottomline issue of whether a defendant must speak to the police,
none of the factors had a significant impact on the disabled subjects'
understanding.45 If a subject was disabled, then the subject did not
understand the Miranda warnings, regardless of where the subject's
IQ lay within the range from 18 to 88, and regardless of any of the
other factors.265 he disabled simply do not understand.
Considering the results from Figure 18's columns 1 and 3 together
with the results from columns 2 and 4 shows that the overriding
influence on whether a person understands the bottom line of the
warnings is whether he has a mental retardation. 2" If he has a
disability, then he does not understand the Miranda warnings. If they
have no disability, then they probably understand the warnings.
Among the subjects with a disability, none of the factors improved
understanding. If the person is disabled, then it does not matter that
the person has only a mild disability, that the person is old, has many
years of education, has been arrested before, or has had the police
earlier read him the warnings. The disabled person still does not
understand the warning.
d) Many nonretarded people fail to understand. Eleven, or more
than one-fifth, of our "disabled" subjects had IQs above the usual
threshold of 70. Like the subjects with scores below 70, this group did
not understand their Miranda rights. For the subjects with IQs from 71
to 88, the average total score was only 45 percent, with scores ranging
from 21 percent to 76 percent. Even the highest total score among this
group was too low to constitute the necessary understanding.
Although only 11 people in our sample had IQs between 71 and 88,
their strikingly low scores are sufficient to suggest, and to do so with a
high level of statistical significance, that this group does not have
sufficient understanding of their rights. For example, even with our
modest sample size, simple calculations indicate that, at more than a
95 percent level of statistical confidence, the true mean for this
population is less than 77 percent'-insufficient to constitute
adequate understanding. Nonetheless, a study with more subjects in
this group would be valuable to test these results.
245 See also Statistical Appendix, Table 15.
246 One subject with an IQ of 72 obtained a total score of 76 percent. No other subject with
an IQ of 88 or below approached this level. Even this score was insufficient to indicate the
necessary understanding. See text accompanying notes 236-41.
247 Statistical Appendix, Table 15.
248 See note 246.
249 The standard deviation for this group's scores is 15.7.
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The regression results confirm this group's lack of understanding.
The results indicate that even a person with an IQ of 80 and prior
experience with police would be expected to obtain an overall score of
only 49 percent, far lower than the 87 percent that the nondisabled
controls achieved. A suspect with an 80 IQ and without prior police
experience would be expected to obtain a total score of only 38
percent.
This result challenges the Miranda decision's fundamental
assumption, that nonretarded people who have been "Mirandized"
will understand their rights. Although our results indicate that our
controls of approximately average intelligence understand their rights,
many nonretarded people of below-average intelligence do not. Only
at some IQ above 88 but below the IQ of our control group do people
begin to understand their rights.
The results suggest that each year thousands of nonretarded
people of below-average intelligence are confessing and being
convicted without the knowing and intelligent waivers that the
Constitution requires.2 Prisons and death rows doubtless house many
nonretarded people who failed completely to understand their right to
silence, their right to an attorney, and the surrounding legal context.
V. SOLUTIONS
These empirical results demonstrate that the Miranda warnings
are not "effective" for the population of mentally retarded people, and
likely are ineffective for many nonretarded people of below-average
intelligence. The empirical results also show that the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis as employed by the courts is inadequate to
ensure that waivers and confessions by mentally retarded suspects
satisfy constitutional standards. These data suggest that some
additional protective mechanisms are needed when mentally retarded
people are confronted with custodial interrogation.
Devising such mechanisms is a formidable undertaking. Crafting
rules that protect individual rights while permitting law enforcers to
perform their important functions is always difficult, and the special
problems posed by mentally retarded suspects only complicate the
problem. Consider, for example, the difficulties inherent in Professor
White's proposal for screening juveniles and mentally retarded people
before interrogation commences.
Because it is very likely that the government's use of standard
interrogation methods on particularly vulnerable suspects will
250 For example, one study suggests that 16 percent of criminal defendants have IQs
between 70 and 80. See Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 214 table 3 (cited in note 22).
[69:495
Words Without Meaning
produce untrustworthy confessions, the police should be required
to determine the suspect's age and mental capacity before
interrogation. Their findings should then dictate the range of
permissible interrogation methods. For example, if a suspect is
determined to be mentally retarded, the police should not be
allowed to use the nine-step process described by the Inbau
Manual With these suspects, the police should be limited to
asking nonleading questions and prohibited from insinuating that
they believe the suspect is guilty."
Pre-interrogation screening would be relatively easy for police
departments to implement with most juveniles, because age is a
readily ascertainable objective fact. But identifying mental retardation
is another matter. Just as it is beyond dispute that mental retardation
makes people more vulnerable to these interrogation tactics, it seems
indisputable that actors within the criminal justice process may fail to
recognize a suspect's disability. M "Individuals with mental retardation
are not always easy to identify, especially those who function well
socially, or attempt to disguise their disabilities.' 3 Police officers,
prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike may fail to identify a
suspect's disability until long after a confession has been secured.
It might be possible to compensate for this uncertainty on a case-
by-case basis. For example, officers could operate under a "when in
doubt, assume retardation" directive, commanding that "when officers
suspect they have an offender with mental retardation, they should
proceed as if the individual is mentally retarded until provided
evidence to the contrary.' '  This solution is imperfect. First, it requires
that officers be trained to identify mentally retarded suspects. Second,
errors of over- and underinclusion inevitably will result.
Similar difficulties attend other common proposals for regulating
interrogations, such as requiring the presence of a defense attorney,"
requiring that questioning be conducted by a judge or magistrate, '
251 White, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 142-43 (cited in note 34). The Supreme Court has
recognized that, by virtue of the Due Process Clause, "certain interrogation techniques, either in
isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned" Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412,466 n 62
(1986), quoting Miller v Fenton, 474 US 104, 109 (1985). Accord Colorado v Connelly, 479 US
157,163 (1986).
252 See note 75 and accompanying text.
253 Bowker, 63 FBI L Enforcement at 13 (cited in note 40). See notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
254 Id.
255 See Grisso, 68 Cal L Rev at 1161-64 (cited in note 22).
256 See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The
Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mich L Rev 2625,2669-70 (1996) (noting possible variations on pre-
trial interrogations by magistrates); Akhil R. Amar and Renee B. Letton, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich L Rev 857,858-59 (1995) (suggesting benefits
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requiring exclusion of confessions resulting from custodial
interrogation, ' requiring that interrogations be recorded,7 limiting
the length of interrogations T2 or prohibiting trickery.2° Because of the
identification problem, each of these remedies would protect all
mentally retarded suspects only if required for interrogation of all
suspects. Otherwise, some number of unidentified mentally retarded
suspects would be interrogated without these safeguards.
It is not even certain that some of these proposals would be
useful mechanisms for ensuring that confessions by mentally retarded
suspects were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. For example,
interrogation by a judge or magistrate might induce a mentally
retarded suspect to confess falsely in an attempt to please an authority
figure who appears even more imposing than does a police officer,
particularly if the questioning occurs in a courtroom. Because defense
attorneys may be no more capable than are police officers of
recognizing the existence of this disability, or of understanding the
special problems confronting mentally retarded suspects, merely
having a defense attorney present may not provide the assistance
required by this unique population/"
of pretrial interrogations presided over by a judge or magistrate).
257 See Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 78 J Crim L & Criminol 699,727-28 (1988).
258 See White, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 153-55 (cited in note 34) (citing numerous earlier
sources recommending reform of interrogation practices).
259 See id at 143-45 (adducing empirical evidence to suggest that longer interrogations
result in more false confessions); Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in
Law and Policy 98-99 (Michigan 1980) (noting Fred Inbau's classifications of interrogation
trickery).
260 See White, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 145-49 (cited in note 34) (arguing that certain
kinds of police deception can sometimes convince even an innocent person of his own guilt).
261 A common solution proposed for resolving analogous problems arising from
interrogations of juveniles is to require the presence of an attorney. See, for example, Steven A.
Greenburg, Learning Disabled Juveniles & Miranda Rights-What Constitutes Voluntary,
Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 Golden Gate U L Rev 487,492 (1991); Holtz, 78 J Crim L &
Criminol at 541-42 (cited in note 180); Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 200-01 (cited in note
22); Grisso, 68 Cal L Rev at 1161-64 (cited in note 21); Grisso and Pomicter, 1 L & Human Beh
at 341 (cited in note 22); Ferguson and Douglas, 7 San Diego L Rev at 50-54 (cited in note 176).
Various national organizations have promulgated standards designed to provide special
protection to juveniles in an interrogation setting. See, for example, National Advisory
Committee on Criminal Justice, Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Standard 5.& Guidelines for Interrogation and Waiver of Right Against Self-Incrimination 212-13
(1976) (recommending in particular that juvenile waivers of Miranda rights should only be
effective when made with consent); National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention of the U.S. Department of Justice, Standards for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice, Standard 2.247 (1980) (recommending that accused juveniles be made aware of
particular rights in language understandable to them). The most widely used police interrogation
manual has advocated that special protection must be afforded to juveniles and to all other
persons of below-average intelligence to minimize the risk of obtaining untruthful admissions
due to their vulnerability to suggestive questioning. See Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights at 16-
19 (cited in note 22) (discussing the possibility that interrogations of juveniles are inherently
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Post-interrogation review of a videotape of an interrogation may
only reveal that officers utilized standard interrogation practices,
without providing insights into the suspect's inability to comprehend
the warnings or their significance. Indeed, the suspect's statement on
the videotape that he understood the warnings could mislead those
reviewing the tape into concluding that a mentally retarded suspect
actually understood the warnings. Although each of these solutions
may have benefits, the most rational way to pursue those benefits
would to be to apply them in all cases, and not merely when a suspect
has been identified as mentally retarded.
Rather than simply rehash the virtues and vices of these common
proposals,2 we have attempted to identify solutions directed more
precisely at the problem of assuring that confessions by mentally
retarded suspects satisfy constitutional standards. We present five
different proposals. None is perfect.
For example, only the first proposal, per se exclusion of
confessions, would ensure that convictions of mentally retarded
people cannot be based upon constitutionally invalid waivers. But this
constitutional benefit is costly: it would eliminate confessions from an
entire class of suspects. In contrast, two of the proposals could lead to
a very different conclusion: disregard mental retardation and admit all
coercive); Grisso, 68 Cal L Rev at 1137 (cited in note 22) (noting the vulnerability of juveniles in
their dealings with police). Following these studies and new standards, many jurisdictions have
adopted per se exclusionary rules for confessions by juveniles whenever certain initial safeguards
have not been met. See Anthony J. Krastek, Comment, Judicial Response to Juvenile Confessions:
An Examination of the Per Se Rule, 17 Duquesne L Rev 659, 660-61 (1978-79) (listing these
jurisdictions). See also Custody Prior to Appearance before Magistrate, 18 USC § 5033 (1974)
(mandating that rights be explained to the arrested juvenile and to her parent, and that the
juvenile should be brought before a magistrate "forthwith"); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 46b-137(a)
(West Supp 1981) (requiring that juvenile confession be ruled inadmissible unless rights were
explained to arrested juvenile and her parent); Okla Stat Ann 10 § 1109(a) (West Supp 1979-80)
(requiring presence of a parent); In re Dino, 359 So2d 586,594 (La 1978) (holding that a waiver
is per se inadmissible if the juvenile did not have the assistance of an informed and interested
adult); Commonwealth v Smith, 372 A2d 797, 802 (Pa 1977) (holding that a minor's waiver is
invalid when the minor is not "in fact provided an opportunity for consultation").
Of course, the Supreme Court has recognized the special vulnerability of juveniles during
police interrogations. In re Gault, 387 US 1, 55 (1967) ("Trhe greatest care must be taken to
assure that the admission was ... not the product of ... adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.").
See also Gallegos v Colorado, 370 US 49, 54 (1962) ("[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how
sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him.").
262 No proposed solution receives more widespread support among Miranda's critics than
does the use of technology to make a record of the interrogation. See, for example, Stuntz, 99
Mich L Rev at 981 n 19 (cited in note 9) (citing numerous commentaries and concluding that
"[t]he need for video- and audiotaping is the one proposition that wins universal agreement in
the Miranda literature"); Paul G. Cassell, 90 Nw U L Rev at 486-92 (cited in note 5); Cassell, 99
Mich L Rev at 938-39 (cited in note 16) (proposing videotaping as a substitute for the warnings);
id at 939 n 224 (citing proposals to use videotaping as a supplement for the warnings);
Schulhofer, 99 Mich L Rev at 952-955 (cited in note 15) (proposing videotaping as a supplement
to the warnings).
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confessions obtained in compliance with Miranda and without
government coercion that would violate the traditional totalities test.
Honest analysis of all five proposals ultimately emphasizes the
difficulty of devising legal rules that will succeed at protecting the
rights of mentally retarded suspects.
1. Apply per se rules of exclusion.
One possible solution is to adopt a per se rule of exclusion. In its
broadest form, the rule would be: if custodial interrogation produces a
confession from a mentally retarded suspect, the confession is
inadmissible in subsequent judicial proceedings.
The justification for such a rule follows directly from our
empirical research. Our results suggest that the class of people with
IQ scores below 70, and perhaps even 80, does not understand the
Miranda warnings, W and the presence of other characteristics
commonly considered in the totality analysis does not compensate for
this fact. If the words "knowing" and "intelligent" are to have any
rational meaning, it is impossible for a person who cannot understand
the warnings to execute a valid waiver of his rights. Because the
underlying justification for Miranda is that the knowledge imparted
by the warnings ensures that confessions are voluntary and not the
product of coercion, waivers by members of the class are not
voluntary. Thus a per se exclusionary rule employs Miranda's own
analysis, equating knowledge with voluntariness in a manner
consistent with the acknowledged psychological propensities of
mentally retarded individuals to succumb to pressures more readily
than would people of at least average intelligence.2'
This solution has a practical virtue: it creates a readily
enforceable bright line rule. A judge would not have to make difficult
decisions about whether a person with mental retardation was capable
of understanding and waiving his or her Miranda rights. A judge also
would not have to make the hard judgment of whether the police
knew or should have known that the person had a mental retardation.
A global exclusionary rule has obvious costs. On the most
practical level, a per se rule might impose additional administrative
costs. For example, governments might be forced to incur the expense
of giving an IQ test to every individual who is arrested and claims to
be disabled, or whose behavior indicates that possibility. Of course,
these costs might be minimized if the government and the defense rely
upon preexisting records of the defendant's mental capacity. IQ tests
263 Although our study suggests that even people with IQs up to 88 may not understand the
warnings, we round down to reduce the possibility of overinclusiveness.
264 See notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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may have been administered previously in a setting where there is no
reason to question the validity of the results. On the other hand,
collateral attacks upon the results of the IQ tests also could occur,
which would generate additional litigation and costs. As a practical
matter, the same kinds of collateral litigation can occur under the
present regime, so the problem of additional costs may be slight.
Another cost might, however, be significant. Exclusion of
confessions might affect the government's ability to prosecute a case
against an individual with mental retardation. This is a real problem
and one that we do not take lightly, because confessions produced by
custodial interrogation frequently provide evidence useful, if not
essential, to the prosecution's case.m In many cases, the government
will have other evidence upon which to bring its case, and exclusion of
a confession will likely have a minimal effect. In cases where the
government's only evidence would be the individual's confession, the
reality is that the government will be unable to prosecute a case
effectively. This is an undeniable cost, but it is a cost offset by the
danger that a mentally retarded person's confession may be false. In
those cases, use of the confession can produce catastrophic effects,
including the imprisonment or even the execution of innocent
people.6
Finally, the costs of a per se exclusionary rule emphasize the
problem of identifying those suspects to whom it would apply. An IQ
score of 70 is typically used as the marker for mental retardation. Yet
IQ scores are unreliable, , and our study demonstrates that some
people with higher IQ scores are incapable of understanding the
warnings.' A suspect with an IQ score of 74 may be as likely to
deserve the benefit of this rule as is one with a score of 70.* 2
These problems suggest that it might be more desirable to adopt
more limited per se rules. For example, it would be possible to exclude
265 See, for example, Cassell, 90 Nw U L Rev at 438 (cited in note 5) (reporting that
according to "reliable" studies confessions are necessary to conviction in about 24 percent of
cases in which confessions are involved); Leo, 86 J Crim L & Criminol at 280 (cited in note 11)
(estimating that interrogations conducted in the 1990s produced useful incriminating statements
in 64 percent of the cases).
266 See notes 34-38 and accompanying text. See also White, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 108 n
26 (cited in note 34) (listing examples of studies' and suspects' claims "that standard
interrogation techniques have led them to give false confessions").
267 Dr. Mel Levine, the prominent author and lecturer about brain function and learning,
uses IQ tests and scores as an example of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," which he
defines as an "abstraction that you have used so long that you forget it's an abstraction." This
remark was made during a lecture at the Emory University School of Law (Sept 10, 2001).
263 See Part IV.B.1.
269 For example, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether the
Constitution permits the execution of mentally retarded people, Atkins v Virginia, 2001 US
LEXIS 5356, amended at 2001 US LEXIS 5463.
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
any confession by a mentally retarded person unless other evidence
corroborated the confession. The existence of DNA or other
corroborating scientific or physical evidence might be required. This
type of rule has virtues for both the prosecution and the defense. It
would allow prosecutors to use confessions substantiated by extrinsic,
reliable evidence while protecting mentally retarded defendants from
use of the most unreliable confessions.2°
Nonetheless, this solution suffers from a notable doctrinal defect.
It substitutes reliability for the constitutional standards governing
waivers of rights. A confession can be truthful and yet not be the
product of a knowing and intelligent waiver. To adopt a limited per se
rule of this sort requires that we be willing to wink at the commands
of current constitutional theory in the hope that the end results are
worth the tradeoff. This kind of compromise is far from uncommon in
constitutional law, and a method that reduces the likelihood of
convictions based upon false confessions has much to recommend it.
At least the words of the confession would be more likely to be
meaningful-even if the command that the mentally retarded
suspects' waiver of these rights must be knowing and intelligent would
continue to be more myth than reality.
Inevitably, this would produce cases in which courts were forced
to decide how to handle confessions that appear to be reliable, yet
were the product of invalid waivers. One possible method of avoiding
this problem would be to try to produce valid waivers by simplifying
the warnings that mentally retarded people can understand.
2. Administer simplified warnings.
This solution would require law enforcement officers to
administer warnings containing simplified synonyms for difficult
words in the Miranda warnings. Our empirical study tested the
capacity of mentally retarded people to understand such synonyms.
Unfortunately, the results suggest that simplified warnings would be
an ineffective means of addressing the problem." '
The mentally retarded subjects in our study understood the
simplified vocabulary only slightly better than the original vocabulary
270 A traditional justification for excluding confessions has been unreliability. See, for
example, John Henry Wigmore, 2 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 822 at 139-40 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1923) (noting that experience
demonstrates that innocent persons may sometimes view silence as a worse alternative than false
confession).
271 The ineffectiveness of a simplified vocabulary is confirmed by studies of juvenile
defendants. The studies show that a simplified vocabulary increased juveniles' understanding
little. See Holtz, 78 J Crim L & Criminol at 553-56 (cited in note 180) (developing a simplified
"Youth Rights Form"); Ferguson and Douglas, 7 San Diego L Rev at 50-54 (cited in note 176)
(finding simplified warnings do not significantly help the understanding of juveniles).
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of the warnings. As Figure 20 shows, considering results for all of the
words together, they obtained an average of only 27 percent correct
on the simplified vocabulary, compared to 20 percent correct for the
regular Miranda vocabulary. In contrast, members of the nondisabled
control group were correct for 83 percent of the Miranda vocabulary
and 89 percent correct on the simplified vocabulary.m Only 14 percent of
the disabled subjects got at least partial credit on each of the simplified
words, compared to 82 percent for the nondisabled control group.
272 These results also indicate that these simplified warnings produced comparably small
increases in the understanding of the warning by those who have no disability. The simplified
vocabulary increased the control subjects' average scoring on the vocabulary test by only 6
percentage points, compared to 7 percent for the disabled subjects.
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FIGURE 20
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Like the overall scores, the results obtained for the individual
words confirmed that the disabled subjects understood the simplified
terms only slightly better than the original terms. For example, Figure
21 shows that although the average score for the disabled on
understanding the original term "entitled" was only 16 percent, the











only 17 percent. 3 Although the disabled subjects' improvement in the
scores for the simplified vocabulary words ranged from 2 percent to
19 percent, the disabled subjects got more than 30 percent correct for
only one of the simplified terms, and did not exceed 50 percent for any
item. These data suggest that a simplified vocabulary would produce
little overall improvement in mentally retarded persons'
understanding of the individual terms contained in the warnings.
FIGURE 21
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The results of our study suggest another reason that a simplified
set of warnings would be ineffective at producing knowing and
intelligent waivers. Even if mentally retarded people could understand
the vocabulary of the warnings, the results of the Concepts Test
suggest that they do not understand the workings of the legal system
sufficiently to understand the contextual meaning of the warnings. The
Concepts Test explored each subject's understanding of the goals of
273 Regression analysis shows that the simplified warning caused the greatest improvement
in young subjects, and, to a lesser extent, in those with earlier police contact. See Statistical
Appendix, Table 17.
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each party in an interrogation, the relationship between a suspect and
his lawyer, and the functional environment for the right to silence. As
Figure 9 shows, the disabled subjects had a poor understanding of the
legal system and the respective roles played by the police, the disabled
subject being interrogated, and the subject's guardian or attorney. The
disabled subjects scored only 38 percent correct on this test, compared
to 87 percent correct earned by the nondisabled controls.2"
Merely simplifying the warnings would do little to provide most
disabled people with the knowledge about the legal system that they
need to understand either how the system functions or their rights
within the system. For example, telling a disabled suspect that he can
speak to a lawyer but need not speak to the police means little if the
suspect does not understand that the lawyer represents the suspect,
while the police and the suspect occupy adversarial roles.
One might argue that such a lack of understanding should not
invalidate waivers. For example, in Colorado v Spring,'7 the Supreme
Court concluded that the "Constitution does not require that a
criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of
a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.' 'n6 Whatever the merits of
this conclusion, it should not govern cases in which the suspect lacks
the mental capacity to understand the warnings. In fact, in Spring, the
Court supported its conclusion that the defendant's waiver was
knowing and intelligent by stressing that there was "no allegation that
Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. Nor [was] there any allegation that he misunderstood
the consequences of speaking freely to the law enforcement
officials."' Once again, it is hard to find support for the validity of a
waiver by a defendant who is incapable of understanding either the
words of the warnings or the concepts they embody.
274 These results conflict with the judicial decisions concluding that, although mentally
retarded defendants were incapable of understanding these concepts, their confessions were
admissible because the police had given the suspects simplified versions of the warnings. See, for
example, People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285,465 NE2d 327,328 (1984) (holding waiver valid when
suspect was capable of understanding the "immediate meaning" of the words of a simplified
warning); Simpson v Commonwealth, 318 SE2d 386, 390 (Va 1984) (holding that the "clear and
simple" language of the warnings issued was sufficient to offset the relatively low intelligence of
the accused).
275 479 US 564 (1987).
276 Id at 574.
277 Id at 575 (recognizing that the defendant claimed, to the contrary, that the waiver was
not knowing and intelligent because the defendant had not been advised by law enforcers of the
full scope of the interrogation).
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3. Modify the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
If the cognitive performance of mentally retarded suspects
cannot be improved by simplifying the warnings, another possible
method of ensuring that waivers by mentally retarded suspects satisfy
constitutional standards would be to attempt to improve the totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis used by the courts. This seems like a
worthwhile endeavor, particularly because courts are almost certain to
continue to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in the
future. A close look at the history of the voluntariness analysis reveals
that the totalities method is so embedded in this particular area of
constitutional law that it would be hard to extirpate, even if this were
the goal.
From a broader jurisprudential perspective, it is equally unlikely
that judges will abandon this type of methodology. This type of "all
things considered" analysis is precisely how our judges often go about
resolving legal questions.2
If judges are certain to continue to employ this "all things
considered" approach, it is sensible to attempt to make the analysis as
accurate and reliable as possible. Unfortunately, the results of our
empirical study of factors commonly relied upon by the courts
indicate that mentally retarded defendants will not understand all of
the Miranda warnings, despite the presence of the factors studied.m If
the courts had available only the factors they traditionally have
emphasized, the data suggest that a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis should contain but a single factor: the defendant's mental
retardation. In effect, this brings us back to a per se approach in which
the existence of the disability governs the admissibility of a
confession.
One limitation in our study suggests a valuable topic for future
research. Since we examined only five of the most common factors
used by the courts, the results provide no information about how
other factors might affect mentally retarded suspects' understanding
of the warnings. A useful subject for future research would be to
attempt to identify other factors that correlate with a mentally
retarded person's capacity to comprehend either the Miranda
278 See notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
279 See, for example, Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 176--80 (cited in note 50) (contrasting
"rule-based" decisionmaking with "all things considered" judicial reasoning); Morgan Cloud,
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L Rev 199,245-
47 (1993) (criticizing balancing but noting that it "now dominates major areas of constitutional
law"); T. Alexander Aleinkoff Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943, 965
(1987) (noting the dominance of balancing in Fourth Amendment and procedural due process
analyses).
250 See Part IV.B.
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warnings or the significance of forsaking them. It is possible that
additional factors could be identified to improve the effectiveness of
the totalities test in ensuring that waivers are valid and confessions are
voluntary.
Ultimately, this may well prove a fruitless endeavor, at least if the
Miranda and Dickerson opinions mean what they say. Miranda held and
Dickerson affirmed that when suspects face custodial interrogation,
something more than the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis is needed to ensure that their confessions are not the
unconstitutional product of government pressure. Additional protections
are needed to ensure that confessions and waivers of the right to remain
silent are instead the product of the suspect's free choice.
Our data indicate that a disabled person's mental limitations
prevent him from understanding the warnings, while those of above
average intelligence are far more likely to comprehend their meaning.
It is hard to understand from either a practical or a theoretical
perspective how the totalities analysis that the Court presumed to be
inadequate to ensure valid waivers by people of at least average
intelligence would provide that assurance for the less cognitively
competent population of mentally retarded suspects. The impact of
retardation may be so significant that improving the waiver test will
do nothing to ensure the constitutionality of waivers by mentally
retarded people.
4. Reinvigorate the "knowing and intelligent" prong of the
waiver test.
Some of the difficulty in evaluating waivers by mentally retarded
suspects may result from imprecise application of the waiver test. In
some cases, courts have obfuscated the "knowing and intelligent"
prong of the waiver test while focusing solely on the existence of
government coercion as a measure of voluntariness. In Colorado v
Connelly,' the Supreme Court reversed a state supreme court's
decision in a case involving confessions by a man who was mentally ill,
not mentally retarded. The evidence suggested that the defendant's
schizophrenia had produced command hallucinations that prompted
his confessions.2 Relying upon the dual nature of the waiver test, the
Supreme Court concluded:
[T]he proper test for admissibility is whether the statements are
"the product of a rational intellect and a free will" [and] "the
absence of police coercion or duress does not foreclose a finding
281 479 US 157,157,171 (1986).
282 See id at 175.
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of involuntariness. One's capacity for rational judgment and free
choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe
mental illness as by external pressure.' ' m
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
conclusion that Connelly's undisputed mental illness prevented him
from waiving his privilege against self-incrimination; his mental
capacity apparently was irrelevant when evaluating the validity of his
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court focused
upon the voluntariness element of the waiver test, and concluded that
the validity of the waiver depended solely upon the presence or
absence of government coercion. Compulsion from other sources,
including the suspect's own mental illness, was irrelevant for Fifth
Amendment purposes:
We think that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in importing
into this area of constitutional law notions of "free will" that have
no place there. There is obviously no reason to require more in
the way of a "voluntariness" inquiry in the Miranda waiver
context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context.
The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was
based, is governmental coercion. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not concerned "with moral and psychological
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official
coercion." The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has
always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on
"free choice" in any broader sense of the word.y
This analysis raises troubling issues, particularly when the
individual who is interrogated is not mentally ill but instead is
mentally retarded. A review of the scientific literature might lead to
the conclusion that for many individuals, mental retardation makes
them so vulnerable to the pressures of custodial interrogation that
their waivers are not voluntaryr
Yet Connelly's singleminded focus on government coercion
would seem to preclude a court from reaching this conclusion.
Applied literally, Connelly's reasoning requires only that the warnings
be administered, and absent evidence of some egregious police tactics,
any waiver of the Miranda "rights" will be valid. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Dickerson, although the Miranda warnings do not
"dispense with the voluntariness inquiry . . . '[c]ases in which a
283 Id at 162, quoting People v Connelly, 702 P2d 722,728 (Colo 1985).
284 See Connelly, 479 US at 170-71.
285 Id at 169-70 (citations omitted).
286 See Part II.B.
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defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating
statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement
authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare."''
The Connelly opinion thus appears to preclude most challenges
to the validity of waivers on the grounds that they were involuntary
because of a suspect's mental disability. At the same time, the opinion
appears to preclude other constitutional challenges based upon the
claim that the defendant's mental disability invalidates the waiver on
grounds other than coercion:
Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into
the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed,
inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the
defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves
this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the
admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this
area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent
might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be
governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed. Rule
Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."
' ' s
As applied to mentally retarded suspects, this analysis cannot be
right. The clinical and empirical research raises such serious questions
about the intellectual and psychological capacities of this population,
that an inquiry into "state of mind" not only is appropriate, but is
essential in evaluating the validity of waivers of constitutional rights.
Nonetheless, Connelly's exclusive emphasis upon government
coercion appears to have led some lower courts evaluating waivers by
mentally retarded suspects to dismiss the significance of the "knowing
and intelligent" dimension of the waiver test, and focus only on the
question of government coercion.2 Some courts have concluded that
retardation alone could not invalidate a confession.m This is a
287 Dickerson, 530 US at 444, quoting Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420,433 n 20 (1984).
288 Connelly, 479 US at 166--67 (citation omitted).
289 See, for example, Rice v Cooper, 148 F3d 747,751-52 (7th Cir 1998) (noting that it may
be beyond the practical competence of courts to find a confession involuntary in the absence of
police coercion); Harris v Kuhlmann, 115 F Supp 2d 326,333-36 (E D NY 2000) (adopting Rice's
reasoning).
290 See, for example, Harris, 115 F Supp 2d at 335-36 (holding that a showing of mental
retardation was insufficient to invalidate a confession without a further showing that the police
knew the defendant did not understand his rights). See also Connelly, 479 US at 163--64:
Thus the cases considered by this Court over the 50 years since Brown v. Mississippi have
focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching. While each confession case has
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conclusion that may be tenable if one considers only the voluntariness
prong of the waiver test. But it is not sensible if we require that
confessions also must be knowing and intelligent.
Some of the courts' lack of clarity about the distinction between
the two lines of analysis may result from the conflation of the two
elements of the waiver test-using warnings that at most could
produce "knowing and intelligent" decisions to ensure they are
"voluntary"-embedded in Miranda. Yet despite Miranda's
commingling of these distinct issues, in a number of cases, the Court
has recognized the dual nature of the inquiry. In Moran v Burbine,"'
for example, the Court explicitly relied upon the dual nature of the
waiver test, and quoted Miranda directly-to validate the defendant's
waiver of Miranda "rights:"
Echoing the standard first articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst,
Miranda holds that "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation" of
the rights conveyed in the warnings "provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." The inquiry has two
distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must
have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
"totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation"
reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda
rights have been waived.2
turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive,
all have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct. Absent police conduct
causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state
actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. Respondent correctly notes
that as interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts
have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the
"voluntariness" calculus. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). But this fact does not
justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation
to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional "voluntariness"
See also Rice, 148 F3d at 751-52 (holding that the important inquiry is whether the police
believed the defendant understood their explanation of his Miranda rights).
291 475 US 412 (1986).
292 Id at 421 (citations omitted). Later in the opinion, the Court emphasized the dual nature
of the inquiry:
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that
he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the
State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and
the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
Id at 422-23.
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This passage helps clarify how waivers by mentally retarded
suspects should be evaluated. The question of whether a disabled
individual possessed "the requisite level of comprehension" is
precisely the question courts must ask whenever they are faced with
this issue. It is essential that courts recognize that the issue of a
suspect's intellectual understanding involves an inquiry distinct from
the question of the voluntariness of the waiver. Consciously
employing this two-stage process allows decisionmakers to focus on
the proper questions and to pursue the necessary evidence.
Ironically, this brings us back to the beginning of the analysis of
problems and solutions. Once we isolate the specific requirement that
mentally retarded suspects must comprehend their legal rights to execute
a valid waiver, we are forced to identify some method for ensuring that
comprehension. Once again we face the reality that the Miranda
warnings themselves do not accomplish this goal for mentally retarded
suspects. And once again, we must determine whether the totalities
analysis is adequate -a question our data answer in the negative.
Unless we can devise some other method that actually is
"effective" at serving Miranda's instrumental goals, it is difficult to
justify admission of confessions by mentally retarded suspects
resulting from custodial interrogation. From the perspective of
constitutional theory, this suggests that the appropriate solution is a
per se exclusionary rule for these confessions.
Whatever its theoretical appeal, adoption of such a broad per se
rule would require a radical revision of doctrine and practice. While it
is far from impossible that the Supreme Court will adopt blanket rules
to protect the rights of mentally retarded defendants,2 the underlying
philosophy of Miranda and its progeny is to admit, not to exclude,
confessions.2' Thus it seems reasonable to expect that if a per se rule
were to be adopted, it would be more limited in scope.9
293 See note 37 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari to decide the
constitutionality of executing mentally retarded defendants).
294 Recall that the Miranda majority eschewed any ban on custodial interrogations and
devoted more than 10 percent of the opinion to evidence that the warnings would not hinder law
enforcement efforts. See notes 135-39 and accompanying text. Miranda did not erect
insurmountable barriers to confessions. To the contrary, the Miranda warnings now serve as a
license for obtaining admissible confessions. Once a suspect has been "Mirandized" and executed
a proper waiver of his rights, courts effectively presume that the confession was voluntary and
therefore admissible. The Supreme Court confirmed this reality in Dickerson, where it noted that
.'[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement
was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare."' Dickerson, 530 US at 444, quoting Berkemer, 468 US at 433 n 20.




For a third of a century, some Miranda critics have argued that it
should be jettisoned because it interferes with the necessary efforts of
law enforcers. Our study suggests that Miranda is just as subject to the
opposite complaint-it fails to preserve the very rights it was designed
to enforce.2 Our empirical study indicates that it fails to provide the
basis for knowing and intelligent waivers, not only by retarded
suspects, but also by many nondisabled suspects of below-average
intelligence. The crucial assumption that underlies the Miranda
framework-that being "Mirandized" will allow understanding of
constitutional rights-appears to be false for virtually all mentally
retarded suspects and some number of nouretarded suspects. Under
Miranda, it seems inevitable that some defendants will be convicted,
and in some cases even sentenced to die, based on confessions made
without the knowing and intelligent understanding of rights that the
constitution requires. Although our study suggests that the Miranda
framework may serve the majority of nonretarded suspects, it also
shows that it likely fails some percentage of that population.
Miranda has its advantages. It offers a convenient, easily applied
rule that conserves judicial resources. Most observers have concluded
that it facilitates the law enforcement goal of securing admissible
confessions. However, our study suggests that the costs of this
convenience may be too great. A system that fails in a substantial
minority of cases might be acceptable if the stakes are small. However,
because Miranda operates in the arena of criminal justice, where
peoples' freedom and lives are in the balance, perhaps we should err
on the side of establishing a new, more reliable system, even if the
repair causes institutional expense and inconvenience.
The most obvious alternative to Miranda is the totalities analysis.
Some of Miranda's most articulate critics have argued that a return to
this traditional approach would better protect civil liberties than does
the Miranda construct of warnings plus waivers. Any suspect might be
permitted to argue that his confession should be excluded because he
did not understand his Miranda rights, even though police read him
the warnings and obtained a waiver. Under this analysis, a mentally
retarded suspect might offer his disability as a basis for challenging
the validity of his confession. Unfortunately, both the decisions of
state and federal courts before and after Miranda, and the empirical
results of our study, suggest that courts applying a totality-of-the-
296 This complaint is voiced with increasing frequency even by Miranda's most effective and
articulate supporters. See, for example, Schulhofer, 99 Mich L Rev at 943 (cited in note 15)
(asserting that the problem with Miranda is not that it shackles law enforcement, but that "the
Miranda system is too weak").
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circumstances approach are likely to overestimate the competence of
mentally retarded suspects to understand their rights and to withstand
the pressures of custodial interrogation.
CONCLUSION
Both theoretical analysis and empirical research demonstrate
that the Miranda decision rests upon assumptions that are
fundamentally flawed, at least when applied to mentally retarded
people. This conclusion is of special importance because the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Dickerson assures that Miranda will remain
the centerpiece of constitutional analysis of confession law for the
foreseeable future.
Miranda's theoretical deficiencies originate with its fundamental
yet unverified assumption that the Miranda warnings work. If this
assumption is wrong, the entire construct crumbles. Miranda then
compounds the theoretical problem by blurring the critical distinction
between the two prongs of the constitutional test for waivers. Miranda
assumes that the information contained in the warnings not only
supplies the information necessary to make a waiver "knowing and
intelligent," but also ensures that the waiver is "voluntary."
Unfortunately, the warnings satisfy neither element of the waiver test
for people who lack the cognitive capacity to understand them.
The empirical research conducted in this study shows that
contrary to Miranda's core assumption, retarded people simply do not
understand their Miranda rights. They do not understand the words
comprising the warnings. They do not understand the rights
themselves. They do not understand the legal context in which the
rights arise. Miranda fails to protect the rights of mentally retarded
people, and it may fail for others as well. The results of our study
suggest that people who are not classified as retarded, but who have
low IQs, also may not understand the warnings.
Finally, the empirical results demonstrate that the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis courts typically use to determine whether
mentally retarded suspects could understand the Miranda warnings
also does not work. Factors including the degree of retardation, the
mentally retarded suspect's age, education level, experience with the
criminal justice system, and history of being "Mirandized" fail as
indicators of a mentally retarded person's competence to understand
the warnings and to execute a valid waiver. The results of the
empirical analysis indicate that for this population the factor that
matters is the presence of retardation, even mild retardation. If mental
retardation is present, the existence of the other factors does not
overcome the disabled person's inability to understand the warnings.
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Both our theoretical and empirical analyses lead to the conclusion
that the language of the relevant constitutional doctrines is meaningless
as it has been employed with mentally retarded suspects. The words of
the Miranda warnings themselves are "meaningless" to mentally
retarded suspects, who simply do not understand them. The words used
to define the waiver test are "meaningless" in a different sense: they are
applied to mentally retarded suspects in ways that contradict the very
meaning of the words by which the standard is defined. Disabled
suspects' waivers of the rights described in the Miranda warnings are
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" only if we are willing to manipulate
and distort the very meaning of these terms.2 Finally, the words of these
confessions may themselves be meaningless. The cognitive and social
weaknesses experienced by mentally retarded people ensure that some
of their confessions will be false. When subjected to the pressures of
custodial interrogation, mentally retarded people are more likely than
others to confess to crimes they did not commit.
Perhaps the failure of current constitutional doctrine to ensure
the validity of confessions and waivers by mentally retarded suspects
should be no surprise. Legal rules are, after all, typically crafted with
some average or "reasonable" person in mind. The results of this
failure are troubling nonetheless. There seems to be little doubt that
current doctrine not only permits unconstitutional waivers and false
confessions, but also permits convictions-even death sentences-to
be based upon those confessions.
Searching for solutions to this problem only accentuates the
difficulty of identifying a set of rules or procedures that will protect
the rights of these individuals while permitting law enforcers to carry
on legitimate investigations. In the end, it may be that this
accommodation is not possible. It may be that the only way to ensure
the constitutional rights of mentally retarded suspects is to adopt a per
se rule excluding their confessions. The cost of this approach is
obvious: if the confession is true, then law enforcers and prosecutors
are deprived of probative evidence. The cost of not adopting such a
per se rule is just as obvious: confessions pried from the most
vulnerable of our people may be false, and those false words may help
send them to prison, or even to death row. In the end, we may be
forced to decide if we can stomach that cost.
297 Consider the example offered by Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, and What
Alice Found There 124 (MacMillan 1872):
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,"' Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled
contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down
argument for you! "' But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice
objected. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
2002]




To assess objectively an individual's understanding of the language of the Miranda
warning. The first seven words appear in standard Miranda warnings. The second seven words
are the type of language that might appear in a simplified warning.
B. Directions
The examiner should explain these directions to the interviewee. For example: "I am going
to say a word and then use it in a sentence. Then I want you to tell me what that word means."
The examiner should say the word. Then the examiner should read the designated sentence
which uses the word. Then the examiner should ask what the word means. In certain
circumstances, the examiner will have to ask follow up questions. Follow up questions should be
limited to those discussed below.
1. Consult. I want to consult him. What does "consult" mean?
When the individual's response refers to talking, but without the idea of aid or advice (e.g.,
to discuss with someone), the examiner should ask, "How do you mean discuss?" When the
individual gives a response that recognizes that discourse is involved, but does not mention the
ideas of aid or advice, the examiner should say, "Give me an example of consulting someone"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
2. Attorney. The attorney left the building. What does "attorney" mean?
When the individual only mentions that either the person is empowered to act for another
in a legal process, that the person is especially trained in law and legal process, or only uses an
accurate synonym (i.e. only mentions one of those three elements), the examiner should ask, "Is
there anything else you can tell me about what an attorney is or does?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
3. Interrogation. The interrogation lasted quite a while. What does "interrogation"
mean?
When the idea of investigation is conveyed, but without mentioning questioning, the
examiner should say, "Please tell me more about what interrogation is." When other aspects of
interrogation are mentioned, but not questioning, the examiner should say, "Please tell me more
about what interrogation is."
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
4. Appoint. We will appoint her to be your social worker. What does "appoint" mean?
When the idea of action to get the person in a position is clear, but the idea of how this
occurs is either nonessential or inappropriate (such as ideas of election to the position, paying
someone to do the job, or to pass a law to put someone in a position), the examiner should say,
"Please tell me more about what appoint means."
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
298 This protocol draws heavily on excellent earlier studies of juveniles, especially Grisso,
Juveniles' Waiver of Rights (cited in note 22), and Ferguson and Douglas, 7 San Diego L Rev 39
(cited in note 176). See also note 176.
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5. Entitled. He is entitled to the money. What does "entitled" mean?
When the following specific answers are given without any addition-he has it, he will get
it, or he can have it-the examiner should ask either, "Can you tell me more about that?" or
"How do you mean (insert phrase used)?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
6. Right. You have the right to vote. What does "right" mean?
When the idea that one is allowed to vote is clear, but without the notion that the privilege
to lay claim to the right is protected, the examiner should ask either, "Can you tell me more
about what right means?" or "How do you mean (insert phrase used)?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
7. Statement. She made a statement. What does "statement" mean?
When the idea that it is told from the speaker's perspective is not clear, the examiner
should ask, "Can you tell me more about what a statement is?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
8. Seek advice. He went to a friend to seek advice.What does "seek advice" mean?
When the individual's response refers to talking, but without the idea of getting aid or
help (e.g., to discuss with someone), the examiner should ask, "How do you mean discuss?"
When the individual gives a response that recognizes that discourse is involved, but does not
mention the ideas of aid or assistance, the examiner should say, "Give me an example of seeking
advice from someone"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
9. Lawyer. My friend works as a lawyer. What does "lawyer" mean?
When the individual only mentions that either the person is empowered to act for another
in a legal process, that the person is especially trained in law and legal process, or only uses an
accurate synonym (i.e. only mentions one of those three elements), the examiner should ask, "Is
there anything else you can tell me about what a lawyer is or does?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
10. Questioning. Her mother was questioning her about where she had been. What does
"questioning" mean?
When the idea of being asked questions is conveyed with nothing more, the examiner
should say, "Is there anything else you can tell me about questioning?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
11. Choose. We will choose him to be your assistant. What does "choose" mean?
When the idea of action to get the person in a position is clear, but the idea of how this
occurs is either nonessential or inappropriate (such as ideas of election to the position, paying
someone to do the job, or to pass a law to put someone in a position), the examiner should say,
"Please tell me more about what choose means."
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
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12. Deserve. Anyone who is sick deserves the chance to go to the doctor. What does
"deserve" mean?
When the following specific answers are given without any addition-he has it, he will get
it, or he can have it-the examiner should ask either, "Can you tell me more about that?" or
"How do you mean (insert phrase used)?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
13. Choice. You have the choice of whether to go to his house. What does "choice"
mean?
When the idea that one is allowed to go is clear, but without the notion that the privilege
to go cannot be taken away, the examiner should ask either, "Can you tell me more about what
right means?" or "How do you mean (insert phrase used)?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
14. Your story. You had a chance to tell your story. What does "your story" mean?
When the idea that it is told from the speaker's perspective is not clear, the examiner
should ask, "Can you tell me more about what your story is?"
If the individual's response is confusing because of double negatives, grammatical
confusion, slang, or disorganization, the examiner should say, "Can you explain that a little
more?"
C. Grading
Generally: Each answer will be given either a score of two, one, or zero based upon the
description below.
1. Consult.
2 points: Conveys idea that information or advice is provided or sought pursuant to a
decision.
Examples: To ask for (give) advice about something. To make plans with
someone. To help to decide. Talk to make plans. To talk over problems.
1 point: Usually, the recognition of discourse is involved, but without the notion of
aid, advice, or recognition of directed use of the discourse.
Examples: To discuss. To talk over. To talk confidentially. To talk to. To tell
someone something. To ask a question. To help someone. To get information
from someone (no improvement after inquiry).
0 points: States only the objective. Also, inaccurate meaning.
Examples:To insult. To decide.To plan something. To discover or find out.
2. Attorney.
Three elements:
a) Someone who is empowered to act for (and in the interest of) another
person in legal proceedings.
Examples: The attorney is someone who's on your side. Someone who
defends you. Who stands for your rights. He fights for you in court.
Someone in your favor. Helps to get you out of trouble. Makes sure you
get a fair deal.
b) Someone especially trained in law and legal process.
Examples: Somebody who knows everything about courts. He knows all
about the law. He knows what your rights are. Someone who can
interpret laws, knows what they mean.
Words Without Meaning
c) An accurate synonym.
Examples: Lawyer, public defender, counselor, legal counsel, legal
consultant, or advisor.
2 points: Any response satisfying at least two of the elements listed above.
1 point: A response including only one of the three elements above.
0 points: A response including none of the above elements.
Examples: An important person. A person who decides whether you are guilty
or innocent. Someone who makes laws.A sort of policeman.A social worker.
3. Interrogation.
Formal definition: to ask questions formally; to examine by questioning
2 points: Idea of being questioned.
Examples: Questioning someone. When police ask you questions. When they
ask you about whether or not you did the crime. When they put the lights on
you and ask you to confess.
1 point: Idea of investigation without mention of questioning, or mention of other
aspects which could be part of an interrogation.
Examples: An investigation of a crime. When they examine the evidence.
When they tell you they think you did or didn't do the crime. When they brief
(tell) you about what might happen to you if you did the crime.
0 points: Other legal processes, or clearly incorrect responses.
Examples: A hearing. Court day. When you go to court. Your trial. Being put
in detention. I don't know what it means.
4. Appoint.
Formal definition: To ordain, prescribe; to name or select for an office or position.
2 points: The idea that a person is named, selected, assigned, told, or designated to do
ajob or fill a position.
Examples: To put someone on the case. To give someone the job. To get a
person to do the job. To assign someone to the duty. To pick someone. To tell
someone to do it.To name someone to do it.
1 point: The idea of action to get a person into a position, but with notions which are
nonessential (and often too specific) regarding the idea of designation.
Examples: To recommend someone. To offer them money to do the job. To
pass a law to put someone in a position. To examine someone to see if they
can do the job.To elect someone to do it.
0 points: Wrong answers.
Examples: To point to someone. To help someone do something.
5. Entitled.
Formal definition: Given a claim or legal title to; qualified (to do something).
2 points: Notion of being qualified or deserving to do or receive s6mething.
Examples: Has a right to do it. Deserves it. Should have (or get) it. Has it
coming to him. It is owed to him. He is allowed to (get, have) it. No one is
allowed to take it away from him. He owns it, it belongs to him. It is his.
1 point Idea of possession, receipt, or action without notion or qualification or
deservingness.
Examples: He has it. He will get (do) it. He can have it.
0 points:Wrong answers.
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Examples: What something is called. The title of something. To be attached to
something. To want to have (do) something.
6. Right.
Formal definition: That to which a person has a just claim; a power, privilege, etc. that
belongs to a person by law, nature, or tradition.
2 points: An action or condition which is allowed to a person, as well as the notion
that this privilege is protected, "inalienable," or not able to be denied arbitrarily by
others.
Examples: It means you can do something no matter what. By law, if you
qualify, you can do it if you want. You can legally do it even if someone else
doesn't like it. You can do it because you were born here. You are entitled to it.
1 point: The idea of being allowed to do something, without the notion of protection
of one's privilege to lay claim to that allowance.
Examples: You can do it. You're allowed to do that. You can if you want to. You
can do it without asking. It's your decision. It is your privilege.
0 points: No recognition of allowance or privilege.
Examples: Your right hand. Left, right. Like you should vote, it's important to
do that. Means something is the right thing to do.
7. Statement.
2 points: Recognition that it is what happened told from the individual's perspective.
Examples: It is when you tell your story. When you tell your side.
1 point: Recognition that it is something someone says.
Examples: When someone says something. When someone talks.
0 points: Wrong answers.
Examples: It is what you are told to say.
8. Seek advice.
2 points: Conveys idea that information or aid is provided or sought pursuant to a
decision.
Examples: To ask for (give) help about something. To make plans with
someone. To help to decide. Talk to make plans. To talk over problems.
1 point: Usually, the recognition of discourse is involved, but without the notion of
aid, advice, or recognition of directed use of the discourse.
Examples: To discuss. To talk over. To talk confidentially. To talk to. To tell
someone something. To ask a question. To help someone. To get information
from someone (no improvement after inquiry).
0 points: States only the objective. Also, inaccurate meaning.
Examples:To insult. To decide. To plan something. To discover or find out.
9. Lawyer.
Three elements:
Someone who is empowered to act for (and in the interest of) another person
in legal proceedings.
Examples: The lawyer is someone who's on your side. Someone who
defends you. Who stands for your rights. He fights for you in court.
Someone in your favor. Helps to get you out of trouble. Makes sure you
get a fair deal.
Someone especially trained in law and legal process.
Words Without Meaning
Examples: Somebody who knows everything about courts. He knows all
about the law. He knows what your rights are. Someone who can
interpret laws, knows what they mean.
An accurate synonym.
Examples: Attorney, public defender, counselor, legal counsel, legal
consultant, or advisor.
2 points: Any response satisfying at least two of the elements listed above.
I point: A response including only one of the three elements above.
0 points: A response including none of the above elements.
Examples: An important person. A person who decides whether you are guilty
or innocent. Someone who makes laws. A sort of policeman. A social worker.
10. Questioning.
2 points: Idea of being asked for information and being investigated.
Examples: Being asked for information for someone. When someone ask you
a lot of questions. When they ask you about whether or not you did
something.
1 point: Idea of questioning without the idea of trying to get information or
investigating.
Examples: When someone asks something to see if you know the answer.
0 points: Other legal processes, or clearly incorrect responses.
Examples: A hearing. Court day. When you go to court. Your trial. Being put
in detention. I don't know what it means.
11. Choose.
2 points:The idea that a person is named, selected, assigned, told, or designated to do
a job or fill a position.
Examples: To put someone on the case. To give someone the job. To get a
person to do the job. To assign someone to the duty. To pick someone. To tell
someone to do it.To name someone to do it.
I pointThe idea of action to get a person into a position, but with notions which are
non-essential (and often too specific) regarding the idea of designation.
Examples: To recommend someone. To offer them money to do the job. To
pass a law to put someone in a position. To examine someone to see if they
can do the job. To elect someone to do it.
0 points: Wrong answers.
Examples:To help someone do something.
12. Deserve.
2 points: Notion of being qualified or deserving to do or receive something.
Examples: Has a right to do it. Deserves it. Should have (or get) it. Has it
coming to him. It is owed to him. He is allowed to (do get, have) it. No one is
allowed to take it away from him. He owns it, it belongs to him. It is his.
1 point: Idea of possession, receipt, or action without notion or qualification or
deservingness.
Examples: He has it. He will get (do) it. He can have it.
0 points: Wrong answers.
Examples: It is dessert. It is a hot place. To want to have (do) something.
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13. Choice.
2 points: An action or condition which is allowed to a person, as well as the notion
that the decision is one that cannot be taken away.
Examples: It means you can do something no matter what. By law, if you
qualify, you can do it if you want. You can legally do it even if someone else
doesn't like it. You can do it because you were born here. You are entitled to
it. You can make up your own mind to do or not do something.
1 point: The idea of being allowed to do something, without the notion of the
decision to do it being protected.
Examples: You can do it. You're allowed to do that. You can if you want to.
You can do it without asking. It's your decision. It is your privilege.
0 point: No recognition of allowance or privilege.
Examples: It is something you have to do. It is what someone wants you to do.
Means something is the right thing to do.
14. Your Story.
2 points: Recognition that it is told from the individual's perspective.
Examples: It is when you tell what you think happened. When you tell your
side.
1 point: Recognition that discourse is involved, but not that it is told from the
individual's perspective.
Examples: When you tell the story of your life. When you tell something.
0 points: Wrong answers.
Examples: It is what you are told to say.
II. WARNINGS TEST
A. Generally
This section tests the individual's comprehension of the Miranda warnings as they are
currently worded. The examiner will read a sentence of the Miranda warning to the individual
while the individual can follow along with a written card. The written card is left on the table.
The examiner will then read the sentence from a second card to the individual, who will have to
determine whether the second sentence means the same thing or something different than the
first sentence. Repeat this procedure three times for each sentence of the Miranda warning.
B. Administration
The examiner should instruct the individual: "Now I am going to show you some
sentences. After I read a sentence to you, I will read three more statements. Each statement
means either the same thing or not the same thing as the first sentence. I want you to tell me
whether each statement is the same or different from the sentence on the card. I will then ask
you three yes/no questions about each sentence." After the examiner gives the instructions, he
should perform the examples: "Here are two examples so that you know what to do. This
sentence says, 'I have volunteered to be in this study.' Now look at this card. 'I have agreed to
take this test and nobody forced me to do it.' Now does that card say the same thing or
something different from the first sentence?" If the individual says "same," proceed to the
second example. If the individual says "different," explain why they are the same, and go on to
the second example. The examiner continues: "Here is the next card. The sentence says, 'I have to
take this test whether I want to or not.' Is this the same as the first sentence?" If the interviewee
says "same," give a zero for all questions requiring the same/different answer, and only ask the
yes/no questions. If the interviewee answer "different," administer both the same/different
questions and the yes/no questions.
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C. Grading
One point is given for every correct answer and 0 points are given for every incorrect
answer.
1. Miranda Sentence 1: You do not have to make a statement and have the right to
remain silent.
Sentences and answers:
It is not right to tell lies. Different.
You should not say anything until the police ask you questions. Different.
You do not have to say anything about what you did. Same.
Questions and answers:
Do you have to tell the police what happened? No.
If you want to, can you talk to the police before they ask you any questions? Yes.
Do you have to answer the police if they ask you any questions? No.
2. Miranda Sentence 2: Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law.
Sentences and answers:
What you say might be used to prove you guilty. Same.
If you won't talk to the police, then that will be used against you in court.
Different.
If you tell the police anything, it can be repeated in court. Same.
Questions and answers:
If you talk to the police, can they repeat what you say in court? Yes.
If you talk to the police, can they use your story to get you in trouble? Yes.
If you do not talk to the police, can they get you in trouble for not talking? No.
3. Miranda Sentence 3: You are entitled to consult with an attorney before
interrogation and to have an attorney present at the time of the interrogation.
Sentences and answers:
You can talk to your social worker before anything happens. Different.
A lawyer is coming to see you after the police are done with you. Different.
You can have a lawyer now if you ask for one. Same.
Questions and answers:
Will a lawyer automatically come to see you after you talk to the police? No.
Can you get a lawyer before you talk to the police if you want one? Yes.
Will you get an attorney in the interrogation with you if you don't ask for one?
No.
4. Miranda Sentence 4: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
Sentences and answers:
If you don't have the money for a lawyer, then the court will appoint a social
worker to help you. Different.
You can get legal help even if you are poor. Same.
The court will give you a lawyer free if you don't have the money to pay for one.
Same.
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Questions and answers:
If you are poor, can you get an attorney? Yes.
Will it cost you money to get an attorney if you are poor? No.
Do you have to have money to get an attorney? No.
III. CONCEPTS TEST
Purpose. To identify an individual's understanding of the legal concepts involved in the Miranda
warning.
Directions. Four different scenarios are drawn on cards. The interviewer then says: "I am going to
show you several pictures of people doing things. After I tell you something about a picture, I
will be asking you questions about what you think the people in the picture could be doing and
thinking and feeling. With these questions, it is best if you just give me a short answer." The card
is given to the individual to look at, while the interviewer presents a brief verbal "story" to
establish a context for the questions. After the story, the examiner will follow-up with questions.
A. Card 1: Joe's interrogation
Description: The card will depict a scene of a boy sitting at a table across from two police
officers. The questions are all related to understanding the nature of interrogation.
Story: "This is a picture about a boy named Joe. The policemen in the picture have brought
Joe into the police station. There has been a crime. The policemen want to talk to Joe.
Remember that Joe is in the police station and the policemen want to talk to him."
Questions and follow-up questions:
1. Q1: What is it that the policemen want Joe to do?
If individual answers talk or answer questions without an indication of the topic,
examiner should ask, "About what?"
If the individual does not mention talking or questioning, the examiner should ask,
"What important thing might the policemen ask Joe to do?"
2. Q2: Finish this sentence. The police think that Joe
3. Q3: What is the most important thing that the police might want Joe to tell them?
If the individual does not mention anything about potentially incriminating
information, the examiner should ask, "What other important thing?"
If the individual mentions the truth, the examiner should ask, "About what?"
4. Q4: How are the policemen probably feeling?
For all responses, examiner should ask, "Why are they feeling that way?"
5. Q5: How is Joe probably feeling?
For all responses, examiner should ask, "Why is he feeling that way?"
If the individual does not refer to being affected, the examiner should ask, "How is
he feeling about what is happening to him now?"
B. Card 2:Tim and His Lawyer
Description: The card depicts a boy and a lawyer in consultation in a room. The questions
are all related to the understanding of the function and the significance of the right to
counsel.
Story: "This is Tim. He is in the police station, too, because the police think he broke into a
house. The police have not questioned him yet. Here Tim is meeting with his lawyer. The
lawyer is asking Tim some things before Tim goes to be talked to by the police. Tell me
what you think might happen here."
[69:495
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Questions and follow-up questions:
1. Qi:What is the main job of the lawyer?
If the individual mentions asking questions and discovering information but does not
indicate whether this is to provide a benefit to Tim, the examiner should ask, "Why
does the lawyer do that?" or "Can you tell me more?"
If the individual's response suggests that the lawyer helps only the innocent, the
examiner should ask, "And what is his job if Tm is not innocent?"
2. Q2: While he is with his lawyer, what is Tun supposed to do?
When the individual only mentions talking, the examiner should ask, "Can you tell
me more?" or "Talk about what?"
When the individual only mentions compliance, the examiner should ask, "Can you
tell me more about what Tim is supposed to do?"
3. Q3:What is main thing Tm's lawyer will be talking to Tim about?
4. Q4: Imagine that Tim's lawyer is saying, "I want you to tell me exactly what you did
and tell me the truth about what happened." Then Tun tells him that he did the crime.
Why would Tim's lawyer want to know that?
If the individual mentions for the purpose of getting information but not for
assistance, the examiner should ask, "Why would the lawyer want to know that?"
If the individual's answer does not make clear that the lawyer's actions are to help
Tim, the examiner should ask, "Why would the lawyer want to do that?"
C. Card 3: Greg's Interrogation
Description: The card depicts a boy entering an interrogation room accompanied by two
police officers. The questions regard the function and significance of the right to silence.
Story: "This is Greg. The police have taken him to detention because they want to talk to
him. Greg stole some money from a store, but the police are not sure he did it because
nobody saw Greg do it. They are getting ready to ask him questions. Greg knows he
doesn't have to talk if he doesn't want to, and he is trying to decide whether or not to
talk."
Questions and follow-up questions:
1. Q: Fmish this sentence. If Greg decides to tell the police about what he did, then the
things he says
If the individual's answer only mentions that it can cause him trouble or be held
against him but does not make any reference to court, the examiner should ask, "Can
you tell me more?" or "In what way?"
2. Q2: If Greg decides not to talk, what is the most important thing the police are
supposed to do?
If the individual's answer only mentions detainment, the examiner should ask, "What
other important thing?"
3. Q3: Finish this sentence. If the police tell Greg he has to talk even if he has said he
doesn't want to, then_ .
If the individual's answer only mentions that he won't/shouldn't/won't want to talk
without further elaboration, then the examiner should ask, "Why won't/shouldn't he
talk?"
If the individual's answer mentions that Greg will or should talk but gives no
mention of the conflict with rights or no statement of why Greg will talk, the
examiner should ask, "Can you tell me more?"
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If the individual's answer is ambivalent about whether Greg will talk and gives no
mention of the conflict with rights, the examiner should ask, "What should Greg do
and why should he do it?"
If the individual's answer is that Greg will attempt to subvert police demands in a
way other than asserting his rights (i.e. will tell a lie, will try to kill himself, etc.), the
examiner should ask, "Can you tell me more about that?"
If the individual's answer is that Greg will be detained or locked up without any
elaboration, the examiner should ask, "Why?"
D. Card 4: Greg's Court Hearing
Description: The card depicts a courtroom hearing with judge, police officers, parents, the
individual's lawyer, and the individual. The questions regard the function of the right to
counsel and the right to silence.
Story: "This is Greg three weeks later. He is at his court hearing. The judge is here, and the
policemen who arrested and questioned Greg are here. Greg's lawyer and his parents are
sitting near him."
Questions and follow-up questions:
1. QI: If Greg's lawyer did just what he is supposed to do here in court, how would
Greg be feeling?
If the answer only mentions a negative effect or outcome and does not refer to the
lawyer's role, the examiner should ask, "How does Greg feel about what the lawyer
is doing?"
For all responses, the examiner should ask, "Why would he feel that way?"
2. Q2: What is supposed to happen when the judge is told that Greg would not talk to
the police?
If the individual's response is that the judge will ask Greg questions, the examiner
should ask, "What if Greg still will say nothing?"
3. Q3: Greg did not tell the police anything about what he did. Here in court, if he were
told to talk about what he did that was wrong, will he have to talk about it?
For all responses, the examiner should ask, "Why?"
IV. GRADING FOR PART III CONCEPTS TEST
Generally. The response to each question will receive either two, one, or zero points. Generally, a
2-point response shows the individual understood the function or significance of the element in
question. Vague or partial responses which cannot be clearly viewed as correct or incorrect are
given 1 point. Responses which demonstrate a lack of understanding of the function or
significance of the element in question are given zero points. The grade should be given after the
follow-up question. For example, if an original answer would be graded as one point and the
response to the follow up question would be given 2 points, then 2 points should be given. If the
original answer would have been given 1 point and the follow up question would have been
given 0 points, then 0 points should be given. Note, however, that it is rare that a 0 would go to a
2 or a 2 to a 0 after a follow-up question.
A. Card 1: Joe's Interrogation
1. Qi: What is it that the police will want Joe to do?
2 points: Clear indication that the police desire a confession, or to acquire
information about Joe's actions at the time of the crime.
Examples: Tell them where he was at time of the crime. To tell why he did it.
To tell who he was with when he stole the stufL Say he did something. Nark
on people.Tell where he was at a certain time. Tell them what happened.
[69:495
Words Without Meaning
1 point: Statement that police want suspect to talk, but without clear mention of the
nature of the information sought.
Examples: Talk about something. Tell them something. Talk, but he won't
answer some questions. Give some information. Make a statement. Tell the
truth.
0 points: Reserved for responses which include no mention of talking, confession, or
providing information specific to the question of one's alleged criminal/delinquent
involvement.
Examples: Act with good manners. Stay in detention for a while. Sign some
papers so they will know who Joe is. Behave himself Never get in trouble
again. Listen.
2. Q2: Finish the sentence. The policemen think that Joe
2 points (Responses may be of three types, and an answer with any of the types
receives 2 points.):
Police see Joe as probably guilty of alleged criminal act, or probably involved
in such a way that he has knowledge of alleged act.
Examples: Committed a crime. Had something to do with a crime. Did a
bad thing. Stole a TV from a house. Is a criminal. Is guilty. Is part of a
gang.
Police see Joe as non-cooperative, as withholding information, or as not
trustworthy.
Examples: Is telling a lie. Is holding back information. Can't be trusted.
Police perception of Joe as untrustworthy or involved in criminal act is
implied, but not clearly stated.
Example: Belongs in detention. Did something. Got too involved in
something.
1 point: Police see youth as probably guilty, but not fully responsible for his actions
(thus reducing adversary conditions).
Examples: Is crazy. Is sick. Has just fallen in with bad company. Needs a
psychiatrist.
0 points: Police are sympathetic with suspect, or do not see him as guilty.
Examples: Is not really bad. Is okay. Is not guilty. Needs their help and they
can help him.
3. Q3: What is the most important thing the police might want Joe to tell them?
If subject obtained 2 point credit on Question 1, skip this question and give an
automatic 2-point credit for this question.
2 points: About Joe's involvement in or knowledge of a crime.
Examples: Whether he did it or not. About what he was doing before they
picked him up. Whether he knows who did the crime. Whether there were
friends involved with him.
1 point:The truth.
0 points: Moralistic or relatively non-incriminating information.
Examples: Why he's so bad. Where he lives. What his name is. Whether or not
he wants to go home.
4. Q4: How are the police probably feeling?
2 points: Affect/reasoning of the subject's response reflects police intentions to deal
with the youth as an adversary.
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Angry.
Examples: Angry 'cause Joe won't talk. Aggravated. Upset because they
have to go through all this.
Good, self-satisfied.
Examples: Happy. Good. Proud. Happy 'cause they caught somebody
doing wrong. Like they are really something. Superior.
Justified.
Examples:That he did it.That he's guilty.That he ought to be put in jail.
Frustrated.
Examples: That he's not cooperating. That he is lying. That he won't tell
the truth. Like they want to smack him.
1 point: Not applicable.
0 points: Emotions which are inconsistent with adversary quality of interrogation, or
don't know, or mixed responses.
Examples: I don't have any idea. Embarrassed. Sorry for him. Sad about the
boy. Joe needs help very bad. Real bad about it, because they didn't want to
upset him. Mad, because they don't want to have to do this to Joe. If he did it,
they feel mad at him, but if they framed him, they feel bad and are going to
help him out.
5. Q5: How is Joe probably feeling?
2 points: Negative emotions appropriate for the accused in an adversary situation.
Examples: Very mad. Sad. Like a criminal. Scared. Miserable. Dumb. Like a
chump. Like he shouldn't have done what he did. That his parents are going to
be upset. Sorry.
1 point: Not applicable.
0 points: Feelings not reflecting the adversary process.
Examples: Pleased. Good. All right. Like everything is ok.
B. Card 2: Tim's Lawyer
1. QI: What is the main job of the lawyer?
2 points: Any response indicating clearly that the lawyer is to assist or work in the
interests of the client.
Examples: Help lm. Protect Tim's rights. Defend Tim. Help Tim get out. Get
Tim off the hook. To get everyone to believe Tun. To help Tim understand
what is going on and to help him through it. To help him get out of detention.
Give him some clues that can help Tim get out of trouble.
1 point: Responses referring to some portion of the process by which the lawyer
works on behalf of a client, but the idea of helpfulness or assistance is not clearly
conveyed (response could also apply to interrogator).
Examples: Find out as much as he can. Find out what happened. Find out if
Tim did it. Get Tim to trust him. Find out the truth from Tim.
0 points: Responses placing the lawyer in a role contrary to an advocate for the client
(response implies lawyer as an adversary).
Examples: Decide whether or not Tim should be found guilty. Decide whether
Tim should be sent home or to jail. Get Tim to confess. To see what the judge
should do to Tim. He protects him if he's innocent.
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2. Q2: While he is with his lawyer, what is Tim supposed to do?
2 points: Responses clearly indicating a helping and trustful relationship. Responses
which imply mere compliance are not given 2 points, but are scored I or 0 (unless
elaboration by individual places the response in the 2-point category).
Examples: To help the lawyer. To tell the lawyer the truth about everything.
Trust him and do what the lawyer thinks is best. Do what he says because he's
on Tim's side. Tell him what he did and why. Cooperate with him. Answer his
questions.
I point: Responses stating mere passive compliance. OR
Examples: Do what the lawyer says. Listen to instructions. Listen to what the
lawyer is saying.
References simply to verbalization.
Examples: Talk to him. Discuss things. Ask him questions about what's
happening.
0 points: Responses indicating the need for silence, caution, mistrust or strong
inhibition of one's own behavior.
Examples: Speak only when spoken to. Don't run away. Keep quiet about
what he did. Don't confess to anything. Keep his mouth shut. Plead the fifth.
Behave himself.
3. Q3:What is the main thing that Tim's lawyer will be talking to Tim about?
2 points: Providing information or advice regarding future events in Interrogation or
other court-related processes. OR
Examples: What is going to happen. What to say. What he can do to help him.
What to do, when to do it, and how.
Emphasis on obtaining Tim's view of the alleged offenses.
Examples: If he really did it or not. How the crime happened. What it was that
he did. Why he did it.
1 point: Moralistic questioning, or less important but still relevant topics.
Examples: Why what he did was wrong. When the hearing date will be. How
long he'll be in jail.
0 points: Accusatory statement by lawyer, also, information or discussion that is not
directly related to alleged offense or to police or court procedures.
Examples: He shouldn't have done it and he will pay for it. That he should try
to do better in school. That he is a failure. About his problems at home (or
other counseling topics).
4. Q4: Imagine that Tn's lawyer is saying: "I want you to tell me exactly what you did
and tell me the truth about what happened."Then Tim tells him that he did the crime.
Why would the lawyer want to know that?
2 points: Lawyer is seeking information to assist in Tim's defense.
Examples: So he can help Tim out better. So he can build a good case. So he
can help Tim beat the rap.To get Tim's side of the story and help him better.
1 point: To get truthful information, but no mention of assistance nor of judgment.
Examples: To get the facts. To find out if Tim did it. To get all the information
he can.
0 points: To make judgments which are contrary to the role of an advocate, or to
assist the court in learning of Tim's guilt.
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Examples: To tell the judge about it. To decide whether Tun should go to a jail
or someplace. To decide whether Tun should be found guilty. So he can get
him to give himself up.
C. Card 3: Greg's Interrogation
1. Qi: Finish the sentence. If Greg decides to tell the police about what he did, then the
things that Greg says
2 points: A relationship is made between what is said and later court hearing or
record.
Examples: Can be used against him in court. Will get him into trouble at court
time. Can turn against him later in court. Will be told to the judge later on.
Will go into his record. Will get him into jail and they will set a court date.
1 point: Idea that what he says can cause him trouble, but without specification or
how or when.
Examples: Will be held against him. Can get him into trouble. Will get him into
detention.
0 points: Responses irrelevant to the essential issues of later use of confession; also,
failure to recognize importance of confession.
Examples: Will be true. Won't matter anyway. He will tell the policemen.
2. Q2: If Greg decides not to talk, what is the most important thing the police are
supposed to do?
2 points: Any action that is not coercive, and represents a legally sanctioned and
probable response by police involving no further questioning.
Examples: Do nothing. Leave him be. Don't question him. Get him a lawyer.
Phone his parents or guardian. Let him go.
1 point: Responses which are not clearly coercive, but which emphasize detainment.
Examples: Hold him until his court hearing. Take him to jail.
0 points: Further questioning; also, don't know.
Examples: Remind him of his rights. Try to make him talk without forcing him.
Tell him the trouble he can get into for hiding the truth. Asking him why he
won't talk.
3. Q3: If Greg says that he doesn't want to talk, but the police tell him he has to talk,
what should happen then?
2 points: Recognition of the illegality of the police action, or the falseness of their
claim. Decision to talk or not to talk is not relevant to scoring 2 points. OR
Examples: They will be lying because he doesn't have to. They would be going
against his rights. It still doesn't mean that he has to talk. Greg can tell them
he doesn't have to talk. They are wrong. He'll know that he doesn't have to
really. He'll talk even though he knows he doesn't have to. They shouldn't be
saying that. They will have to let him go. Stop asking him questions and put
him back in jail. Nothing should happen, but they will probably beat him up.
He doesn't have to talk until he goes to court.
Seeking intervention by anyone who could potentially be an advocate.
Examples: Greg should ask to talk to his lawyer. He'll ask to see a social
worker first. He will tell them he wants to talk to his parents or guardian now.
1 point: Responses primarily refer to Greg's decision, without offering either a
reason for the decision, or recognition of illegality of police action.
Responses indicating that the youth will not or should not talk, but without
recognition of impropriety of the police statement. OR
[69:495
Words Without Meaning
Examples: Greg still won't talk. He shouldn't if he's smart.
Responses indicating simply that Greg will talk, or that he may or may not
talk (ambivalent responses). OR
Examples: Greg will tell them the truth. He would talk and get himself
messed up. He will get scared and talk. He might talk. He will rebel or
he might tell everything. He'll have to talk.
Responses which could represent attempt to subvert police demands. OR
Examples: Then Greg will probably tell the police a lie. He will make up
something. H would tell them something but not much. He would go
into the bathroom and eat soap.
Lock him up (without further explanation).
0 points: Responses in which youth does or does not decide to talk solely on the basis
of the importance of avoiding future negative consequences, without any sign of
recognition of the inappropriateness of the police demand. OR
Examples: Greg will talk because he doesn't want to get beat. He still won't
talk because it would get his friends into trouble. He'll talk so he can get out
of going to jail.
Other responses showing no recognition of impropriety of police demands.
Examples: Greg will wish he had never stole the money. Greg will be sad. The
police will start to ask him questions.
D. Card 4: Greg's Court Hearing
1. Qi: If Greg's lawyer did just what he is supposed to do here in court, how would
Greg be feeling?
2 points: Affect or attitude reflecting knowledge of lawyer's intended role as
advocate; generally, positive effect or "mixed" responses.
Examples: Good, because he's going to get out. Relieved. Good. Better. Like
there is some hope. Like things are ok. Like the lawyer is doing the best he
can. Satisfied. Like he's got a fair deal. Good because he's trying to help, bad
because some things he's saying could hurt. Happy if the lawyer says good
things, but bad because some things may not be right.
1 point: Bad or negative outcome, without reference to the lawyer's role.
Examples: Probably feeling bad, because they might not let him go. Worried,
the judge might go hard on him. Guess he's feeling bad, with all those people
around him asking questions.
0 points: Generally negative affect.
Examples: Mad. Like a criminal. Scared. Miserable. Like there is not hope.
Guilty. Sad because some of what the lawyer said was bad. Upset because the
lawyer told what he had done.
2. Q2: If the judge finds out that Greg wouldn't talk to the police, then what should
happen?
2 points: Any response that does not constitute a penalty for assuming one's right to
silence, nor suggests prejudice against the individual because of it.
Examples: Nothing bad will happen. Go on with the hearing. The judge will
listen to what everybody else has to say. Greg can always talk to his lawyer.
The judge will have to let him go.
I point: Inquiry regarding silence itself
Examples:Ask Greg why he wouldn't talk.The judge might ask Greg if he still
wishes to say nothing.
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0 point: Any response indicating prejudice regarding motive for maintaining silence,
increased penalty, reflection on probable guilt, or asking individual to give
information about the alleged offense.
Examples: Make punishment worse. Judge will say if he wasn't guilty, he
should have nothing to hide. Think he's guilty. Think that something is wrong.
Make him talk now. Judge will ask Greg what did happen. Judge will send him
back to jail. Judge will send him somewhere.
3. Q3: Greg did not tell the police anything about what he did. Here in court, if he is
asked to talk about what he did that was wrong, will he have to talk?
2 points: Answer of "No."
1 point: Answer of "Yes, if his lawyer says it is best to."
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Disabled Controls Disabled Controls
(N=49) (N=22) (N=49) (N=22)
Mean total score 2.84 11.64 3.82 12.41
(% correct) (20.3%) (82.9%) (27.3%) (88.6%)
(Standard deviation) (3.29) (2.30) (4.12) (2.26)
Range = 0-14
Percent of sample Percent of sample
with each score with each score
Score distribution
14 0 27.3 0 41.0
13 0 18.2 2.0 31.8
12 2.0 9.1 4.1 4.6
11 0 22.7 6.1 9.1
10 2.0 4.6 4.1 0
9 2.0 4.6 2.0 0
8 8.2 9.1 4.1 4.6
7 4.1 0 4.1 9.1
6 4.1 4.6 4.1 0
5 4.1 0 4.1 0
4 8.2 0 2.0 0
3 4.1 0 6.1 0
2 14.3 0 14.3 0
1 8.2 0 18.4 0
0 38.8 0 24.5 0
Obtained zero-point credits
On no items 4.1 63.6 14.3 81.8
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On one item 8.2 22.7 2.0 4.6
On two items 4.1 4.6 10.2 13.6
On three items 4.1 9.1 8.2 0
On four items 4.1 0 6.1 0
On five items 16.3 0 10.2 0
On six items 12.2 0 24.5 0
On seven items 38.8 0 24.5 0
On one or more items 95.9 36.4 85.7 18.2
Adequate (2-point) response
(Simplified term in parentheses)
I. Consult (Seek advice) 4.1 54.6 18.4 86.4
II. Attorney (Lawyer) 28.6 95.5 30.6 95.5
III. Interrogation (Questioning) 8.2 90.9 14.3 77.3
IV. Appoint (Choose) 16.3 72.7 18.4 95.5
V. Entitled (Deserve) 10.2 100 14.3 72.7
VI. Right (Choice) 10.2 59.1 8.2 54.6
VII. Statement (Your story) 6.1 50.0 18.4 90.9
Inadequate (0-point) response
(Simplified term in parentheses)
I. Consult (Seek advice) 73.5 13.6 69.4 4.6
II. Attorney (Lawyer) 49.0 0 32.6 0
III. Interrogation (Questioning) 87.8 9.1 57.1 9.1
IV. Appoint (Choose) 75.5 18.2 75.5 0
V. Entitled (Deserve) 77.6 0 79.6 18.2
VI. Right (Choice) 69.4 9.1 63.3 0




THE WARNINGS TEST SCORES, OVERALL RESULTS
Disabled Controls
(N = 49) (N = 22)
Mean total number correct of all 24 6.47 (27.0%) 21.50 (89.6%)
comparisons and questions (percent
correct)
Mean total number correct of 12 1.37 (11.4%) 10.45 (87.1%)
comparisons (percent correct)
Mean total number correct of 12 5.10 (42.5%) 11.05 (92.1%)
questions (percent correct)
Percent of sample Percent of sample
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TABLE 5
RESULTS FOR FIRST MIRANDA SENTENCE:
"YOU DO NOT HAVE TO MAKE A STATEMENT AND
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT."
Disabled (N=49) Controls (N=22)
All 6 comparisons and questions 1.33 (22.2%) 5.22 (87.0%)
Mean number correct (percent correct)
3 comparisons 0.29 (9.7%) 2.59 (86.3%)
Mean number correct (percent correct)
3 questions 1.04 (34.7%) 2.64 (88.0%)
Mean number correct (percent correct)
Total number correct Percent of sample Percent of sample





Fraction of subjects with correct answer 10.2 90.9
on comparison: "You do not have to say
anything about what you did."
Fraction of subjects with correct answer 20.4 95.5
on question: "Do you have to tell the
police what happened?"
Fraction of subjects with correct answer 30.6 81.8
on question: "Do you have to answer the




RESULTS FOR SECOND MIRANDA SENTENCE:
"ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED
AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF LAW."
Disabled (N--49) Controls (N=22)
All 6 comparisons and questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.84 (30.7%) 5.68 (94.7%)
3 comparisons
Mean number correct (percent correct) 0.31 (10.3%) 2.77 (92.3%)
3 questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.53 (51%) 2.91 (97.0%)
Total number correct Percent of sample Percent of sample





Fraction of subjects with correct answer 12.2 95.5
on comparison: "What you say might be
used to prove you guilty."
Fraction of subjects with correct answer 36.7 95.5
on question: "If you talk to the police,
can they use your story to get you in
trouble?"
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TABLE 7
RESULTS FOR THE THIRD MIRANDA SENTENCE:
"YOU ARE ENTITLED TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY
BEFORE INTERROGATION AND TO HAVE AN ATORNEY
PRESENT AT THE TIME OF THE INTERROGATION."
Disabled (N=49) Controls (N=22)
All 6 comparisons and questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.84 (30.7%) 5.18 (86.3%)
3 comparisons
Mean number correct (percent correct) 0.33 (11.0%) 2.59 (86.3%)
3 questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.51 (50.3%) 2.59 (86.3%)
Total number correct Percent of sample Percent of sample





Fraction of subjects with correct answer on 10.2 95.5
comparison: "You can have a lawyer now
if you ask for one."
Fraction of subjects with correct answer on 71.4 95.5
question: "Can you get a lawyer before




RESULTS FOR FOURTH MIRANDA SENTENCE:
"IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD AN ATTORNEY, ONE
WILL BE APPOINTED FOR YOU."
Disabled (N=49) Controls (N=22)
All 6 comparisons and questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.47 (24.5%) 5.41 (90.2%)
3 comparisons
Mean number correct (percent correct) 0.45 (15.0%) 2.50 (83.3%)
3 questions
Mean number correct (percent correct) 1.02 (34.0%) 2.91 (97.0%)
Total number correct Percent of sample Percent of sample





Fraction of subjects with correct answer 18.4 91.0
on comparison: "The court will give you a
lawyer free if you don't have the money
to pay for one."
Fraction of subjects with correct answer 38.8 100
on question: "If you are poor, can you get
an attorney?"
Fraction of subjects with correct answer 26.5 100
on question: "Do you have to have
money to get an attorney?"
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TABLE 9




Mean score (percent correct) 6.18 (61.8%) 9.23 (92.3%)
(standard deviation) (3.79)) (1.02)
Range 0-10
Percent of adequate (2-point) responses on items
1. Purpose of interrogation 46.9 81.8
2. Crime suspected 67.4 95.5
3. Information sought by police 44.9 77.3
4. Police feelings/attitude 57.1 81.8
5. Suspect feelings/attitude 69.4 90.9
Percent of inadequate (0-point) responses on items
1. Purpose of interrogation 30.6 4.6
2. Crime suspected 30.6 4.6
3. Information sought by police 36.7 0
4. Police feelings/attitude 40.8 0
5. Suspect feelings/attitude 28.6 0
TABLE 10
SCORES ON MIRANDA CONCEPTS TEST PART I: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Variable Disabled Controls
(N=49) (N=22)
Mean score (percent correct) 3.47 (34.7%) 9.32 (93.2%)
(standard deviation) (2.25) (.99)
Range 0-10
Percent of adequate (2-point) responses on items
1. Lawyer's defense role 22.5 81.8
2. Client's role 26.5 81.8
3. Information sought by lawyer 24.5 90.9
4. Reason to seek truth 16.3 86.4
5. Lawyer's defense potential 28.6 95.5
Percent of inadequate (0-point) responses on items
1. Lawyer's defense role 53.1 0
2. Client's 32.7 0
3. Information sought by lawyer 53.1 0
4. Reason to seek 71.4 4.6




SCORES ON MIRANDA CONCEPTS TEST PART MI. RIGHT TO SILENCE
Variable Disabled (N=49) Controls (N=22)
Mean score (percent correct) 1.78 (17.8%) 7.45 (74.5%)
(standard deviation) (2.02) (2.42)
Range 0-10
Percent of adequate (2-point) responses
on items
1. Use of confession 26.5 90.9
2. Freedom from pressure 8.2 81.8
3. Right is irrevocable regarding police 12.2 77.3
4. No penalty for asserting right 2.0 72.7
5. Right is irrevocable regarding judge 18.4 40.9
Percent of inadequate (0-point)
responses on items
1. Use of confession 61.2 0
2. Freedom from pressure 65.3 18.2
3. Right is irrevocable regarding police 83.7 13.6
4. No penalty for asserting right 98.0 27.3
5. Right is irrevocable regarding judge 81.6 59.1
TABLE 12
REGRESSION RESULTS: TOTAL SCORES ON ALL TESTS
Dependent variable: percent correct on all tests.
Ordinary least squares estimation, reporting: Coefficient (T statistic)
Column I Column 2 Column 3
All Subjects Disabled Subjects Controls




Age -. 001 -. 001 -. 001
(-0.667) (-0.708) (-.321)
Years of education completed .008 .003 .024
(0.979) (0.406) (1.634)
Earlier contact with police .104 .121 .006
(2.001)** (2.031)** (.096)
Earlier police contact and .001 .060 .042
received Miranda warning (0.009) (0.551) (.557)
Race -. 0490 .053 -. 051
(-0.867) (0.778) (-.770)
Sex -. 014 .029 -. 027
(-0.314) (0.551) (-.420)
Constant .767 -. 180 .584
(5.245)** (-1.171) (2.549)**
Number of subjects 171 49 22
Adjusted R2  1.703 1.388 .060
** and bold type indicate significance at 5% level.
2002]




Dependent variable: total score out of 14 possible on the Miranda Vocabulary Test.
Ordinary least squares estimation, reporting: Coefficient (T statistic)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
All subjects Disabled subjects Controls




Age -. 018 -. 014 -. 045
(-.629) (-.391) (-1.217)
Years of education .165 .108 .459
completed (1.225) (.705) (1.879)*
Earlier contact with police -. 294 .064 -1.327
(-.325) (.052) (-1.245)
Earlier police contact and .363 .823 1.610
received Miranda warning (.269) (.372) (1.279)
Race -1.129 .106 -1.237
(-1.153) (.076) (-1.107)
Sex .132 .876 -. 959
(.175) (.887) (-.901)
Constant 10.316 -3.314 8.178
(4.064)** (-1.060) (2.129)**
Number of subjects 71 49 22
Pseudo R2, adjusted R2  .645 .075 .308





UNDERSTANDING OF MIRANDA WARNINGS TEST
Dependent variable: total score out of 24 possible on Understanding of Miranda
Warnings Test.
Ordinary Least Squares estimation, reporting: Coefficient (T statistic)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
All subjects Disabled subjects Controls




Age -. 006 .001 -. 005
(-.180) (.023) (-.090)
Years of education completed .083 .021 .333
(.492) (.114) (.896)
Earlier contact with police 2.735 2.494 2.119
(2.404)** (L713)* (1.305)
Earlier police contact and -1.190 -2.092 .078
received Miranda warning (-.698) (-.790) (.041)
Race -1.215 1.702 -2.653
(-.984) (1.024) (-1.558)
Sex -. 410 -. 600 -. 056
(-.430) (-.509) (-.035)
Constant 19.914 -1.095 16.704
(6.229)** (-.293) (2.855)**
Number of subjects 71 49 22
Adjusted R2  .772 .171 .132
** and bold type: significance at 5% level. * and bold type: significance at 10% level.
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TABLE 15
REGRESSION RESULTS:
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS ON THE WARNINGS TEST
Logistic Regression, reporting: Odds ratio (z statistic)
Column I Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
All subjects Disabled All subjects Disabled
subjects subjects
Independent Dep. var.: Correct on "Do Dep. var: Correct on "Do you
variables you have to tell the police have to answer the police if they
what happened?" ask you any questions?"
Subject is disabled: .010 .052
IQ below 90 (-3.793)** (-3.628)**
IQ 1.019 1.008
(0.648) (0.363)
Age .996 1.007 1.037 1.035
(-.166) (.224) (1.551) (1.265)
Years of education .942 .940 .902 .888
completed (-.538) (-.504) (-1.046) (-1.119)
Earlier contact with 1.493 .854 2.020 1.754
police (.476) (-.156) (1.004) (0.649)
Earlier police contact 1.002 .527 .774 .685
and received Miranda (.002) (-.385) (-.226) (-0.248)
warning
Race 1.119 2.933 .438 1.258
(.115 (1.013) (-1.017) (0.243)
Sex .579 .309 1.092 .0912
(-.760) (-1.435) (.149) (-0.125)
Number of subjects 71 49 71 49




REGRESSION RESULTS: CONCEPTS TEST
Ordinary Least Squares Logistic Regression,
estimation, reporting: reporting: Odds ratio (z
Coefficient (T statistic) statistic)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
All subjects Disabled All subjects All subjects
subjects
Independent variables Dep. var.: Total score out of Dep. var.: Correct on
30 points on Concepts Test. whether judge can force
defendant to testify.
Subject is disabled: IQ -11.933 .369
below 90 (-5.830)** (-1.250)
IQ .306 1.018
(5.896)** (.672)
Age -. 009 -. 009 1.003 1.002
(-.145) (-.141) (.120) (.046)
Years of education .275 .132 1.018 .995
completed (.968) (.512) (.166) (-.041)
Earlier contact with police 5.165 6.079 1.333 2.277
(2.709)** (2.978)** (.398) (.771)
Earlier police contact and .601 3.040 .208 .345
received Miranda warning (.210) (.819) (-1.394) (-.589)
Race -. 013 3.588 5.147 10.28
(-.006) (1.539) (2.186)** (2.098)**
Sex -. 994 .760 1.481 4.395
(-.622) (.459) (.613) (1.431)
Constant 19.905 -9.917
(3.715)** (-1.891)**
Number of subjects 71 49 71 49
Adjusted R2 .547 .512
** and bold type: significance at 5% level.
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TABLE 17
REGRESSION RESULTS:
IMPROVEMENT ON SIMPLIFIED MIRANDA VOCABULARY TEST
495
Dependent variable: Difference in score on Miranda Vocabulary Test and Simplified
Miranda Vocabulary Test.
Ordinary least squares estimation, reporting: Coefficient (T statistic)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
All subjects Disabled subjects Controls




Age -. 039 -. 068 .030
(-1.876)** (-2.432)** (1.559)
Years of education -. 066 -. 119 -. 028
completed (-.669) (-1.009) (-.218)
Earlier contact with police 1.230 1.239 .198
(1.870)** (1.332) (.352)
Earlier police contact and -. 083 2.311 -1.684
received Miranda warning (-.085) (1.367) (-2.S35)**
Race -. 530 -1.153 .643
(-.743) (-1.085) (1.090)
Sex .018 .476 1.059
(.033) (.631) (L.887)*
Constant 2.455 2.918 -. 525
(1.329) (1.221) (-.259)
Number of subjects 71 49 22
Adjusted R2  .018 .119 .172
** and bold type: significance at 5% level. * and bold type: significance at 10% level.
